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Summary 
 
Globalization and growing demand for high-quality food have facilitated and increased international 
trade in food products and at the same time opened up new and promising business opportunities for 
farmers worldwide. Given this trend, the expansion of smallholders´ income opportunities through 
their participation in high value chains been promoted as a promising measure to promote rural 
economic growth and contribute to poverty reduction.  Linking small farmers to global markets 
through contract farming has become an important policy recommendation aiming to increase farmers’ 
income and foster rural development. Different studies conclude that the access to these new markets 
has a positive impact on rural welfare either through product or labor markets (Maertens and Swinnen 
2009; Bellemare 2012; Minten et al. 2009). Moreover, contractual arrangements can provide farmers 
in developing countries with a secure market and thus potentially support investments into farm-level 
upgrading and standard adoption.  However, overcoming the initial constraints and gaining access to 
the export market may not be sufficient to guarantee sustained benefits from market participation in 
the long run. Some of the arrangements involving small farmers have been reported to loose 
participants or collapse over time.  Constructing a sustainable marketing relationship also depends on 
whether both actors fulfill the terms of the contract and on the relational capital that is built through 
the interactions. Trust is a part of this capital that can discourage opportunism and facilitate the 
compliance of contracts, especially in regions with expensive or weak legal systems.  Nevertheless, 
both topics: contract compliance and trust in the agribusiness context, has been addressed to our 
knowledge only by very few authors and from a theoretical point or view.  Empirical studies to 
understand the dynamics of small farmers´ participation in high value chains in the long run are still 
missing.      
This dissertation is an empirical analysis of the dynamics of two small farmers´ high value chains 
supplying the export market and how they are affected by transaction risks.  It is based on the study of 
two cases:  broccoli in Ecuador and pineapple in Costa Rica.    Both cases represent typical 
agricultural value chains for fresh products characterized by vertically coordinated agribusiness 
producing for the export market and with high quality requirements.       
First, an analysis of the extent of broccoli smallholders´ participation in the export market over an 11-
year time period using correlated random effects and diff-GMM models is conducted.  Jointly, the 
hazards of dropping out of the export chain based on a multi-spell cox duration model are also 
estimated (chapter two). Results suggest that small-scale farmers' exit from the export sector is 
accelerated by hold-ups experienced in the past and that family ties and being a member in a famers´ 
group play an important role in farmers' marketing decisions. Negative external shocks – such as the 
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bankruptcy of the main buyer in our case study – represent a major threat towards the sustainability of 
this chain.    
In a second study (chapter 3), an artefactual framed field experiment with prior signaling is played 
with a sub-sample of 180 broccoli farmers to explore the effect of opportunistic behavior on their trust.  
The results reveal that this group of individuals has lower than average trust towards unknown people. 
Furthermore, signal that mimics the payment of a loan before the predesigned trust game is used to 
unravel farmer´s behavior when facing possible opportunism.  Results show that a positive signal 
increases trust, but a negative signal has no effect on it.   Reacting slowly to external negative signs 
can threaten individuals who fail to protect themselves rapidly towards opportunism. If farmers do not 
react quickly enough, they might face larger losses that can threaten their presence in the chain.      
A third approach uses data from a household survey conducted with pineapple growers in Costa Rica 
and analyzes the determinants of contract choice and the dynamics of standard adoption. An 
evaluation of the effects of different market arrangements on pineapple revenues, transaction risks and 
relational capital is also carried out. The study reveals that while contracts represent an important 
catalyst for farm-level upgrading, major transaction risks in the supply chain remain unresolved. In 
particular, farmers in formal contract schemes face high rejection rates and long payment delays.  
Verbal agreements appear to be a flexible option for farmers which lead to an increase in total 
revenues, low transaction risks and higher levels of trust and loyalty towards the buyer.  
The thesis concludes by summarizing the main results of this work and its contribution to the literature 
in the field of rural development.  Policy recommendations are also developed in an attempt to 
contribute with propositions that could improve the current state of agribusinesses and achieve more 
stable relations between small farmers and exporting firms.  I further state the limitations of the study 
and ideas for future research.    
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1.1. General Introduction 
Agriculture plays a central role in poverty reduction which ranks as one of the most important goals 
set by the United Nations aiming to increase the living standards of the world population. In the 
developing world, three out of four poor people1  live in rural areas (World Bank 2007) where there 
are around 500 million farms of less than 2 hectares (Wiggins et al. 2010).  For these people, who also 
have to cope with undernourishment, agriculture is the main source of livelihoods and job 
opportunities (FAO, IFAD and WFP 2013; World Bank 2007). Evidence suggests that investing in 
agriculture is 2.5 to 3 times more effective for increasing income levels of the poor (World Bank 
2007).  In the same way, achieving agricultural growth lifts more people out of poverty in comparison 
to what can be accomplished by promoting growth in other sectors (Diao et al. 2007)   Therefore, great 
efforts have been made to stimulate agricultural and rural development. International, governmental 
and non-governmental organizations have focused on improving farmer and agro-industrial access to 
markets. The production of non-traditional fruits and vegetables for high value markets has been a 
strategy of developing countries to generate income and partially diversify exports from traditional 
products (Llambi 1994).  Nonetheless, there is still work to be done on understanding and reducing the 
risks faced by producers once they overcome existing entry barriers and become food suppliers of high 
value markets (Cleaver 2013).     
In this context, supporting smallholders2 has become a priority. Peasant agriculture is part of a 
complex natural and social form of organization structured around family and community labor 
(Guarín 2013). As smallholders are more likely to be poor, raising their income has a direct effect on 
poverty reduction. Smallholders are also a source of temporal rural employment during periods when 
labor demands are not fulfilled by the family circle. Last but not less important,  these farmers are 
more likely to spend their income locally which further stimulates the rural non-farm economy   (Kydd 
et al. 2004). Studies suggest that smallholders in developing countries are efficient users of resources 
but poor (Schultz 1964; Wiggins et al. 2010), and therefore struggle to access all the necessary inputs 
required.  Besides the limited access to information and technology, smallholders also often face 
missing markets linked to a lack of credits, insurance and secure outlet markets that makes it more 
difficult to comply with the market demands (Key and Runsten 1999). In their process of integrating 
to world markets, these producers additionally face serious limitations caused by stringent standards 
and regulations set by importing countries (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Henson et al. 2005).  
1 Living on less than $2 a day.   
2 Smallholder, small farmer and peasant are used as synonyms throughout this document. 
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Nevertheless, participating in high-value markets can bring significant benefits (e.g. higher revenues, 
higher household income, higher productivity) to the small farmer population as pointed out in 
different studies  (Miyata et al. 2009; Minten et al. 2009; Bellemare 2012; Narayanan 2014; Maertens 
and Swinnen 2009).   This thesis focuses on the determinants of smallholders´ long term participation 
in high-value export markets in the context of evolving food safety and quality standards. Special 
attention is paid to the transaction risks faced by suppliers and the effects these have on marketing 
decisions and behavior. Factors influencing the form of vertical coordination adopted by suppliers and 
their implication on different scopes –income, transaction risks and relational capital- are also 
analyzed. The rest of this section provides the basic conceptual elements for understanding the 
emergence and development of contract farming and standards in high value chains in developing 
countries. Uncertainties and risks experienced by suppliers when participating in the export sector are 
also explained under the context of weak formal institutions. 
1.2. High-value export chains and standards 
In the past three decades global food chains have changed drastically due to market liberalization, an 
increase in foreign or domestic investments and an increase in the demand for food due to urbanization 
and increasing incomes (Reardon et al. 2009).  These huge structural changes have driven the sector 
towards the modernization of the procurement system (in order to reduce costs and ensure food 
security) and the appearance of high value markets demanding innocuous and high quality products. 
The modernization process involves the appearance of newer and stricter standards, the possibility of 
global sourcing, a shift from spot market transactions to vertical coordination and a higher degree of 
concentration at the wholesale, processing and retail level (Gereffi et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2012; 
Reardon et al. 2009).  There is a great amount of literature dealing with the restructuring process at the 
different stages of the chain that shows a tendency for higher coordination to ensure that supply meets 
the requirements of consumers (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Reardon et al. 2009).  This tendency has 
led to a consolidation process which in turn has brought about new challenges for participating 
farmers such as the increased power of buying firms that are now in the position to impose new 
requirements.  In contrast to the many benefits expected from small farmers´ participation in high-
value chains, some potential threats can also appear if adequate regulations are not in place.  Some 
studies claim that farmers can become dependent on a few cash crops, locked into unbalanced 
relationships and that tensions within the household or community can increase (Chemnitz et al. 2007; 
Cungu et al. 2008; Echanove and Steffen 2005; Key and Runsten 1999).  Furthermore financial 
benefits might appear not significant in some particular cases  (Narayanan 2014). 
After several scandals related to food security, governments and food retailers have tightened up food 
regulations triggering the emergence and proliferation of complex public and private standards. 
Nowadays, these new regulations do not only comprise food safety public regulations (e.g. pesticide 
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residues and food additives), but are also established by private entities and have expanded to cover 
quality, social and environmental issues. Actors within the chain –especially retailers- use private 
standards as tools to help coordinate supply chains by standardizing product requirements (World 
Bank 2007).  Moreover, private standards help differentiate their products from the competitors´ 
through signaling and in this way reach new markets where they can obtain a price premium that 
consumers, especially in the developed world, are willing to pay (Lee et al. 2012).  A growing market 
has developed nowadays for products with special characteristics such as organic, “fairly produced” or 
“environmentally friendly” (Hughner et al. 2007). These events have led to a debate on how the 
increasing numbers of standards affect producers´ participation in world markets. From a 
smallholder´s perspective, standards can act as a catalyst for farm upgrading (i.e. improve farming 
techniques and product quality) but these can also become market entry barriers given that compliance 
often requires new investments and access to information and networks (Henson and Humphrey 
2009). 
1.3. Linking small farmers through contract farming 
Contract farming has become a popular tool to solve the missing market problems faced by producers 
(e.g. no access to credits, insurances, technical support, information, stable outlet markets). Through 
an oral or written agreement a firm purchases the harvest of independent producers,  acquiring certain 
control over the production process without making high investments (i.e. the firm does not invest in 
land or engage in labor monitoring), and producers gain access to credit, information and a secure 
market outlet (Echanove and Steffen 2005; Key and Runsten 1999).  Moreover, contract arrangements 
can help smallholders to comply with high standard requirements.   
 
A firm will decide to work with the suppliers that allow the maximum possible profit to be obtained 
while minimizing risks (including food safety risks).  From a transaction cost perspective, firms  prefer 
to source from large farms to reduce procurement costs including negotiation, monitoring and 
administrative costs (Key and Runsten 1999). In addition, to facilitate traceability and standard 
compliance they prefer to deal with only a small group of suppliers (Dolan and Humphrey 2000). 
Different studies (Berdegué et al. 2005; Carter and Mesbah 1993; Dolan and Humphrey 2000; 
Reardon et al. 2007; Rao and Qaim 2011)  show evidence of smallholder exclusion from high value 
markets and mention that export companies or local supermarkets source only a small percentage of 
their produce from smallholders. However, these become attractive to firms when there is a scarcity of 
land and/or water, when the crop of interest is labor intensive or when larger producers have higher 
profit expectations and better marketing options compared to smaller ones (Barrett et al. 2012; 
Reardon et al. 2007; Wiggins et al. 2010). In countries characterized by a high fractionalization of land 
or where the access to it is limited by law, firms have no other choice than to incorporate smallholders 
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to their supplier base (Key and Runsten 1999; Raynolds 1997). This is also the case when the product 
is labor intensive as small farmers rely on family labor that is flexible to work whenever needed 
without any monitoring. A farmer, on the other hand, will be willing to participate in an export 
marketing channel if the incentives offered are high enough in comparison to the traditional market 
and if he has the capacity to make the required farm and non-farm investments. However, in reality, 
small producers in developing countries face limited access to the information and technology needed 
to cultivate and sell nontraditional products (Gibbon 2003). In addition, they frequently miss secure 
outlet markets and find it hard to get access to credit, insurance and factors of production, plus they 
endure high risks and information asymmetry  (Key and Runsten 1999). In response, contract farming 
has evolved as a support structure to help small farmers adjust to the new market requirements 
(Kersting and Wollni 2012) and reach global modern markets in a “competitive” way (Miyata et al. 
2009).      
 
To facilitate the relationship, negotiate better terms of trade and reduce transaction costs, producers 
have organized themselves into farmer groups that act as intermediaries who deal with the firm on one 
side and with individual farmers on the other  (Barrett et al. 2012; Kersting and Wollni 2012). 
Moreover, interventions of governmental or non-governmental institutions appear necessary to 
facilitate standard adoption, organize and support farmers´ organizations and stimulate relationships 
with private firms (Henson et al. 2005; Kersting and Wollni 2012; Poulton et al. 2010). 
 
Despite the tendency towards vertical integration, the constraints faced by producers and the potential 
problems that are associated with such schemes, high value food chains are still considered important 
links between small farmers in developing countries and wealthy consumers in developed ones. 
Participants who overcome the existing barriers and become successful suppliers of lucrative markets 
are expected to increase their income and improve their livelihoods. Several studies report successful 
stories involving smallholders and show an increase in their incomes and positive spillovers to the 
rural economy (Bellemare 2012; Maertens and Swinnen 2009; Minten et al. 2009; Reardon et al. 2009; 
Schipmann and Qaim 2010). 
1.4. Hold up problems 
Actors will engage and honor a contract as long as the benefits they perceive from this arrangement 
are greater than the costs.  Nevertheless, contract farming is not free of problems.  There is an ongoing 
debate on the advantages and disadvantages of contract farming from the producers’ perspective. 
Chemnitz et al. (2007), for example, points to the dangers and high dependencies that this structure 
could bring to producers in the long run.  Small farmers may find themselves locked in an unbalanced 
power relationship where firms are able to transfer all production risks and costs to their suppliers 
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(Key and Runsten 1999). Furthermore,  Echanove and Steffen (2005) list social differentiation 
between producers, loss of producers´ independence and increased gender inequalities as other 
negative effects of contract farming.    
In the course of the relationship, producers and buyers are exposed to moral hazards and hold up 
situations exerted by their business partners. According to Gow and Swinnen (1998), a moral hazard 
appears when “one party is subjected to the hazard that the other party will engage in activities that are 
undesirable” and hold-ups are ex post problems in which “each party worries about being forced to 
accept disadvantageous terms after it has sunk an investment”. The farmer, for example, can fail to 
deliver the agreed volume and quality on time because there is a better price in the spot market (i.e. 
side selling). In contrast, the firm can choose to  reject the product, lower the price ex post or default 
on the payment (Barrett et al. 2012; Cungu et al. 2008; Klein 1996).  This dissertation will focus on 
two hold up problems experienced by the farmer: (1) high rejections and (2) delay on payment. When 
market conditions are not favorable for the firm, higher quality standards can appear, producing higher 
rejections that become losses to the farmer if he struggles to find another buyer for his perishable 
produce (Echanove and Steffen 2005). In a similar way, delay of payment decreases the real price 
received by the producer and can cause severe cash flow problems. This practice is used by some 
firms as a way to get interest free loans from their suppliers (Gow and Swinnen 1998).  To our 
knowledge only a few studies have approached the topic in the context of food production and high 
value chains from an empirical point of view (Cungu et al. 2008; Gow and Swinnen 1998; Guo and 
Jolly 2008).  Getting access to adequate data to quantify the impact of hold ups on farmers’ decisions 
has been a challenge so far (Barrett et al. 2012; Gow and Swinnen 1998).  This dissertation adds to the 
existing literature by analyzing a panel data set from a collection center supplying the export market 
and containing detailed marketing information for all its suppliers.  Furthermore, the topic is 
approached from a behavioral point of view by collecting information on farmers´ decisions using a 
framed field experiment. 
Market agreements should be enforced through public and/or private mechanisms to secure their 
compliance. If third party enforceable mechanisms are well functioning, adequate contracts could 
decrease the risk for potential hold-ups but this is not the case in many developing countries where 
formal institutions are oftentimes weak and the cost to use the legal system is usually high (Torero and 
Viceisza 2011). The risks of experiencing hold ups can affect farmers’ agricultural production and 
marketing decisions (i.e.  decrease in farmers’ investments or decision to sell to other buyers), 
especially when markets and legal institutions are imperfect (Gow and Swinnen 1998). However, in  
the context of an unreliable and expensive legal system, informal mechanisms (e.g. trust and loyalty) 
can discourage opportunism and facilitate market transactions (Cardenas and Carpenter 2008; 
Fafchamps and Minten 2001;  Klein 1996; North 1990; Poulton et al. 2010).  Understanding farmers´ 
informal norms can help us unravel the causes for the lack of stability of high value chains where 
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farmers start side selling to alternative markets.  The alternative to high value chains, had farmers 
decided to look for an additional buyer because formal or informal institutions are not sufficient to 
enforce an agreement, are traditional markets. In such a market, transactions are regulated by price, 
while quality or standards do not play a major role.  Additionally, traditional markets are characterized 
by numerous producers and buyers.  Traditional markets can become alternative outlets for farmers 
with a diversified production which provide immediate cash as opposed to specialized chains where 
farmers have to wait at least some weeks in order to obtain the payment (Guarín 2013). Nevertheless, 
they are still characterized by information asymmetry problems and high transaction costs that 
increase the final price to the consumer.  
Establishing close ties between buyers and suppliers can increase performance in global supply chains 
by discouraging opportunism and enhancing market transactions (Klein 1996; North 1990; Fafchamps 
and Minten 2001).  The existing relational capital between the actors can be assessed by the degree of 
respect, trust and close interaction among them (Cousins et al. 2006).  It has been shown that trust has 
a positive influence on the development of agricultural trade: Lyon (2000), Höhmann et al. (2002), 
Fafchamps and Minten (2001),  Echanove and Steffen (2005) mention that in order to avoid contract 
breaching, firms attempt to establish links of trust, patronage and reciprocity with their producers.    
 
1.5. Problem statement and research objectives  
Factors influencing smallholder participation in modern markets, exclusion problems and the impact 
on welfare, as well as market failures and contract farming have been recurrent topics of research.  
Yet, the sustainability of these emerging chains has not been properly addressed. Some authors 
suggests that contract farming schemes lose participants or collapse over time (Barrett et al. 2012).  
Possible risks and conflicts arising within contract farming have already been mentioned, but the ways 
in which they affect production and marketing decisions and household livelihoods are still not well 
understood.  Recent studies have started to approach this topic (Andersson et al. 2015; Holzapfel and 
Wollni 2014; Carletto et al. 2010), but they make use of either a two year panel dataset or rely on 
recall data due to the difficulty of obtaining information for longer periods of time.  Thus, it may be 
argued that these are not precise enough to reveal the importance of transaction risks, or the effects of 
learning from past contract performance on present contract status (Gow and Swinnen 1998).  
Furthermore, studies on relational capital and the effects of hold ups in farmers´ behavior are still 
missing.   
This dissertation sheds some light on why food supply chains are not stable over time.  Our work 
questions the expected advantageous situation of smallholders once they overcome market failures and 
achieve export market participation.  Their low bargaining power and the obligations acquired during 
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the upgrading process (i.e. credits and inputs) leaves them in a vulnerable situation vis à vis large 
exporting firms. Even when organized, they still face high transaction risks which influence their 
participation over time.  A good understanding of the weaknesses in the farmer-buyer relationship 
within a high-value export chain will be helpful for identifying means of improving relations and to 
define policies that support weaker actors. 
The specific research objectives that will be addressed in the following chapters are as follows:  
1. To analyze the role of transaction risks on small farmers’ decisions to deliver their produce to the 
export market and to investigate determinants of withdrawing from a horticultural export chain 
temporarily or permanently. 
2. To examine the effects of firms’ opportunistic behavior in the form of delayed payment on small 
farmers´ trust and investment decisions. 
3. To analyze the determinants of contract choice and its influence on  standard adoption and to 
evaluate the effects of different market arrangements –signed contracts, verbal agreements or spot 
market- on revenues, transaction risks and relational capital.   
The research objectives are addressed in the context of two case studies carried out with export-
oriented smallholders in Ecuador and Costa Rica. Both cases represent typical agricultural value 
chains for fresh products characterized by vertically coordinated agribusiness producing for the export 
market and with buying firms powerful enough to impose their requirements and conditions on their 
suppliers.   
To approach the first objective, household survey data were collected from a random sample of 401 
small broccoli farmers in the highlands of Ecuador. These data was merged with records provided by a 
farmers´ group containing information on the quantity of broccoli delivered to the export market from 
2002 to 2012, the days to payment, and the quantity rejected by the exporter per delivery. Appropriate 
econometric methods were used to take advantage of the panel data and obtain precise estimations 
after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of farmers.  To analyze the second objective, a trust 
framed field experiment was run with a subsample of 180 broccoli farmers. The experiment measured 
how trust varies in our group of farmers according to a previous treatment that exposes participants to 
opportunistic behavior in the form of delayed payment.  The level of trust measured in the treatment 
group (farmers receiving either a positive signal in the form of on time payment or a negative signal in 
the form of delayed payment) was compared to a the one measured in a control group (farmers not 
receiving any signal) in order to understand the informal codes of conduct involving smallholders.    
Finally, to analyze the third objective, a database collected through a household survey run with 173 
pineapple farmers in the Huetar Norte Region in northern Costa Rica is used.   In this region, farmers 
use different market arrangements with their buyers and have adopted different standards throughout 
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time.  This diversity in terms of coordination mechanisms allow us to determine the characteristics of 
farmers opting for different paths and the implications they have for income, transaction 
characteristics and trust and loyalty.   
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows:  The second chapter deals with the effects 
of transaction risks on the dynamics of participation in a horticultural export chain. The effect of 
rejection and delay on payment on the extent of participation and hazard of withdrawal is modeled 
using different approaches to analyze panel data.  Chapter 3 analyzes farmers´ responses to 
opportunism from a behavioral point of view.  It quantifies the effect of delay of payment on farmers´ 
trust and investment decisions using an experimental approach.  Chapter 4 deals with the determinants 
of contract choice and the dynamics of standard adoption.  Additionally, it evaluates the effect of 
different market arrangements on three dimensions of the relationship: revenue, transaction risks and 
relational capital.  To finalize, Chapter 5 recaps the most important results of this work and presents 
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2. Dynamics of smallholder participation in horticultural 
export chains                                                                               




In this paper we study the dynamics of smallholder participation in export value chains focusing on the 
example of small-scale broccoli producers in the highlands of Ecuador. We analyze the extent of 
participation over an 11-year time period using correlated random effects and diff-GMM models and 
explain the hazards of dropping out of the export chain based on a multi-spell cox duration model. The 
empirical results suggest that small-scale farmers' exit from the export sector is accelerated by hold-
ups experienced in the past and that family ties play an important role in farmers' marketing decisions. 
Negative external shocks – such as the global financial crisis starting in 2007 that was associated with 
the bankruptcy of the main buyer in our case study – represent a major threat towards the 
sustainability of smallholder inclusion in high-value chains.  
 





During the past three decades the agri-food industry has undergone rapid structural changes. The 
growing demand for innocuous and high quality food has led to the modernization of procurement 
systems inducing a shift from spot market transactions to vertical coordination (Reardon et al. 2009). 
These structural supply and demand side changes have opened up new marketing opportunities for 
small-scale farmers in developing countries. Farmers' inclusion in global agri-food markets through 
producer groups and contract farming schemes is often considered a promising way to increase farm 
incomes and thus foster rural development (Braun, Hotchkiss, and Immink 1989; Kydd et al. 2004; 
Hernández, Reardon, and Berdegué 2007; Maertens and Swinnen 2009). Based on the argument that 
participation in high-value markets can provide an avenue out of poverty in rural areas, promoting and 
1  This chapter is co-authored by Meike Wollni.  The authors’s contributions are as follows:  both authors contributed to the 
conceptualization and design of the research.  CR implemented the survey.   Both authors contributed to the data analysis,  
interpretation of the results, writing the manuscript and revising it.  
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linking small farmers to these markets has become a main focus of donors and NGOs in recent years 
(Altenburg 2006). 
While the export of fresh products from developing to high-income countries has increased over the 
past decades, smallholders often face major barriers in their access to high-value markets (Dolan and 
Humphrey 2000; Henson et al. 2005; Schuster and Maertens 2013). An extensive set of literature 
dealing with the determinants of smallholder participation in modern food markets offers mixed 
results. Berdegué et al. (2005), Dolan and Humphrey (2000), Reardon et al. (2007), Schuster and 
Maertens (2013), and Rao and Qaim (2011) show evidence for the exclusion of small-scale farmers 
from high-value markets and reveal that export companies or local supermarkets source only a small 
percentage of their produce from smallholders. In contrast, Bellemare (2012), Henson et al. (2005), 
Maertens and Swinnen (2009), Minten et al. (2009), Reardon et al. (2009), and Schipmann and Qaim 
(2010) describe successful cases of smallholder inclusion that rely on institutional innovations, such as 
contract farming schemes.  
While these studies provide some evidence on the determinants of participation at a particular point in 
time, little research has been done on the sustainability of smallholder inclusion in high-value chains 
over time. This is of particular relevance as some evidence suggests that contract farming schemes 
regularly lose participants or collapse entirely (Barrett et al. 2012). Therefore, the dynamics of 
participation may be much more complex than suggested by cross-sectional studies and may also 
explain to some extent seemingly contradictory results. A few recent studies have investigated the 
dynamics of market participation focusing on domestic supermarkets in Kenya (Andersson et al. 
2015), export-related standard adoption in Thailand (Holzapfel and Wollni 2014), and the disadoption 
of horticultural export crops in Guatemala (Carletto et al. 2010). However, due to the difficulty of 
obtaining consistent data on farmers' marketing choices over several years, these studies rely on two-
year panel or recall data. These data are usually too short or not precise enough to reveal the complex 
dynamics of (multiple) entries and exits from a high-value chain and the relative importance of 
transaction risks for contract performance.  
The aim of this study is to address this research gap by analyzing the factors influencing smallholders' 
decision to deliver their produce to the export market as well as the decision to remain a supplier or to 
drop out temporarily or permanently from the export chain. We place particular emphasis on the role 
of transaction risks (i.e. payment delays and product rejections) that may influence and shape the 
farmers' marketing decisions. We thus investigate the effects of household characteristics and past 
experiences in the supply chain on the extent of participation (measured in terms of the quantity 
delivered to the export chain). Furthermore, we analyze the determinants of withdrawal from the 
export chain, taking into consideration that farmers may enter and exit the chain multiple times. 
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Our analyses are based on a unique data set consisting of original household survey data collected in 
2012 and the records of a collection center to which all broccoli from small-scale farmers destined for 
the export market is delivered. The records of the collection center contain transaction level 
information for every transaction of all the suppliers during the past eleven years (i.e. since it was 
established). Our data shows that a large percentage of small-scale farmers do not participate 
continuously in the high-value export market channel, but instead decide to abandon it temporarily or 
completely and return to the local market. Using panel data we can investigate the dynamic 
relationships within the supply chain while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity of farmers and 
for yearly shocks that may affect production levels (e.g. weather shocks, price shocks, etc.). 
The article is organized as follows. The next section gives background information on the broccoli 
sector in Ecuador. The third section discusses the conceptual framework for the empirical analysis. 
Section four provides information on data collection and develops the econometric models. Finally, 
section five and six present the results and section seven concludes.  
2.2. The broccoli market in Ecuador  
Broccoli was introduced as a crop in Ecuador in the 1990's and since then its cultivation has spread 
rapidly until it became the country's second most important non-traditional export product. In 2008, 
Ecuador became the 6th largest exporting country of broccoli and cauliflower (5th in value exported) 
with around 60 thousand tons sent to North American and European markets representing around 57 
million dollars (FAOSTAT, 2013). However, in the following years exports started to decrease, and by 
2010 Ecuador was relegated to the 11th place (34 thousand tons and 35.5 million dollars). Figure 2.1 
presents export prices and quantities of broccoli and cauliflower2 since 1992, showing a constant and 
significant increase in quantity until 2009 and after that a constant drop until present times (National 
Central Bank, 2013)3. During the same time, prices have been relatively stable spiking in 1996 and 




2 Data for broccoli alone are not available. 
3 The price/ton depicted in the graph was obtained dividing total broccoli and cauliflower exported per year by total income 
received obtained from national statistics. Therefore, it is the average of the price obtained in the international market, which 
increased over the years, but it does not necessarily represent the price paid by exporting firms to local producers. 
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Figure 2-1 Prices and quantities exported by Ecuador during the past decade. 
 
    Source: National Central Bank, 2013 
Initially, broccoli was only cultivated on large plantations and exported by a few processors, but since 
the year 2001 small-scale farmers from the Chimborazo province4 were linked to the export market. A 
few years later, small-scale farms5 represented one-third of the total broccoli area planted for the 
international market and the remaining two-thirds were cultivated by medium and large-scale farms as 
well as by the same exporting firms in vertically integrated production units6 (Gall 2009). 
Small-scale farmers were linked to the export market through a producer organization that served as 
an intermediary between farmers and the export firm. The producer organization established a 
collection center in the village in order to assemble the broccoli and send it to a private processing-
exporting firm (from here on referred to as exporter). This firm cut the broccoli into small pieces, 
froze it and exported it to international markets. The first eight months only members of the 
association supplied the export sector through the collection center. Over the following years, the 
number of members of the association remained constant and no new members were admitted. 
However, hundreds of producers from neighboring villages joined the chain as suppliers7.  
Between the exporter and the producer organization a written contract was signed, in which the 
volume, a fixed price, quality and payment conditions were specified. The producer organization 
relied on verbal agreements with smallholder farmers regarding the quantity and quality specifications 
of broccoli deliveries. A typical production contract system was put into operation with the exporter 
providing the plants through the collection center and facilitating access to inputs, credit, market and 
technical information. The farmers on the other hand were in charge of growing broccoli on their land 
4Small-scale farmers were supported by a local NGO to form a producer group and produce broccoli for the export market. 
5 Defined as farmers owning less than 20 ha (Gall, 2009). 
6 Large and medium scale plantations are located in the province of Cotopaxi and were not included in our analysis. 
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under the firm's technical direction and had to deliver the product to the collection center in order to 
pay for the services received.  
In summary, the broccoli harvest and post-harvest process consists of the following stages: i) prior to 
the harvest, the farmer has to decide where to sell his product according to its quality, which is 
assessed by a collection center's worker, ii) the broccoli going to the export sector is delivered to the 
collection center, where it undergoes a first grading process in the presence of the farmer, iii) the 
broccoli meeting the quality criteria at the collection center is further sent to the exporter, where a 
second grading process takes place, this time in the absence of the farmer8. Until 2010, the broccoli 
from different farmers was sent to the exporter in separate bins. As the overall quantity delivered by 
smallholders has decreased, the broccoli from different producers is nowadays mixed in the same 
container and sent to the firm. Therefore, since 2010 the quantity rejected by the exporter is divided 
equally among the farmers who sent their product with that specific shipment (on average one truck is 
dispatched every working day from the collection center to the firm). Finally, iv) the product meeting 
the exporting firm's quality requirements is accepted and the payment is made two weeks later 
according to the terms of the contract. Due to the fact that broccoli for the export market is harvested 
differently than that for the local market and due to its high perishability, the broccoli rejected at the 
exporter level can no longer be sold in the local market and thus represents a monetary loss to the 
farmer9.  
Nowadays, twelve years after the inclusion process started, a large percentage of small-scale suppliers 
have abandoned the scheme and the collection center faces a shortage of broccoli supplies. In 
consequence of the global financial crisis starting in 2007, the export broccoli chain underwent a 
major crisis in 2009, when the exporting firm sourcing from the collection center went bankrupt and 
left the scene without paying for the product delivered over several months. As a consequence, the 
collection center faced a liquidity crisis, and payments to farmers were delayed for extended time 
periods. Formal legal institutions have not solved the problem so far and the farmers' collection center 
still has a large debt to recover from the exporter. After their original buyer went out of business, the 
farmers' collection center established a new marketing contact with one of the remaining broccoli 
processors-exporters in the country. This exporter agreed to source from the collection center to 
supplement its own estate production. The contract scheme outlined above still applies in this new 
marketing relationship, and is re-negotiated on an annual basis. 
In personal interviews, the exporters have emphasized the existing demand for Ecuadorian broccoli in 
the international market and the constant need for new and efficient suppliers given land constraints 
8 The rejection data in our data set refer to the rejections at the exporter level, and do not take into account rejections at the 
collection center where the farmer can assist and verify the process. 
9 When harvested for the export market only the head of the broccoli is cut and the rest of the plant is left in the field, while 
for the intermediaries and local market the head has to be covered by several plant leafs. 
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that hinder the expansion of their own plantations. Yet, they have also pointed out their reluctance to 
work with smallholders because of the associated coordination problems, especially since there is a 
shortage of suppliers. When the collection center was booming with suppliers, trucks were filled faster 
and dispatched to the processing plant immediately. In addition, traceability was easier to implement 
since the broccoli from different farmers could be kept in separate bins. Nowadays, it takes longer for 
the truck to fill and the waiting time affects the quality of the product. Moreover, planning is difficult, 
because the exporter cannot rely on certain volumes being delivered by the collection center. 
Fig. 2.2 shows the dynamics of broccoli supplies to the collection center during the last decade. The 
amount of broccoli delivered to the export sector drastically declined in 2009 and since then has been 
further decreasing. Suppliers have joined and abandoned the supply chain at different points in time. 
The total number of farmers who have ever participated in the export sector is around 630 from eight 
different villages located in the province of Chimborazo. The largest number of suppliers (403 
smallholder farmers) was registered in 2005. Nowadays, there are only 108 active suppliers of which 
only 47 are members of the producer organization.  
Figure 2-2 Number of suppliers and quantity delivered per year to the collection center. 
  
    Source: Farmers' collection center records 
2.3. Conceptual framework 
Broccoli producers in Ecuador can choose between two alternative marketing channels to sell their 
produce: 1.) The spot market: coordinated by price and characterized by nonrecurring transactions 
with no prior arrangements and no promise of repeating the transaction in the future. It takes place at 
the local market or at small market points close to each community. There are multiple buyers and 
multiple sellers and payment is usually made at the moment of the transaction. 2.) The export market: 
characterized by vertical coordination between the parties to supply a fixed quantity of broccoli with 
certain characteristics, during a certain time period and at a constant price. The payment is usually 
Chapter 2. Dynamics of smallholder participation in horticultural export chains. 
Evidence from Ecuador                           19 
 
 
made 15 days after delivery and the closer relationship between the parties can facilitate the flow of 
information. While large-scale farmers are offered individual contracts directly with the exporting 
firm, small-scale farmers can only access the export market through verbal agreements with the 
collection center managed by the farmers' group under study.  
In order to participate in the export marketing channel, farmers have to fulfill stringent requirements 
related to the quality, quantity and timing of deliveries. The farmer's ability to meet these conditions 
determines the probability and extent of participation. In principle, we assume that farmers decide to 
participate in the export market if their utility derived from participation is higher than their utility 
derived from non-participation, or in other words, higher than their opportunity costs of participation 
(Barrett et al. 2012). The farmer's utility associated with participation in the export chain is influenced 
by several factors including revenues and production costs as well as the transaction risks associated 
with selling broccoli in the export sector. Based on the framework proposed by Williamson (1979) and 
extended by Hobbs and Young (2000), Table 2.1 summarizes the transaction risks associated with the 
commercialization of broccoli in the export chain compared to the alternative, i.e., the local market.  
Table 2-1 Transaction risks associated with export market participation. 
Transaction risks related to: 
Exposure in export market  
(compared to local market) 
Price uncertainty 
Timing of payment uncertainty 
Buyer uncertainty 
Quality uncertainty 
Relationship-specific investments  
(and related exposure to opportunistic behavior) 
Lower (annually fixed price)  
Higher (frequent delays) 
Lower (secure buyer) 
Higher (frequent product rejections) 
Higher (in particular after harvest) 
 
While certain types of risks are typically reduced through contract farming arrangements that link 
smallholders to export markets similar to the one studied here, other types of risks can be exacerbated 
(Barrett et al. 2012). Uncertainty related to the price and to finding a suitable buyer is usually lower 
compared to transactions in the local market, given that a purchase agreement exists with a secure 
buyer and the price is negotiated ex-ante, thus allowing farmers to plan production costs accordingly. 
However, new uncertainties may be introduced, e.g., related to the farmer's ability to meet strict 
quality requirements. Furthermore, even though an ex-ante agreement exists, the exporter may renege 
on the agreement10, e.g. by rejecting produce inappropriately or by delaying or defaulting on the final 
10 This refers to both situations in which the exporter is experiencing a negative shock and is therefore unable to fulfill his 
contract obligations as well as situations in which the exporter is behaving opportunistically. 
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payment11 (Barrett et al. 2012). When high quality requirements are defined, as in the export market, 
uncertainty surrounding the compliance with these quality criteria increases (in particular when criteria 
are difficult to determine objectively and depend on subjective assessment). As a result, the grading 
process, often performed in the absence of the farmer, is characterized by asymmetric information and 
can be susceptible to opportunistic behavior (as reported e.g. by Saenger et al. 2014). Furthermore, the 
threat of opportunistic behavior is exacerbated by relationship-specific investments incurred by 
farmers producing for the export market. In the broccoli sector, these become especially relevant after 
harvest, due to distinct harvesting technologies between the two markets. Thus, once the product has 
been harvested for the export market, the farmer is locked into the marketing relationship with the 
exporter, given that his second best option of marketing the broccoli elsewhere now tends towards 
zero12. We expect that the realization of these transaction risks, i.e., to what extent the exporter takes 
advantage of holdup opportunities, determines the gains accruing to farmers, and thus, in the long term 
the dynamics of smallholder participation in the export market. In particular, past holdups experienced 
by the farmer threaten the sustainability of the chain by reducing the farmer's willingness to invest, 
and thus the quantity of produce delivered, and – if transaction risks become too high – can even 
induce a farmer to drop out of the export market entirely. 
2.4. Empirical analysis 
2.4.1.  Data collection 
In order to disentangle the dynamics of small-scale farmers supplying the export market we collected 
quantitative as well as qualitative data on the marketing decisions of broccoli producers in Ecuador. 
Qualitative methods were used to collect general information on broccoli production and on the 
organization of the broccoli sector in the province of Cotopaxi – where the processing firms and large-
scale farms are located – and in the province of Chimborazo. In a first step, we conducted semi-
structured interviews with members of the farmers' group, exporting firms and government entities 
supporting inclusive business13 in order to understand the structure of the sector, its development since 
the 90's and the current state of the value chain. Subsequently, quantitative research was carried out in 
the province of Chimborazo, where the small-scale farmers are located. The farmers' association under 
study is the only organized group of smallholders producing broccoli for the export sector in the 
11 When payments are delayed, the contracting firm is effectively extracting rents from its suppliers by getting access to 
interest-free loans. Suppliers on the other hand experience economic losses and can face cash-flow shortages, especially if 
they are credit-constrained. 
12 In the local market, asset specificity is lower, because multiple buyers exist. Accordingly, even if one buyer turns down the 
produce, other equally good marketing options exist in the spot market. 
13 The main purpose of inclusive business is to link small/poor producers to the market in a sustainable way.  
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country. It has supplied exporting firms through contract farming for over a decade14. A household 
survey was carried out from November 2012 to February 2013 in nine villages of the province of 
Chimborazo. We covered all eight villages where former and active suppliers of the collection center 
live. In addition, we interviewed farmers who never participated in the export market living in the 
same eight villages and from a ninth village located in the same province (with the same infrastructure 
and climatic characteristics).  
Three categories of farmers were identified for the analysis: Active suppliers of the export market 
(current participants, n=108), former participants who stopped supplying the export market channel 
(former participants, n=522) and farmers who have always supplied the local market (non-
participants, n= approx. 1500). A stratified random sample was used to select farmers for the 
interviews. Given their comparatively small number, we decided to over-sample current suppliers in 
order to ensure sufficient observations for analysis. Current and former participants were randomly 
chosen from a complete list of active and former producers provided by the association. If producers 
were not available or did not agree to participate in the interviews, they were replaced with the next 
person on the list. Non-participants were selected using a random walk sampling approach. In order to 
obtain a comparable control group, households were chosen only if they have been producing broccoli 
during the last 12 months.  
The final sample is composed of 401 farmers: 88 farmers who still participate in the export chain, 195 
farmers who have dropped out of the scheme, and 118 farmers who have always grown broccoli 
exclusively for the local market. A structured questionnaire was used to collect information on socio-
economic and farm characteristics, agricultural production and marketing, group memberships, family 
ties and household assets. Information on farm size and on family members who have worked in the 
collection center was obtained for the past eleven years using recall data. The respondent's attitude 
towards risk was measured using an experimental risk lottery designed by Binswanger (1980), where 
real payoffs were offered. Enumerators visited each household and conducted a face-to-face interview 
of approximately 1.5 hours with a household member involved in the cultivation and 
commercialization of broccoli. The data collected for the current and former suppliers of the export 
chain was merged with records provided by the farmers' association containing data on the quantity of 
broccoli delivered from 2002 to 2012, the days to payment, and the quantity rejected by the exporter 
per delivery. 
14 Nowadays, smallholders can only access the export chain through a farmers' group given that firms do not sign individual 
contracts with small-scale producers. Sporadic participation in the export chain of non-organized small-scale suppliers was 
possible during the 90s and early 2000s.  
                                                          
Chapter 2. Dynamics of smallholder participation in horticultural export chains. 
Evidence from Ecuador                           22 
 
 
2.4.2. Model specification 
2.4.2.1. Extent of participation 
Each year farmers have to decide how much of their broccoli they allocate to the export sector and 
how much they sell in the local market. We model this marketing decision by analyzing the factors 
influencing the extent of participation in the export chain specifying the following model:  
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝜃𝜃𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜋𝜋𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
The extent of participation is measured as the quantity Q that farmer i delivers to the export market in 
year t15. Qit is specified as a function of previous deliveries Qi(t-1), the transaction risks experienced by 
the household in the previous period TRi(t-1), a vector of other time variant covariates Xit, and a vector 
of time invariant covariates Zi potentially influencing the marketing decision. The error term is 
composed of a time constant unobserved heterogeneity term (ci) reflecting the unobserved 
characteristics of each individual (e.g. management ability, motivation, cognitive ability, etc.), and a 
time varying error term (μit), which reflects external shocks that are non-systematic. If the farmer does 
not deliver any broccoli to the export market during a specific year, Qit is set to zero, i.e. the 
observation enters the analysis. However, transaction risks are not observed during years in which the 
farmer does not participate in the export market, resulting in missing values in the subsequent year, 
and thus giving our panel an unbalanced structure. 
There are three potential sources of endogeneity in our estimation: i) The decision to participate each 
year may be correlated with the constant unobserved characteristics of each individual (ci) (e.g. loyal 
individuals may participate more consistently, while others decide to participate only sporadically). ii) 
ci may be correlated with the independent variables (e.g. the motivation of a farmer can influence the 
quantity delivered to the export sector, but also the quality of the broccoli and thus the quantity 
rejected). iii) Controlling for persistence in supplying behavior may cause endogeneity, because the 
lag term of the dependent variable Qi(t-1) is likely to be positively correlated with the error term (due to 
ci) (Bond 2002). Even though we are not interested in the effect of Qi(t-1), Bond (2002) states the 
necessity to control for possible autoregressive dynamics in order to obtain consistent estimates of the 
remaining parameters. We propose two estimation techniques to address these problems: a) a 
Correlated Random Effects model for unbalanced panel data to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
(ci), and b) a First-Differenced General Method of Moments model, which eliminates ci and controls 
for the endogeneity of Qi(t-1).  
 
15 Qit equals zero if the farmer does not deliver any broccoli to the export market in a specific year. 
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Correlated random effects (CRE) model for unbalanced panels  
With panel data, one way of controlling for time constant unobserved heterogeneity (ci) is to use Fixed 
Effects estimators. This removes, however, all time constant explanatory variables (Zi) from the 
analysis, which are often of interest for understanding the drivers and barriers to participation. This 
disadvantage can be overcome using the Mundlak-Chamberlain approach, which controls for fixed 
effects by including a correlated random effects (CRE) estimator. Wooldridge (2010) show that this 
method is also valid for obtaining unbiased estimators with unbalanced panels, as long as we can 
assume that selection is not correlated with the time varying error term (μit).  
The CRE model allows for linear correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity term ci and the 
observed explanatory variables by including a vector of variables containing the means of all time-
varying covariates for each household as indicated in the following equation:  
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝛽𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜋𝜋𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑋𝑋𝚤𝚤� + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
where Xit contains all time-varying covariates including TRi(t-1), and 𝑋𝑋𝚤𝚤�  is a vector of variables 
containing the means of the time-varying covariates including the time dummies (Wooldridge 2010). 
In unbalanced panels, the calculation of means is based only on the selected observations that enter the 
estimation in the specific year (Wooldridge 2010). With this approach we eliminate the problem of 
self-selection based on ci and the endogeneity caused by possible correlation between covariates and 
ci. The model is estimated using Random Effects and standard errors are clustered at the household 
level to obtain estimates robust to heteroskedasticity and correlation among the disturbances as 
recommended by Wooldridge (2010). 
Generalized Method of Moments 
The second estimation strategy is First-Diff GMM developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). It uses 
first differences to eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity term (ci) and an instrumental variable 
approach to eliminate the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable (Qi(t-1)). For this purpose, 
further lags of Qi(t-1) in levels are used as instruments. The final model to be estimated is specified in 
the following equation:  
∆𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼∆𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝛽∆𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + ∆𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 |𝛼𝛼| < 1  
where ΔXit contains all differences of the time-variant covariates including TRi(t-1). First difference 
GMM is expected to perform poorly if the series used in the estimation are random walks or highly 
persistent (Bond 2002). A necessary assumption for the model is that the time-varying errors are not 
serially correlated. This implies that Qi(t-2) and past lagged levels are not correlated with Δμit and 
therefore can be used as instruments for ΔQi(t-1). The assumption of no serial correlation is fulfilled if 
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there is no second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals16. The validity of the 
instruments can be tested using the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions.  
An indication of the consistency of α can be obtained by comparing the first-differenced GMM results 
with those obtained with OLS and Fixed Effects. Since Qi(t-1) is correlated with the individual effects 
(ci), the OLS estimate is expected to be biased upwards. On the other end, the Fixed Effects estimate 
will be biased downwards, because of the negative correlation introduced between the transformed 
lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term. Therefore, a consistent estimator of α is 
expected to lie between the ones obtained with OLS and FE (Bond, Hoeffler, and Temple 2001; Bond 
2002). 
2.4.2.2. Dropping out of a high-value chain 
Time duration models estimate the probability that an individual switches from one stage to another 
given that he has not done so in the previous period (Dadi, Burton, and Ozanne 2004). We model the 
farmer's decision to withdraw from the export marketing channel, by estimating the probability that 
the farmer changes his position from participation to non-participation at the beginning of time period 
t, given that he has not done so before t. We organize our data in a discrete time fashion, where each 
farmer has eleven observations, one for each year of the time period under study (2002 – 2012). Given 
that the withdrawal from the export sector is conditional on previous participation, we exclude those 
farmers who never participated in the export sector from the analysis. The event of withdrawal is 
called failure, and we denote the discrete time to failure with T. The dependent variable is a dummy 
variable that equals zero in every year that the farmer supplies the export sector and one in the year he 
stops supplying (failure). Multiple spells are allowed, which means that farmers can decide to 
participate a second or third time after withdrawing. The spell or time of duration starts when the 
farmer starts supplying the export market and finishes when he decides to withdraw. A vector of time 
variant covariates (Xit) is included, which is fixed within the interval t and speeds up or delays the 
failure time of the individual. A vector of time invariant covariates (Zt) is also observed, which is 
constant over the whole period under study. 
The hazard function (α i), which characterizes T, is given by the conditional probability for the risk of 
failure in interval t (Fahrmeir 1997) given that the individual has not failed before t and is expressed 
by:  
αi(t|Xit,𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡) = Pr(Ti = t|Ti ≥ t, Xit,𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖) , t = 1, … , q 
16 First order serial correlation is expected in the first-differenced residuals even if the disturbances are serially uncorrelated. 
When using System GMM, second order correlation is present, therefore we limit our model to using only Difference-GMM.  
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Where  Ti = t denotes failure within interval t, Ti ≥ t denotes survival up to time t for individual i, Xit 
is a vector of time varying covariates including TRi(t-1), and Zi is a vector of time invariant covariates. 
The hazard function can also be expressed as a function of time (baseline hazard) combined with a 
vector of covariates acting multiplicatively on the baseline hazard and shifting it proportionally 
(Burton, Rigby, and Young 2003). Semi-parametric approaches in duration analysis, such as the Cox 
model, do not require any assumption on the distribution of the errors, and thus of the baseline hazard. 
Instead they rank the occurrence of failures and conduct a binary analysis on each observation, 
exclusively using the ranking of survival times (Cleves et al. 2008). The proportional hazard model, 
which we will estimate using the Cox model approach, is specified as: 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) = 𝛼𝛼0(𝑡𝑡)𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖) 
Where α0(t) is the unspecified baseline hazard, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 corresponds to the error term (frailty) of the model, 
i.e., a latent random effect within groups that enters multiplicatively on the hazard function. Given that 
in our data we have multiple observations per individual (multiple spells), we can expect that the 
failing times for each farmer are not independent from each other and thus the standard errors should 
be adjusted to account for this possible correlation. The option of shared frailty is used to account for 
this potential correlation, which is measured by θ and is assumed to have a gamma distribution 
(Cleves et al. 2008). As we consider time discrete (yearly data), it is likely that more than one 
observation fails at the same time (tied failures) and as a result the order of failures within this year 
cannot be established as required for the simple Cox model. Cleves et al. (2008) mention three ways of 
handling such tied failures, of which we use the Efron's method17. 
2.4.2.3. Potential determinants 
Among the variables potentially explaining the extent of participation as well as the decision to drop 
out of the export sector, we are particularly interested in the effect of transaction risks. In particular, 
hold-ups experienced in previous periods might increase the perceived risk of the transaction and thus 
have a strong negative effect on participation. Transaction risks are captured by the variables: a) 
payment delay(t-1) which is the average number of days the farmer had to wait for payment from the 
exporter in the previous year, and b) log_kg rejected(t-1) which represents the total kilograms rejected 
17 Efron's method is an approximation to the exact marginal calculation method for tied failures, where all the possible orders 
of failures within a group failing at the same t are taken into account for the final probability of failure at that specific time t. 
In Efron’s method the risk set used as denominator contains all the observations failing at time t, but is corrected using 
probability weights (Cleves et al, 2002). 
                                                          
Chapter 2. Dynamics of smallholder participation in horticultural export chains. 
Evidence from Ecuador                           26 
 
 
by the exporting firm in the previous year in logs18. We consider these variables strictly exogenous, 
which means that feedback from current or past external unobserved shocks has been ruled out.  
Regarding other transaction characteristics, the price per kilogram paid by the exporter to the 
collection center at time t is included in the model (price export market). This value represents a fixed 
price that is negotiated between the farmers' group and the exporter on an annual basis. In addition, we 
include a dummy that equals one if during 2012 the average price obtained by the farmer in the local 
market was below the fixed export market price of 2012. We use this variable as a proxy for low 
bargaining power in the local market. As we only have farmer-specific local market prices for 2012 
and not for the full study period, we implicitly assume that individual bargaining power remained 
invariable throughout the analyzed time period.  
Furthermore, we consider three distinct proxies for social networks and information access. First, we 
include a dummy variable that equals one if the farmer has family ties with workers of the collection 
center. Given that family ties play an important role in Latin American rural societies (Carlos and 
Sellers 1972), farmers may feel more obliged to meet their commitment and deliver their produce to 
the collection center, if a family member is working there. On the other hand, for the case of 
Madagascar, Fafchamps and Minten (2001) show that contracts are handled more flexibly among kin 
and thus deviations from the original agreement are observed more frequently. Second, we follow 
Moser and Barrett (2006) using the aggregate quantity delivered per village (aggregate village 
supplies(t-1)) as a proxy for community behavior and expectations. Moser and Barrett (2006) describe 
how the pressure to conform to behavioral norms established within a community can affect individual 
decisions. Therefore, if many village members are active suppliers of the export market and village 
leaders encourage participation, individual farmers might associate higher social acceptance with that 
particular marketing channel. In addition, higher levels of aggregate village supplies can also result in 
better access to information and lower costs of transportation for individual farmers. In the 
econometric estimation we consider this variable as pre-determined (it may be influenced by past 
external shocks) and use lagged aggregate village supplies to minimize endogeneity problems 
resulting from reverse causality. Third, membership in the farmers' group operating the collection 
center can facilitate access to information, e.g. regarding the conditions of export market participation, 
and to the services provided by the organization such as access to technical support and credit. In 
addition, members made monetary contributions to the initial investments of the organization and 
therefore have a stake in the business, which also makes them more likely to patronize the collection 
center. It is important to note that farmers became members of the farmers’ group when it was founded 
in 2001, and in the following years no new members were admitted.  
18 In the duration model, we do not control for the total amount of broccoli delivered in the previous time period, and 
therefore, instead of the absolute quantity rejected we include the percentage of produce rejected in the previous time period. 
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While often unobserved in empirical studies due to the difficulty of measurement, we also include the 
farmer's attitude towards risk as a potential determinant. This is particularly important in the context of 
our study, given that the farmer's risk attitude is likely to influence his subjective perception and 
evaluation of transaction risks. We played an experimental game with real payoffs proposed by 
Binswanger (1980) to obtain a measure of risk attitude. Six different gambling options were presented 
to each farmer at the end of the interview, each option with a different partial risk aversion coefficient 
ranging from extreme risk-averse (if option 1 was preferred) to neutral or negative risk-averse (if 
option 6 was preferred). Given that many of the interviewed farmers were illiterate, for each of the six 
options we presented them a picture of the sum of money they could win. The partial risk aversion 
coefficient was then calculated according to the farmer's choice as explained in Binswanger (1980) and 
normalized to a scale from 0 (low risk aversion) to 1 (high risk aversion). We expect that more risk-
averse farmers prefer the market channel associated with lower risk. Accordingly, risk-averse farmers 
may be more likely to participate in the export chain offering them a secure market and a secure price. 
On the other hand, if there is mounting evidence of increasing transaction risks, such as payment 
delays or product rejections, risk-averse farmers may be the first to drop out of the chain. 
To capture poverty, we use a dummy variable that equals one if the household received a 
governmental cash transfer (cash transfer), which is targeted to the poorest households in the country. 
Other variables capturing household and farm characteristics are included as controls, such as age, 
gender and education of the household head, number of household members, lagged farm size, and 
distance to the collection center in kilometers. In most specifications, we include interaction terms 
between a dummy variable for the period 2009 – 2012 and our main variables of interest in order to 
control for the time span after the negative external shock caused by the bankruptcy of the buyer. Long 
payment delays and payment defaults during this time may have jeopardized the trust of smallholder 
suppliers, negatively affecting their participation in the value chain. Year and village dummies are also 
included to control for year-specific macroeconomic effects and shocks as well as village-specific 
characteristics.  
2.5. Descriptive results 
Descriptive statistics for the covariates included in the models are presented in Table 2.2 as well as in 
Table A1.1 in the Appendix. Table 2.2 compares the characteristics for the year 2012 of farmers 
currently supplying the export market (current participants), farmers who dropped out of the export 
market (former participants) and farmers who have never supplied the export market (non-
participants). Descriptive results indicate that while most of the household characteristics do not differ 
significantly between the three groups, current participants have less education but more farming 
experience than former participants and in particular than non-participants. Geographically, current 
Chapter 2. Dynamics of smallholder participation in horticultural export chains. 
Evidence from Ecuador                           28 
 
 
participants are located closer to the collection center and further away from the local market, 
compared to both former and non-participants. We find no significant difference in the size of owned 
land (in 2012) between the three categories of farmers; only when taking into account rented and 
shared plots the total land size of non-participants is slightly bigger than that of current participants 
(significant at the 10% level). Yet, current participants are more specialized in terms of the area 
dedicated to broccoli production. Nevertheless, when looking at the income derived from broccoli 
production, we find no significant difference between the three groups. Furthermore, income 
differences, even though slightly lower for current participants, are not significantly different between 
the groups. According to our proxy for wealth (cash transfer), however, we do find evidence that 
current participants are significantly poorer than non-participants. Finally, we find significant 
differences between the groups with respect to social networks. A significantly larger share of current 
participants is member of the farmers' group and has family ties with workers at the collection center. 
Compared to non-participants, both current and former participants have a larger number of relatives 
producing broccoli for the local market and in particular for the export market.  
Large differences also exist between the three groups of farmers regarding the characteristics of the 
market transactions. First of all, we observe that only 22% of the current participants exclusively sell 
their broccoli to the export market. The majority of current participants, besides delivering to the 
export market, also deliver some of their produce to the local market. Yet, when compared to former 
and non-participants, their income obtained from local market sales is significantly lower, because 
some of their produce was destined to the export sector.  
Table 2-2 Household, farm and transaction characteristics in 2012, by participation status. a 




part. Sig. differences 
(no. obs) 88 195 118 ab bc ac 
Household characteristics       
Risk aversion  0.247 0.211 0.267    
HH members  4.17 4.18 4.32    
HH head age  48.35 47.23 46.58    
HH member off-farm  0.72 0.64 0.74  *  
HH head secondary education  0.19 0.23 0.35 ** ** ** 
Farming experience  10.23 9.59 8.14  ** ** 
Farm characteristics             
Distance to collection center (km) 1.37 4.51 10.02 *** *** *** 
Distance to local market (km) 13.25 12.05 9.91 *** *** *** 
Total area (solar)b  4.21 5.13 6.50   * 
Own area (solar) 3.73 4.3 5.07    
Broccoli area (solar) 2.61 1.95 2.07 ** ** *** 
Wealth related variables             
Cash transfer  0.70 0.6 0.52 *  *** 
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Total income (USD) 6412.09 7766.7 8576.87   ** 
Total farm income (USD) 2740.10 2777.32 3214.68    
Social Networks             
Membership farmers' group  0.48 0.24 0.00 *** *** *** 
Family ties 0.34 0.10 0.01 *** *** *** 
Relatives in local market 5.17 5.42 4.02  *** ** 
Relatives in export market 4.0 1.64 0.43 *** *** *** 
Characteristics of the transaction             
Broccoli income total 1117.91 1014.33 1101.99    
Broccoli income local market 635.12 904.72 1067.05   ** 
Collection center only 0.22 0 0 ***  ** 
Payment delay (local market) 4.2 2.65 1.81 *** * *** 
Payment delay (export market) 38.54 - -    
% rejection (in export market) 11.5 - -    
          
a Mean values calculated from survey data. An explanation of each variable can be found in Table A1.1 in the appendix. 
b Area is measured in solar. 1 solar = 1700m2  (approximately) 
*Significant at the 10% level ** Significant at the 5% level *** Significant at the 1% level 
 
With respect to the transaction risks, we can observe stark differences between the two marketing 
channels. In the export market farmers had to wait on average 38 days for their payment in 2012, 
whereas in the local market payment was made on average within two to four days after delivery. 
Similarly, stringent quality requirements result in relatively high rejection rates in the export sector. 
On the average, 11.5% of produce delivered by current participants was rejected in the high-value 
chain, while in the local market produce rejections are not an issue. In the export market, farmers 
received a fixed price of 0.25 US$/kg throughout the whole year (of which the collection center kept 
0.02 US$/kg to cover their costs), but in the local market farmers faced extremely volatile prices 
ranging from 0.04 US$/kg to 1.43 US$/kg (mean: 0.40 USD/kg, standard deviation: 0.24).  
When current and former participants were asked about the problems experienced in the export sector, 
over 70% reported payment delays and 30% mentioned that they were not paid at all, because the 
exporter defaulted on the payment (see Figure 2.3). Furthermore, around 35% experienced produce 
rejections. This reflects the high levels of uncertainty to which farmers in the export sector are 
exposed. Both delayed/lack of payment as well as produce rejections negatively affect the cash flow 
and/or income of smallholder farmers, which often do not possess the means and liquidity to 
compensate such losses. Finally, low prices and high quality requirements were considered a problem 
by 25% and 10% of the current and former participants, respectively. 
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Figure 2-3 Problems experienced by farmers in the export sector a 
 
aSub-sample of 283 surveyed farmers who ever delivered broccoli to the export sector. 
In spite of the perceived problems, over 60% of the entire sample (including non-participants) would 
be willing to produce broccoli for the export market and join a contract scheme, if it was supported by 
a legal document19 (Figure 2.4). The conditions that are critical for them to sign an agreement include 
secure payment (85%) and higher prices (50%). Less than 16% of the farmers mentioned the provision 
of inputs, training or credit as a condition to participate in the export market, thus providing some 
evidence for the existence of functioning factor markets in the area.  
Figure 2-4 Farmers's conditions for signing a new contract a 
 
 aSubsample of 254 farmers willing to sign a new contract.  
 
19 No particular buyer was specified in the question. 
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2.6. Econometric results 
When investigating the determinants of the quantities delivered to the export market or the factors 
influencing the withdrawal from the export chain, those farmers who never participated in the export 
chain (non-participants) are not considered in the analyses, given that participation is a pre-requisite 
for the subsequent decision of product allocation and withdrawal from the chain20. Nonetheless, we 
are interested to know whether there are systematic differences between those farmers who at some 
stage supplied the export market and those farmers who have never done so. To test for potential 
selection bias, we estimate a Heckman selection model based on the full sample (non-participants, 
former and current participants). In the first stage, a probit model is used to predict the probability of 
ever participating in the export market. In the second stage, for those farmers who have ever supplied 
the export sector the quantity delivered during their first year of participation is predicted. Estimation 
results are reported in Table A1.3 in the appendix. Rho is not statistically significant, indicating that 
sample selection is not an issue and farmers who participate in the export sector are not systematically 
different from those who supply the local market. In the following sections, those farmers who have 
never entered the export sector are not further regarded in the analyses. 
2.6.1. Extent of participation 
Table 2.3 presents the estimates from the Correlated Random Effects and First-Differenced GMM 
models on the determinants of the extent of participation. Models (1) and (2) include interaction terms 
of various potential explanatory variables with the time dummy 2009-2012 to control for the 
possibility of a structural break induced by the external financial shock. For comparison, columns (3) 
to (5) report additional model specifications and alternative estimators. Column (3) provides CRE 
estimates without interaction effects. Comparing results in columns (2) and (3) illustrates the 
importance of controlling for the structural break that is associated not only with changes in the 
magnitude but even in the sign of several coefficients before and after the external shock. 
Accordingly, the data provides strong evidence that supply patterns were adjusted in response to the 




20 In the model on the extent of participation, non-participants could enter the analysis by setting their amount delivered equal 
to zero. However, if they never participated in the export chain, they never experienced any transaction risks and accordingly 
drop out of the analysis due to missing values. Setting their transaction risk values equal zero would be misleading, because it 
suggests that they experienced no problems, when in reality they simply did not perform any transactions in the export sector. 
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Table 2-3 Results on the exteng of participation in the export sector. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Diff-GMM CRE CRE OLS FE 
Kg delivered(t-1) 0.504** 0.378*** 0.406*** 0.554*** 0.224*** 
 
(0.225) (0.0408) (0.0409) (0.0432) (0.0507) 
Transaction characteristics           
Payment delay(t-1) -9.749* -9.781* -3.267 -8.742** -8.868* 
 
(5.880) (5.221) (2.621) (3.548) (4.884) 
Log kg rejected(t-1) -2,330*** -460.3* -1,099*** 109.2 221.0 
 (822.2) (262.5) (178.2) (244.6) (275.4) 
Price export market 88.38 2,349 3,263** 452.4 -170.4 
 
(518.0) (1,665) (1,502) (514.2) (411.5) 
Low bargaining local market  213.8 147.3   
  (425.9) (243.5)   
Social networks           
Family ties  651.5 -648.2 -1,309 1,032 228.7 
 
(1,283) (1,225) (846.8) (947.6) (1,313) 
Aggregate village supplies(t-1)  2.439 0.111 1.517*** 0.565 1.723*** 
 (2.127) (0.709) (0.579) (0.463) (0.647) 
Membership farmers’group  1,758*** 454.7   
 
 (586.5) (360.2)   
      
Other control variables           
Risk aversion   643.3 -142.1   
 
 (551.2) (301.3)   
HH members 225.2 -1,664** -1,348* -3.644 -1,855** 
 
(1,046) (776.5) (765.7) (90.56) (780.7) 
HH head female  -16.97 204.0   
 
 (482.7) (359.5)   
HH head age -786.6*** -895.6 -407.7 14.24 137.8 
 
(286.7) (1,365) (1,273) (12.08) (223.8) 
HH head secondary education  -185.3 -222.8   
 
 (325.2) (319.9)   
Distance to collection center  7.124 -19.47   
 
 (66.69) (69.01)   
Own area(t-1) 731.2** 696.9** 528.0* 166.4** 665.0** 
 
(361.2) (277.5) (289.0) (65.33) (321.0) 
Cash transfer  -777.0** -295.1   
 
 (386.6) (223.9)   
Total years of participation  615.7*** 539.3***   
 
 (85.04) (84.81)   
Period 2009 - 2012           




















2009-20012 x aggregate village supplies(t-1) -1.717 0.873  -0.827* -0.0818 
 (1.108) (0.587)  (0.489) (0.463) 
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2009-2012 x membership farmers' group  -3,227***    
  (798.1)    






















-65,257 -77,014* -7,480 9,519 
  
(49,953) (46,588) (10,307) (14,358) 
            
Observations 1,108 1,480 1,480 1,483 1,483 
R-squared     0.5939 0.5717 0.498 0.430 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dummies for years and villages included in both models. 
Means for the time-variant covariates included in the CRE model. 
Probability weights are used to correct for sampling stratification in models 1, 4, 5. 
 
In the Diff-GMM model (column (1)) we address the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable kg 
delivered(t-1) by using lags two to five as instruments. A Fisher-type unit root test for panel data rules 
out the existence of random walks in the series used in the model confirming its validity (results are 
reported in Table A1.4 in the appendix). The Sargan and Hansen tests also show that the instruments 
used are exogenous to the lagged dependent variable and therefore valid for the estimation (results are 
reported in Table A1.5 in the appendix). Additionally, we find no autocorrelation of second order in 
the model using the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation21. Autocorrelation of first order is expected 
in first differences because Δµ t and Δµ t-1 share a common term (results are reported in Table A1.6 in 
the appendix). Controlling for potential endogeneity, the Diff-GMM estimates show that the amount 
of broccoli delivered in the previous period has a significantly positive effect on the amount of 
broccoli delivered in the current period. The coefficient estimate obtained from the Diff-GMM model 
lies between the OLS and Fixed Effects estimates, which confirms its consistency. The path 
dependency or persistence of deliveries reflected in this coefficient is in line with other studies that 
have reported a strong positive correlation between lagged and current horticultural export volumes 
(e.g. Schuster and Maertens (2015) for the Peruvian asparagus sector). 
Regarding transaction risks, we find – consistently across both models (columns (1) and (2)) – a 
strongly negative effect of past produce rejections on the extent of participation. According to the CRE 
model estimates, a one percent increase in the amount rejected in the previous year leads to a decrease 
in current deliveries of 4.6 kg. This effect is even further exacerbated by the crisis, after which a one 
percent increase in rejection rate is associated with a decrease in the delivered quantity by 17.6 kg. 
Once we adequately control for the endogeneity of lagged product deliveries, the Diff-GMM model 
21 The existence of autocorrelation of second order would invalidate the use of lags as instruments. 
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predicts an even stronger effect of product rejections ranging from a reduction in deliveries of 23.3 kg 
before the crisis to 32.7 kg after the crisis. Regarding payment delays, results are also consistent across 
both models, indicating a negative effect that is statistically significant at the 10% level. Accordingly, 
each additional day of payment delay in the previous period decreases current product deliveries by 
9.8 kg. The effect of payment delays on product deliveries remains unaltered after the external shock. 
The CRE model further allows us to investigate the relationship between potential time-invariant 
determinants and the extent of participation. First of all, a strong and significantly positive correlation 
is identified for membership in the farmers’ group. On the average, membership increases deliveries 
by as much as 1758 kg compared to non-members. This positive effect, however, reverses with the 
event of the negative external shock to the supply chain. After the crisis, members on the average 
deliver 1469 kg less to the collection center than non-members. This may be due to members having 
better access to information regarding the performance of the organization and thus being more aware 
of the difficult situation faced by the supply chain and reacting accordingly by reducing their produce 
allocated to the export market. Besides membership in the farmers’ group, the other social network 
variables (aggregate village supplies22 and family ties) do not seem to play an important role in 
farmers’ product allocation decisions among alternative market outlets.  
Finally, we observe that the quantity delivered increases with farm size, and that poor farmers deliver 
significantly less compared to non-poor households. These relationships are affected, however, by the 
negative external shock. After the supply chain is struck by the crisis in 2009, farmers with larger farm 
sizes reduce their produce allocation to the export market, even though the overall effect of farm size 
remains positive. On the other hand, the difference between poor and non-poor farmers becomes 
insignificant in the post-crisis period (joint significance of the coefficients on cash transfer and the 
interaction term: p= 0.1327). Finally, farmers with higher risk aversion respond to the crisis delivering 
significantly less compared to farmers with low risk aversion in the post-crisis period. 
2.6.2. Dropping out of a high-value chain 
Table 2.4 shows estimation results from the Cox model of proportional hazards analyzing the decision 
of current and former participants to exit the export market. The coefficients represent the change in 
the log odds of the outcome variable for a one-unit increase in the independent covariate, holding all 
other covariates constant. For easier interpretation, the hazard ratios are also provided, which were 
calculated by exponentiating the coefficients. A negative coefficient implies a negative change in the 
log odds of the outcome variable, which means a decrease in the hazards of dropping out of the export 
sector (hazard ratio < 1). On the contrary, a positive coefficient reflects an increase in the log odds of 
22 In the Diff-GMM model we instrument for the pre-determined variable Aggregate village supply(t-1) using the lags seven 
to ten as instruments. Sargan and Hansen test results are reported in the appendix and confirm the validity of the instruments.  
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the outcome variable, meaning an increase in the hazards of dropping out (hazard ratio > 1).  The 
empirical hazard function is visualized in Figure A1 (in the appendix). It represents the conditional 
probability of dropping out in each time period, given that the farmer did not drop out in the previous 
time period, but without taking potential multiplicative effects of covariates into account. Figure A1 
suggests that the baseline hazard of dropping out increases during the early years of participation stays 
relatively constant between years five to seven, and then increases sharply after year eight.  
Table 2-4  Results on the hazard of dropping out of the export sector. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
  Coefficient Hazard ratio Coefficient 
Hazard 
ratio 
Transaction characteristics     
Payment delay(t-1) 0.0042** 1.0042** 0.0032*** 1.0033*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
 % rejection(t-1) 0.0608** 1.0627** 0.0164 1.0165 
 (0.0285) (0.033) (0.0164) (0.016) 
Price export market -0.507 0.6021 -0.449 0.6384 
 (0.400) (0.236) (0.385) (0.246) 
Low bargaining local market -1.401** 0.2462** -0.599** 0.5490** 
  (0.706) (0.179) (0.293) (0.133) 
Social networks     
Family ties 1.173** 3.2319** -0.0512 0.9501 
 (0.494) (1.680) (0.255) (0.22) 
Aggregate village supplies(t-1)  -0.0001 0.9999 -0.0003 0.9997 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Membership farmers' group -2.452*** 0.0861*** -1.153*** 0.3155*** 
  (0.438) (0.038) (0.232) (0.069) 
Other control variables     
 Risk aversion -0.307 0.7356 -0.207 0.8132 
 (0.331) (0.275) (0.203) (0.175) 
HH members 0.0178 1.0180 0.0195 1.0197 
 (0.0466) (0.047) (0.0488) (0.047) 
HH head age -0.0066 0.9934 -0.0043 0.9956 
 (0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0066) 
HH head secondary education  -0.0929 0.9113 -0.0442 0.9568 
 (0.177) (0.174) (0.174) (0.181) 
HH head female 0.692** 1.9985** 0.315 1.3708 
 (0.288) (0.564) (0.239) (0.291) 
Distance to collection center -0.00439 0.9956 -0.00691 0.9931 
 (0.0282) (0.052) (0.0322) (0.053) 
Own area(t-1) -0.00687 0.9932 -0.0141 0.986 
 (0.0132) (0.02) (0.0126) (0.016) 
Cash transfer 0.403* 1.4969* 0.168 1.1831 
  (0.208) (0.337) (0.131) (0.174) 
Period 2009 - 2012     
d2009-2012 x days to payment(t-1) -0.00156 0.9984 
   (0.0024) (0.0027) 
  d2009-2012 x % rejection(t-1) -0.0554 0.9461 
   (0.0362) (0.034) 
  d2009-2012 x Low bargaining local market 1.018 2.7673 
   (0.744) (2.1358) 
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d2009-2012 x family ties -1.501*** 0.2228*** 
   (0.528) (0.129) 
  d2009-2012 x aggregate village supplies(t-1)  -0.0001 0.9998 
   (0.0002) (0.0003) 
  d2009-2012 x membership farmers' group 1.787*** 5.9721*** 
   (0.495) (3.019) 
  d2009-2012 x Risk aversion 0.111 1.1176 
   (0.411) (0.5069) 
  d2009-2012 x HH head female -0.822** 0.4395** 
   (0.419) (0.191) 
  d2009-2012 x own area(t-1) -0.0181 0.9821 
   (0.0259) (0.031) 
  d2009-2012 x Cash transfer -0.392 0.6756 
   (0.262) (0.185) 
  θ 1.03 e-7     1.03 e-7     
Observations 1538  1538  
Number of groups 278   278   
Log-likelihood -1174.67  -1188.75  
Standard errors in parenthesis: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dummies for years and villages included. 
Likelihood-ratio test of  θ: p=0.498 for both models. 
 
Column (1) in Table 4 provides full results from the Cox model of proportional hazards, including 
interaction effects and thus allowing for changes in magnitude and size of the coefficients after the 
structural break induced by the financial crisis. For comparison, we also report results without 
interaction terms in column (2). As in the extent of participation model, for several variables we 
observe substantial changes in the effects, both in terms of effect size and direction, after the structural 
break.  
The results of the full model (column (1)) show that the coefficients of the transaction risks variables 
regarding payment delays and rejections are positive and significant. Both a larger number of days to 
payment and a higher percentage of rejection in the previous period increase the speed of withdrawal 
from the export chain. Specifically, for each additional day the farmer had to wait for payment, the 
individual hazard rate increases by 0.42 percentage points. This can become an important risk factor 
considering that for the period 2004 - 2009 farmers had to wait for more than 60 days on the average 
for their payment (see Table A2 in the appendix). Moreover, for each additional percentage point of 
rejection (in relation to the quantity delivered), the hazard rate of withdrawal increases by 6.27 
percentage points. These effects remain unchanged after the supply chain shock. Finally, we find that, 
everything else held constant, farmers with low bargaining power in the local market tend to drop out 
of the export market more slowly, which is intuitive given that they have less attractive outside 
options. On the average, low bargaining power in the local market decreases the hazard rate of 
withdrawal by 75 percentage points. 
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We further find that having a family member who works at the collection center speeds up the process 
of withdrawal from the export chain, increasing the hazard rate by 223 percentage points. While this is 
unlike expected, it is likely that the enforcement of the existing agreement is hampered by family ties 
to the extent that farmers do not fear strong punishment when diverting their product entirely to the 
local market. Our results also confirm the findings of Fafchamps and Minten (2001), who explain that 
agreements are handled more flexibly, when actors are related through kinship. However, after the 
crisis (2009-2012) the effect of family ties reverses, decreasing the overall hazard rate of withdrawal 
by 28 percentage points23. Thus, farmers with family ties, while often pursuing short-term benefits in 
the period before the crisis, tended to support the collection center during difficult times. This may be 
a rational strategy, if farmers maximize family level (rather than individual level) utility and therefore 
seek to prevent the collection center from going bankrupt and loosing income from wage employment 
at the center.  
Membership in the farmers’ group has a negative effect on the log odds of dropping out of the export 
chain, decreasing the hazard rate of withdrawal by almost 91 percentage points, when compared to 
non-members in normal times. This result can be explained by the fact that members are also the 
owners of the collection center and thus hold shares of the enterprise. Nonetheless, the negative 
external shock also significantly affected the members of the association. Overall, after the crisis 
(2009-2012) the effect of being a member on the speed of withdrawal is still negative, but to a lesser 
extent. In this period, membership decreases the hazard rate by only 49 percentage points. This 
provides evidence of how the event of a negative external shock, in this case resulting in the 
bankruptcy of the main buyer, increases uncertainty in the supply chain and affects the loyalty of 
small-scale suppliers in the upstream segment of the chain. 
Furthermore, the speed of dropping out of the export sector is correlated with household-specific 
characteristics. We find that poor and female-headed households drop out faster from the export chain. 
For poor households, the hazard rate of withdrawal is 50 percentage points higher compared to non-
poor households. Similarly, for female-headed households the hazard rate is 100 percentage points 
higher compared to male-headed households. Interestingly, after the crisis the effect reverses for 
female-headed households, who now tend to remain longer in the export chain compared to their male 
counterparts. Compared to male-headed households, the hazard rate of withdrawal is 12 percentage 
points lower for female-headed households in the period 2009-2012. This marked difference between 
the two periods is likely to be related to the different transaction costs associated with the two market 
channels and the perceptions thereof of vulnerable population groups, such as female-headed 
households. For example, the bankruptcy of the main buyer led to large outstanding debts of the 
23 To calculate the effect of a variable in the period 2009-2012 the coefficients before and after this period are added and then 
exponentiated.  
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collection center towards farmers. More vulnerable households may be more inclined to stay in the 
export chain hoping to recover at least some of their payments.  
 
2.7. Conclusions 
This study combines cross-sectional and panel data to analyze the determinants of smallholder 
participation in the broccoli export market. We focus on the effects of transaction risks on the extent of 
participation and on the timing of withdrawal from a high-value chain. While previous studies have 
investigated the factors influencing participation in high-value markets and contract schemes, we add 
to the current literature by using longitudinal data, which allows us to identify the threats to the long-
term sustainability of smallholder inclusion in high-value export chains controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity of the farmers. Given that linking smallholder farmers to high-value markets is 
considered a promising tool for lifting rural households out of poverty, the identification of such 
threats is of paramount importance for designing and promoting sustainable value chains for rural 
development. 
Results of our analyses reveal that hold-ups experienced in the export chain substantially increase the 
uncertainty associated with market transactions in the chain and thus have a negative influence on 
farmers' participation. In particular, we find that farmers are especially sensitive to product rejections, 
which reduce the amount delivered to the export market in the following year and increase the risk of 
dropping out entirely. Delay in payments, although having a smaller effect, can also become an 
important source of uncertainty, in particular, when farmers are exposed to long payment delays. Our 
results further show that family ties play an important role in the farmers' decision to participate in or 
drop out of the export chain, however, the relationship is complex. On the one hand, if farmers have 
family members working at the collection center, they appear to be less loyal and take advantage of 
short-term benefits when these can be realized in the local market. On the other hand, after the 
collection center was affected by the bankruptcy of its main buyer, farmers with family ties proved to 
be more committed staying with the collection center during difficult economic times. This behavior 
could be explained, if farmers maximize household welfare, rather than the returns from broccoli 
sales. 
Association membership can increase the extent of participation and slow down withdrawal, but is no 
guarantee for farmers' loyalty during difficult economic times. In our analysis we find that farmers 
who are members of the association deliver significantly less in the aftermath of the crisis, possibly 
because they have better access to information and are more aware of the difficult situation faced by 
the enterprise. In our case study, members holding a share in the collection center are unlikely to be 
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expelled from the farmers' group even when they decide to market their produce elsewhere. 
Furthermore, members may still derive other benefits from the organization besides having a market 
outlet for their produce, such as preferential access to credit, training and external support even when 
they reduce the quantity delivered to their association.  
While we find no particular evidence for the exclusion of small-scale farmers from the export sector, 
we do find that poorer households and female-headed households tend to drop out faster, especially as 
long as the sector is still prospering. After the sector is struck by the crisis, female-headed households 
drop out more slowly and larger-scale farmers reduce their supplies to the export sector more 
drastically than small-scale farmers. This suggests that those farmers, who have better outside options, 
retire from a crisis-struck sector more immediately, while disadvantaged households may get trapped 
more easily in less profitable market arrangements.  
Based on our results, we derive some policy recommendations aiming to improve the long-term 
sustainability in high-value chains. As high rejection rates in the export sector have strong economic 
implications for farmers and thus negatively influence their participation, it is important to increase the 
transparency regarding the reasons for rejections. Saenger, Torero, and Qaim (2014) e.g. propose the 
implementation of a third-party control mechanism to increase transparency in the grading process. 
This could also be useful in the Ecuadorian broccoli sector, where non-transparent product rejections 
provoke farmers' mistrust in downward actors of the value chain. 
Furthermore, it should be a priority to reduce the risk of external shocks caused by the sudden 
retirement of an export firm and the consequent default in payment borne by farmers. There is an 
urgent necessity for a stronger legal framework regulating the finances in contract farming and the 
participation of small farmers' businesses in such schemes. In particular, adequate safeguards could be 
demanded from export firms to reduce opportunistic behavior and protect small-scale farmers from 
bearing the consequences of downstream actors' financial problems.  
Finally, farmers' businesses and organizations should be placed in a real network environment. Policy 
attention needs to shift from supporting and regulating particular organizations towards a whole value 
chain perspective. The debate about smallholder participation in high-value markets needs to graduate 
from the initial focus on facilitating access to a focus on how to make these business relationships 
viable and beneficial in the long term. For donors and practitioners this means for example that it is 
not sufficient to provide incentives for participation, but that more long-term business assistance is 
needed, for example improving bargaining skills and providing support to conduct legal actions when 
farmer association are affected by the opportunistic behavior of downstream actors of the value chain. 
 
Chapter 2. Dynamics of smallholder participation in horticultural export chains. 




Altenburg, Tilman. 2006. “Governance Patterns in Value Chains and Their Development Impact.” The 
European Journal of Development Research 18 (4): 498–521. 
doi:10.1080/09578810601070795. 
Andersson, Camilla I. M., Christine G. K. Chege, Elizaphan J. O. Rao, and Matin Qaim. 2015. 
“Following Up on Smallholder Farmers and Supermarkets in Kenya.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, February, aav006. doi:10.1093/ajae/aav006. 
Arellano, Manuel, and Stephen Bond. 1991. “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations.” The Review of Economic Studies 58 
(2): 277–97. doi:10.2307/2297968. 
Barrett, Christopher B., Maren E. Bachke, Marc F. Bellemare, Hope C. Michelson, Sudha Narayanan, 
and Thomas F. Walker. 2012. “Smallholder Participation in Contract Farming: Comparative 
Evidence from Five Countries.” World Development 40 (4): 715–30. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.09.006. 
Bellemare, Marc F. 2012. As You Sow, So Shall You Reap: The Welfare Impacts of Contract Farming. 
World Development 40(7): 1418-1434. 
Berdegué, Julio A., Fernando Balsevich, Luis Flores, and Thomas Reardon. 2005. “Central American 
Supermarkets' Private Standards of Quality and Safety in Procurement of Fresh Fruits and 
Vegetables.” Food Policy 30 (3): 254–69. doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2005.05.003. 
Binswanger, Hans P. 1980. “Attitudes Toward Risk: Experimental Measurement in Rural India.” 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62 (3): 395–407. doi:10.2307/1240194. 
Bond, Stephen R. 2002. “Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data Methods and Practice.” 
Portuguese Economic Journal 1 (2): 141–62. doi:10.1007/s10258-002-0009-9. 
Bond, Stephen R., Anke Hoeffler, and Jonathan R. W. Temple. 2001. GMM Estimation of Empirical 
Growth Models. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 290522. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=290522. 
Braun, Joachim Von, David Hotchkiss, and Maarten Dirk Cornelis Immink. 1989. Nontraditional 
Export Crops in Guatemala: Effects on Production, Income, and Nutrition. Intl Food Policy 
Res Inst. 
Burton, Michael, Dan Rigby, and Trevor Young. 2003. “Modelling the Adoption of Organic 
Horticultural Technology in the UK Using Duration Analysis.” Australian Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics 47 (1): 29–54. doi:10.1111/1467-8489.00202. 
Carlos, Manuel L., and Lois Sellers. 1972. “Family, Kinship Structure, and Modernization in Latin 
America.” Latin American Research Review 7 (2): 95–124. 
Chapter 2. Dynamics of smallholder participation in horticultural export chains. 
Evidence from Ecuador                           41 
 
 
Carletto, C., Kirk, A., Winters, P.C., Davis, B., 2010. Globalization and Smallholders: The Adoption, 
Diffusion, and Welfare Impact of Non-Traditional Export Crops in Guatemala. World Dev. 
38, 814–827. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.02.017 
Cleves et al.,. 2008. An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata, Second Edition. Third. Stata 
Press. 
Dadi, Leggesse, Michael Burton, and Adam Ozanne. 2004. “Duration Analysis of Technological 
Adoption in Ethiopian Agriculture.” Journal of Agricultural Economics 55 (3): 613–31. 
doi:10.1111/j.1477-9552.2004.tb00117.x. 
Dolan, C., and J. Humphrey. 2000. “Governance and Trade in Fresh Vegetables: The Impact of UK 
Supermarkets on the African Horticulture Industry.” Journal of Development Studies 37 (2): 
147–76. doi:10.1080/713600072. 
Fafchamps, Marcel, and Bart Minten. 2001. “Property Rights in a Flea Market Economy.” Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 49 (2): 229–67. doi:10.1086/edcc.2001.49.issue-2. 
Fahrmeir, Ludwig. 1997. “Discrete failure time models” Sonderforschungsbereich 386. Paper 9. 
Universität München 
FAO Stat 2013. http://193.43.36.221/site/342/default.aspx. Retrieved : 28.04.2013 
Gall, Julie Le. 2009. “El Brócoli En Ecuador: La Fiebre Del Oro Verde. Cultivos No Tradicionales, 
Estrategias Campesinas Y Globalización.” Anuario Americanista Europeo, no. 6: 261–88. 
Henson, Spencer, Oliver Masakure, and David Boselie. 2005. “Private Food Safety and Quality 
Standards for Fresh Produce Exporters: The Case of Hortico Agrisystems, Zimbabwe.” Food 
Policy 30 (4): 371–84. doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2005.06.002. 
Hernández, Ricardo, Thomas Reardon, and Julio Berdegué. 2007. “Supermarkets, Wholesalers, and 
Tomato Growers in Guatemala.” Agricultural Economics 36 (3): 281–90. doi:10.1111/j.1574-
0862.2007.00206.x. 
Hobbs, Jill E., and Linda M. Young. 2000. “Closer Vertical Co-Ordination in Agri-Food Supply 
Chains: A Conceptual Framework and Some Preliminary Evidence.” Supply Chain 
Management: An International Journal 5 (3): 131–43. doi:10.1108/13598540010338884. 
Holzapfel, Sarah, and Meike Wollni. 2014. “Is GlobalGAP Certification of Small-Scale Farmers 
Sustainable? Evidence from Thailand.” The Journal of Development Studies 50 (5): 731–47. 
doi:10.1080/00220388.2013.874558. 
Kydd, Jonathan, Andrew Dorward, Jamie Morrison, and Georg Cadisch. 2004. “Agricultural 
Development and Pro‐poor Economic Growth in sub‐Saharan Africa: Potential and Policy.” 
Oxford Development Studies 32 (1): 37–57. doi:10.1080/1360081042000184110. 
Maertens, Miet, and Johan F.M. Swinnen. 2009. “Trade, Standards, and Poverty: Evidence from 
Senegal.” World Development 37 (1): 161–78. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.04.006. 
Chapter 2. Dynamics of smallholder participation in horticultural export chains. 
Evidence from Ecuador                           42 
 
 
Minten, Bart, Lalaina Randrianarison, and Johan F.M. Swinnen. 2009. “Global Retail Chains and Poor 
Farmers: Evidence from Madagascar.” World Development 37 (11): 1728–41. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.08.024. 
Moser, Christine M., and Christopher B. Barrett. 2006. “The Complex Dynamics of Smallholder 
Technology Adoption: The Case of SRI in Madagascar.” Agricultural Economics 35 (3): 373–
88. doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2006.00169.x. 
National Central Bank, Ecuador (Banco Central del Ecuador) 2013. 
http://www.bce.fin.ec/contenido.php?CNT=ARB0000203. Retrieved: 15.04.2013. 
Rao, Elizaphan J. O., and Matin Qaim. 2011. “Supermarkets, Farm Household Income, and Poverty: 
Insights from Kenya.” World Development 39 (5): 784–96. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.09.005. 
Reardon, Thomas, Christopher B. Barrett, Julio A. Berdegué, and Johan F. M. Swinnen. 2009. 
“Agrifood Industry Transformation and Small Farmers in Developing Countries.” World 
Development 37 (11): 1717–27. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.08.023. 
Reardon, Thomas, Spencer Henson, and Julio Berdegué. 2007. “‘Proactive Fast-Tracking’ Diffusion 
of Supermarkets in Developing Countries: Implications for Market Institutions and Trade.” 
Journal of Economic Geography 7 (4): 399–431. doi:10.1093/jeg/lbm007. 
Saenger, Christoph, Maximo Torero, and Matin Qaim. 2014. “Impact of Third-Party Contract 
Enforcement in Agricultural Markets—A Field Experiment in Vietnam.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, May, aau021. doi:10.1093/ajae/aau021. 
Schipmann, Christin, and Matin Qaim. 2010. “Spillovers from Modern Supply Chains to Traditional 
Markets: Product Innovation and Adoption by Smallholders.” Agricultural Economics 41 (3-
4): 361–71. doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2010.00438.x. 
Schuster, Monica, and Miet Maertens. 2013. “Do Private Standards Create Exclusive Supply Chains? 
New Evidence from the Peruvian Asparagus Export Sector.” Food Policy 43 (December): 
291–305. doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2013.10.004. 
———. 2015. “The Impact of Private Food Standards on Developing Countries' Export Performance: 
An Analysis of Asparagus Firms in Peru.” World Development 66 (February): 208–21. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.08.019. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1979. “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations.” Journal of Law and Economics 22 (2): 233–61. 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey. 2010. “Correlated Random Effects Models with Unbalanced Panels”. 
Manuscript. Department of Economics. Michigan State University.  
 
 
Chapter 2. Dynamics of smallholder participation in horticultural export chains. 









Table A1.1. Explanation of variables 
Variable Specification 
% rejection  Percentage of produce rejected by the exporter; calculated as kg rejected/kg delivered*100 
Aggregate village supplies Total sum of broccoli supplies delivered to the collection center by village members; measured in metric tons 
Broccoli area Total land area cultivated with broccoli in 2012, in solar 
Broccoli income local market Income from broccoli sold in the local market in USD for 2012 
Broccoli income total Total income from broccoli in USD for 2012 (calculated based on survey data) 
Cash transfer  1 if household is eligible for government cash transfer program targeting poor households 
Collection center only 1 if farmer sold broccoli exclusively to the collection center in 2012 
Distance to collection center  Distance to the collection center in km 
Distance to local market  Distance to the nearest local market in km 
Family ties  1 if family member works at the collection center 
Farming experience Number of years the household has grown broccoli 
HH head age Age of the household head in years 
HH head female 1 if household head is female 
HH head secondary education  1 if household head has obtained secondary education 
HH member off-farm 1 if household head has off-farm employment 
HH members Number of household members 
Kg delivered Quantity of broccoli delivered to the export market in kg 
Kg rejected Quantity rejected by the exporter in kg   
Low bargaining local market 1 if average price obtained in the local market is lower than export market price in 2012 
Membership farmers' group 1 if household is a member of the farmers' group 
Own area Total land area owned by the household in 2012, in solar 
Payment delay Number of days after delivery until payment was received (in 2012) 
Price export market Price per kilogram paid by the exporter to the collection center in USD 
Relatives in export market Number of relatives delivering broccoli to the export market 
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Relatives in local market Number of relatives delivering broccoli to the local market 
Risk aversion 
Partial risk aversion coefficient calculated according to Binswanger 
(1980); normalized to a scale from 0 (low risk aversion) to 1 (high 
risk aversion) 
Total area  Total land area cultivated by the household in 2012 (owned, rented, and under sharecropping), in solar 
Total farm income  Total farm income in 2012 in USD 
Total income Total household income in 2012 in USD (incl. farm income, off-farm income, remittances, cash transfers, rents) 
Total years of participation Number of years household has participated in the export market 
Note: Land area is measured in solar: 1 solar = approx. 1700m2  
 
Table A1.2. Descriptive statistics for export market transaction variables per year 
Year Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
2002 
Kg delivered 112 5996.5 6056.514 127 30543 
Kg rejected 112 514.4375 471.3525 4 2511 
% rejection 112 0.095804 0.037142 0.02 0.2 
Days to payment 111 47.04505 13.62577 17 96 
2003 
Kg delivered 166 8587.723 7437.829 280 34066 
Kg rejected 166 594.5964 497.4679 11 2587 
% rejection 166 0.073133 0.02071 0.03 0.14 
Days to payment 166 27.21687 14.34345 6 101 
2004 
Kg delivered 164 9057.701 8087.636 160 34672 
Kg rejected 164 334.3841 328.599 2 1454 
% rejection 164 0.037744 0.028096 0.01 0.28 
Days to payment 164 68.52439 14.35759 23 153 
2005 
Kg delivered 168 9607.327 8490.575 203 34500 
Kg rejected 167 409.6048 376.4703 8 1724 
% rejection 168 0.042619 0.013939 0 0.14 
Days to payment 168 74.79762 12.74323 21 148 
2006 
Kg delivered 150 9049.487 7728.636 284 34109 
Kg rejected 150 638.5467 608.9711 15 3064 
% rejection 150 0.064867 0.024184 0.03 0.18 
Days to payment 148 68.53378 11.45082 37 115 
2007 
Kg delivered 171 10736.37 7757.177 432 34947 
Kg rejected 171 801.0058 1601.17 11 20261 
% rejection 171 0.070175 0.043811 0.03 0.43 
Days to payment 168 80.32143 34.4238 34 489 
2008 
Kg delivered 176 10588.84 8275.709 478 35275 
Kg rejected 176 1773.614 1932.781 21 11507 
% rejection 176 0.06125 0.021478 0.02 0.17 
Days to payment 176 144.8636 24.67396 66 236 
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Kg delivered 154 6019.455 5909.05 191 28781 
Kg rejected 152 406.9934 430.0803 11 2673 
% rejection 153 0.066994 0.032969 0.03 0.22 
Days to payment 120 200.575 94.74634 0 388 
2010 
Kg delivered 146 4495.548 3892.135 111 19194 
Kg rejected 146 389.2877 358.2424 10 1797 
% rejection 146 0.089795 0.044029 0.03 0.42 
Days to payment 145 49.62069 41.68184 0 367 
2011 
Kg delivered 132 4799.97 4512.431 152 23891 
Kg rejected 132 592.7121 539.3078 27 2794 
% rejection 132 0.133182 0.062362 0.05 0.55 
Days to payment 132 52.34848 35.7472 0 217 
2012 
Kg delivered 88 1999.545 1881.352 119 10232 
Kg rejected 88 229.8636 230.6466 6 1223 
% rejection 88 0.115 0.046312 0.01 0.23 
Days to payment 85 38.54118 26.77354 0 155 
Note: Calculations based on data obtained from the collection center's records. Only the households included in the 
household survey were used for calculating these values.  
Table A1.3. Heckman model estimates of initial export market participation and extent of participation 
Variable 
Probability of ever 
supplying export 
market 
Quantity delivered to 
export market in first 
year (kg) 




 Family ties  -0.0379 954.7 
 
(0.813) (1,748) 
Aggregate village supplies -0.000141 0.650 
 
(0.0002) (0.700) 
Risk aversion -0.0261 291.7 
 
(0.307) (948.6) 
HH members -0.183** 97.55 
 
(0.0724) (163.0) 
HH head secondary education -0.182 306.5 
 
(0.272) (807.1) 
HH head female -0.574* -1,802** 
 
(0.347) (771.6) 
Own area 0.0162** 163.3** 
 
(0.00744) (79.12) 
Cash transfer 0.106 -643.8 
 
(0.256) (623.3) 
Membership farmers' group 7.260*** 2,655*** 
 
(0.837) (819.0) 
Price export market 2.281*** 163.4*** 
 
(0.292) (43.56) 
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 Observations 401 401 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Wald test for rho: p=0.1816  
 
In the first stage probit model on the decision to ever participate in the export sector, we use the 
distance to the collection center as exclusion restriction. The coefficient is statistically significant, 
indicating that farmers located further away from the collection center are less likely to participate in 
the export chain. Furthermore, female-headed households and larger households (family size) have a 
lower probability to enter the export sector. On the other hand, land size (owned area), membership in 
farmers' group and export market price positively influence the decision to participate in the export 
market. The parameter 𝜌𝜌 is not statistically significant indicating that there is no systematic 
unobserved differences between export sector participants and non-participants. 
 
Table A1.4. Fisher-type unit root test for panel data 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots Number of panels = 283 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary Avg. number of periods = 5.75 
AR parameter: Panel-specific Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
  
  Statistic p-value 
Kg delivered     
Inverse chi-squared(128) 205.3834 0 
Inverse normal -5.3951 0 
Inverse logit t(324) -5.1144 0 
Modified inv. chi-squared 4.8365 0 
   Kg rejected 
  Inverse chi-squared(126) 261.311 0 
Inverse normal -8.0771 0 
Inverse logit t(319) -7.7579 0 
Modified inv. chi-squared 8.5238 0 
   Payment delay 
  Inverse chi-squared(128) 182.1162 0.0012 
Inverse normal -4.1785 0 
Inverse logit t(324) -3.8992 0.0001 
Modified inv. chi-squared 3.3823 0.0004 
 
 
Table A1.5. Sargan/Hansen test 
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Sargan test of overid. restrictions Prob> chi2 = 0.415 
(Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments)       
Hansen test of overid. restrictions Prob> chi2 = 0.164 
(Robust, but weakened by many instruments.)       
 
 
Difference in Hansen tests of exogeneity of instruments subsets 
 gmm(kg delivered(t-1), collapse lag(2 7))       
 Hansen test excluding group:  
 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.444 
 Difference (null H = exogenous):     Prob > chi2 = 0.130 
 gmm(aggregate village supplies(t-1),  
 collapse lag(7 10))       
 Hansen test excluding group:  
 
 Prob > chi2 = 0.695 
 Difference (null H = exogenous):     Prob > chi2 = 0.041 
 
Table A1.6. Arellano-Bond test for Autocorrelation 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences Prob > z = 0.004 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences Prob > z = 0.446 
 
Figure A1.1. Smoothed hazard estimate for farmer’s withdrawal of the export chain. 
 
 
The hazard function is the derivative of the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard which is the number of 
expected failures in the period (0, t) for a subject if failure were a repeatable event.  As the cumulative 
hazard can not be directly diffentiated, the hazard is estimated by smoothing the steps of the 
cumulative hazard with a kernel smoother.  This requires averaging values over a moving window of 
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data.  Near the endpoints, these windows contain insufficient data for accurate estimation, so the 
estimators contain boundary bias and are not plotted in the graph (Cleves et al. 2002).   
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Linking small farmers to global markets through contract farming has become an important policy 
recommendation aiming to increase farmers’ income and foster rural development. Nevertheless, some 
of the arrangements involving small farmers have been reported to loose participants or collapse over 
time. Trust is an informal institution that can discourage opportunism and facilitate the compliance of 
contracts in a setting with an expensive and weak legal system.  Nevertheless, the study of trust has 
been addressed mostly in lab experiments, but in the agribusiness context it has been addressed only 
by a few authors in a rather descriptive way     
We use a framed field experiment with prior signaling on a sample of 180 small broccoli farmers in 
the highlands of Ecuador to explore the effect of opportunistic behavior on small farmers´ trust.  The 
results reveal that this group of farmers has lower than average trust towards unknown people. 
Furthermore, we use a signal that mimics the payment of a loan by the B partner as treatment in the 
predesigned trust game.  Results show that a positive signal increases trust, but a negative signal has 
no effect on it.     Reacting slowly to external negative signs can threaten individuals who will not 
protect themselves towards opportunism. If farmers do not react quickly enough, they might face 
larger losses and will not be able to stay in business. In addition, if informal norms include weak 
sanctions, contract farming will be less likely and individuals will prefer the spot market were only 
one-time exchanges take place.   
 





Farmers´ inclusion in global markets as food suppliers is perceived as a way not only to increase farm 
income but also to foster rural development (Barrett et al. 2012; Braun et al. 1989; Hernández et al. 
2007). Based on the idea that participation in high value markets can alleviate poverty, linking small 
farmers to such markets has become an important focus of donors and nongovernmental organizations 
1  This chapter is co-authored by Meike Wollni.  The authors’s contributions are as follows:  both authors contributed to the 
conceptualization and design of the research.  CR implemented the game and did the data analysis.  Both authors contributed 
to the interpretation of the results.  CR wrote the manuscript and both authors revised it. 
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(NGOs) in recent years (Altenburg 2006).   Simultaneously, contract farming through formal or 
informal agreements has made this linkage possible by solving the market failures that confront 
disadvantaged producers2.    In practice, access to international high-value markets can be beneficial 
and sustainable only if existing agreements are honored by both buyers and suppliers. Even when 
governmental and non-governmental organizations facilitate smallholders´ inclusion, contract 
breaches and weak institutions may hold them back and threaten existing relationships among 
participants and in the communities where they live (Carletto et al. 2010;)  .  The consequences of 
opportunistic behavior under weak contract enforcement in developing countries have been addressed 
by only a few authors.  For example, Cungu et al. (2008) find empirical evidence using survey data of 
a decrease in farmers´ monetary investment as a response to delayed payments in Hungary´s 
agricultural sector. Nevertheless, the effect on farmers´ trust has not been quantified so far.     
Adequate institutions and enforcement mechanisms that deter contract breach are essential for stable 
business relationships.  North (1990) describes institutions as constraints that decrease uncertainties by 
providing rules of behavior that shape human interaction and facilitate cooperation. Institutions can be 
either formal, such as a country´s political and economic rule or informal such as a country´s culture, 
codes of conduct and norms of behavior.  Informal rules govern most of our daily interactions, 
whereas formal rules influence only a small proportion of our choices; thus, even when formal rules 
change quickly, it remains difficult to modify informal rules. When the legal system becomes either 
unreliable or too expensive, these informal mechanisms can become complements that both 
discourage opportunism and facilitate market transactions (Klein 1996; North 1990; Fafchamps and 
Minten 2001). This situation is particularly common in rural areas in developing countries, which are 
often characterized by weak legal systems associated with high transaction costs. In such a context, 
both trust and informal codes of conduct can provide structures that promote exchange (Cardenas and 
Carpenter 2008; Fafchamps and Minten 2001; North 1990). Analyzing how these informal codes of 
conduct are shaped can help us to understand interactions in supply chains involving smallholder 
farmers. 
Trust refers to the expectation of good behavior by others and is seen as a lubricant that both decreases 
the fear of opportunism and facilitates trade (Arrow 1974; Höhmann et al. 2002; Höhmann and Welter 
2002). According to Höhmann and Malieva (2002), the “degree of trust between people and towards 
existing institutions determines the structure, quality and efficiency of interactions and transactions.” 
The conditions under which trust is built, sustained or destroyed are important for understanding the 
existence of institutions and organizations (Torero and Viceisza 2011). Informal codes of conduct and 
opportunism affect the level of trust and the governance structures that guide trade in rural areas, such 
as contract farming. Thus, trustworthiness and reciprocity either reward or punish others’ behavior 
2 For an overview on contract farming refer to Key and Runsten (1999). 
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(Greig and Bohnet 2008) and in the absence of efficient external enforcement mechanisms, they make 
contracting possible (Morduch 1999).  
The correlation between trust and market development has been extensively studied. Prior studies 
show that trust has a positive influence on the development of trade; such studies include those of 
Lyon (2000) for the case of rural Ghana, Höhmann et al. (2002) for Eastern Europe and Fafchamps 
and Minten (2001) for Madagascar. The effect of market participation on trust has also been analyzed 
more recently. Siziba and Bulte (2012) conclude that a rapid entrance into markets decreases the level 
of trust in a society, and Fischer (2008) and Berggren and Jordahl (2006) find that frequent trade 
experiences under good economic institutions generate trust. In the same field, but using an 
experimental approach, behavioral economics attempts to quantify the level of individual trust by 
measuring the actual behavior of people under controlled game settings. In such games, individuals are 
offered real money as payoffs for the decisions that they make. The trust or investment game designed 
by Berg et al. (1995) has been used extensively to measure trust and reciprocity based on an 
investment simulation. The results show that individuals can both trust and reciprocate in anonymous 
relationships to achieve mutual gains and enhance cooperation (Berg et al. 1995). Using the same 
game, other studies have found that trust is higher in more homogeneous groups (Bouma et al. 2008), 
that men trust more than women (Buchan et al., 2008) and that women are more reciprocal than men 
(Croson and Buchan 1999).  
Experimental games are usually run with students in a lab, but studies have shown that their behavior 
varies significantly when compared to that of individuals operating under different social constraints 
(Anderson et al. 2012; Henrich et al. 2001).  This indicates that such data should be collected directly 
from the specific populations whose behavior is being investigated. To our knowledge, only a few 
framed trust experiments have been conducted with farmers in developing countries to study their 
behavior when facing specific problems,3 leaving room for further research to determine possible 
explanations for their observed decrease in cooperation in the long term. Given the characteristics of 
small farmers and the high costs of using the legal system in rural areas, informal institutions are 
extremely important for compliance with and the sustainability of payment agreements. In developing 
countries in which the rural economy is dominated by such small producers, studying the determinants 
of trust is important for the design of new programs and interventions that aim to create social capital 
(of which trust is an important component) and sustainable relationships.  
Our main objective in this paper is to explore the effect of opportunistic behavior in the form of 
delayed payment on small farmers’ trust and investment decisions.  Farmers exposed to payment 
delays should decrease their level of trust as a measure of protection. Conversely, a positive signal in 
3 Torero and Viceisza (2011) conduct framed trust experiments to analyze the effect of third-party enforcement and possible 
collusion in Vietnamese dairy farmers’ investment decisions. 
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the form of on-time payment should increase trust and encourage exchange. We use a field-framed 
trust experiment with prior signaling conducted with a sample of small broccoli farmers linked to 
different markets in the highlands of Ecuador. The game measures changes in trust by the change in 
the amount of money sent by the trustor after receiving a signal in the treatment group. Given that 
some of the invited farmers did not show up to the experiment, we correct for possible selection bias 
in the analysis that may be introduced if the farmers who participate in our game significantly differ 
from the rest of the sample. 
The article is organized as follows. The next section provides background information on the broccoli 
supply chain in Ecuador and on the farmers invited to participate in our game. Section three provides a 
conceptual framework discussing the definition and measurement of trust. Information on the 
experimental approach and the implementation of the trust game is given in section four. Finally, 
section five presents and discusses the results, and section six concludes. 
3.2. The broccoli export chain and small farmers in Ecuador 
Broccoli became important as an export crop in the Ecuadorian highlands at the end of the 90s and 
was considered a promising source of income for small farmers.  The inclusion of small farmers in the 
export chain was promoted by a local NGO, which organized a farmers´ group and established a 
collection center to gather the produce and sell it to an exporting firm.  The farmers´ group acted as 
intermediary between the exporter and the small farmers and an agreement specifying the volume, 
price, quality and payment conditions was made between the farmers´ group, the exporter and the 
suppliers.  The business relationship was not free of problems and during the past decade producers 
and buyers have been exposed to different transaction risks during the marketing process.  Suppliers 
for example have experienced hold ups when the buyer decided to reduce the price, delay the payment 
or increase the grading criteria. According to the contract, the payment for the delivered produce had 
to be made within a two-week period but in practice suppliers faced regular delays on their payment. 
When a payment is not made on time, the buyer is effectively extracting rent from its suppliers by 
getting access to interest-free loans (Gow and Swinnen 1998).  This problem worsened in 2009 when 
an exporting firm supplied by the collection center went bankrupt and left the area without paying for 
the received product. Consequently, the farmers’ group endured a liquidity crisis, and payments were 
delayed even longer than usual. Meanwhile, a large percentage of suppliers have abandoned the 
scheme, and the farmers’ collection center faces a broccoli shortage.  Figure 3.1 shows the average 
number of days the farmer had to wait for the payment and the number of suppliers working with the 
collection center during the past 11 years.  
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Figure 3-1Payment delays experienced by broccoli farmers and number of farmers supplying the 
export chain in the past 11 years.. 
 
   Source:  Farmers ‘group collection center records. 
Several studies mention the importance of trust to facilitate exchange and to construct a flexible and 
good relation (Cardenas and Carpenter 2008; Fafchamps and Minten 2001; Lyon 2000).  However, 
perceiving the buyer as opportunistic could negatively affect the suppliers´ trust.   Table 1 describes 
the level of perceived trust for two marketing channels (i.e. export market and local market) for a 
sample of broccoli farmers who are currently supplying the export sector (Current suppliers of export 
market), who dropped out from the export sector (Former suppliers of export market) or who sold 
their produce only in the local market (Never participated in export market). The level of trust for the 
local market is higher than the level of trust for the export market for the whole sample of surveyed 
farmers.  The construct for trust depicted in Table3.1 is based on 4 different statements rated by 
farmers on a five-point Likert scale during a household survey.   Based on these statements trust was 
identified using principal component analysis4.  All the surveyed farmers show similar levels of trust 
for buyers in the local market, but trust for the export market differs between the two groups involved 
in the export market.  Farmers who withdrew from the export market show lower levels of trust when 
compared to farmers who are still participating in the scheme.  However, different hold ups 
experienced (e.g: delay in payment and high rejection) could have had different effects on the way 
farmers´ perceive their buyers. This can also be determined by personal characteristics.  Furthermore, 
the group of former suppliers could have had a lower trust even before joining the export chain.   
Thus, the measuring of trust and how trust is affected by possible hold ups can be further improved.  
For this we conducted an artefactual field experiment with a subsample of the same group of farmers 
in order to quantify general trust and their response to a payment delay.   
4 For details on the statements used to build the construct as well as its validity (variance explained, loadings of the 
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export market   
(No. Obs) 
 
( 861) (174) (113)   
Trust in the export 




Trust in the local market 0.650 0.633 0.669 0.631 
   *** b   *** c     
*Significant at the 10% level ** Significant at the 5% level *** Significant at the 1% level.  a:  Significant difference in trust 
expressed for export market by current and former suppliers.  b: Significant difference in trust expressed for the export 
market and for the local market for the whole sample.  c:  Significant difference in trust expressed for the export market and 
for the local market by the group of former suppliers.    1 The number of observations is 74 when measuring trust in the local 
market for current suppliers 
3.3. Conceptual framework 
3.3.1.  Trust and enforcement mechanisms 
Berggren and Jordahl (2006) classify trust into two categories: particularized and generalized trust. 
Particularized trust is based on reputation and refers to trusting concrete actors who are known from 
past interactions, which leads to a decrease in transaction costs and the creation of sustainable 
relationships. In contrast, generalized trust is linked to social capital and refers to putting trust in 
unknown people. Different beliefs about others’ trustworthiness and the ability to elicit trustworthy 
behavior are some of the factors that influence a person’s willingness to trust (Glaeser et al. 2000). 
Yamagishi (2001) discusses high and low trustors in society. In the absence of any prior evidence, 
high trustors have high expectations that people are trustworthy, whereas low trustors expect the 
opposite. General distrust provides protection to individuals but simultaneously leads them into 
isolation. By not interacting with others, low trustors miss opportunities to develop their social 
intelligence, which could make them more vulnerable to opportunistic situations over the long term 
(Yamagishi 2001). Yamagishi (2001) finds evidence that because of this lack of social interaction, low 
trustors take more time to decipher signals from others and therefore their response is slower than that 
of high trustors.  
An individual’s trustworthiness, which is directly linked to reciprocity, makes a contract possible in 
the absence of external enforcement mechanisms (Bohnet et al. 2001). Greig and Bohnet (2008) 
distinguish between balanced and conditional reciprocity. Balanced reciprocity exists when the 
receiver repays an investment as if it were an interest-free loan. This approach characterizes 
populations with harsh economic conditions under which individuals must insure themselves against 
income shocks. Conditional reciprocity, in contrast, occurs when a relationship is seen as a 
partnership, with both actors profiting. In this case, higher trust is rewarded with higher 
trustworthiness, thus increasing the efficiency of the transaction. 
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Rational choice theory assumes that trust is a product of some system of rewards and penalties that act 
as incentives for the trustee to fulfill his duties in repeated interactions (Bacharach and Gambetta 
2001). Coleman and Coleman (1994) and Calvert (1995) refer to mistrust or the withdrawal of trust as 
a social sanction imposed on a person who has violated some norm. Nevertheless, it can be the case 
that a relationship with a partner may be too strong (family or friendship), such that maintaining it 
becomes more important than sanctioning opportunism. An absence of strong sanctioning can also 
occur if the affected person wants to avoid the reputation of being difficult to do business with, which 
could harm his future business relationships (McMillan and Woodruff 2000).  
3.3.2. Measuring trust 
The trust game designed by Berg et al. (1995) has been used extensively to study trust and 
trustworthiness in an investment setting. In the two-player game, player A is given the choice to send 
part of his initial endowment to an anonymous partner, B. The amount sent is tripled by the 
experimenter and delivered to player B, who then must decide how much of the received money he 
wants to return to player A. Anonymity is preserved during the game and in the original version, no 
repetitions are played to eliminate potential punishment and long-term strategies such as reputation 
building. Generalized trust is observed if player A sends part of his endowment to his unknown 
partner, who may not reciprocate. The ratio of B’s response to A’s initial decision is referred to as 
trustworthiness. Player B reciprocates if the amount that he returns is equal to or larger than the 
original quantity sent by A (Greig and Bohnet 2008). 
Signaling can be introduced to the game to reveal the players’ intentions. These signals can be used to 
establish if a partner possesses or lacks trustworthiness qualities (Bacharach and Gambetta 2001). 
Weele (2012) notes that when introducing signaling to a game, people can behave in a more calculated 
manner when giving their trust. Using a repeated trust game, McCabe et al. (2003) find evidence that 
certain players do consider their partners’ intentions when making a decision. Therefore, sending a 
credible signal is expected to guide trustors to make a more rational decision regarding how much to 
trust someone. We use prior signaling in our experiment to frame possible opportunism when paying 
back a loan. Thus, a private signal is sent by the B players to their A partners before the trust game is 
played. The B players are asked to decide whether they want to pay back a loan made by A on time or 
if they prefer to delay the payment and obtain an additional profit.  
3.4.  Experimental approach 
3.4.1.  Instructions for the game and predictions 
The first stage of the game is framed as a loan in which player A must send a fixed portion of his 
endowment to player B, and B must decide to either repay the loan on time or delay repayment. In the 
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second stage, the normal trust game is played after A has learned of his partner’s decision with respect 
to the loan. Neither player is informed that the trust game will be played in the second stage to ensure 
enough variation in B’s decision with respect to the loan. If B was aware of the second stage, he would 
be more likely to choose to pay the loan on time as a reputation-building strategy. To mimic the 
opportunity cost of money, a profit is awarded to the player holding the money from the loan. Because 
providing the loan is mandatory for players A, the profit for the first stage must be shared between the 
players. During the second stage, the profit corresponding to the loan stays with the person who retains 
the capital from the loan. According to the rules as conveyed to both players, player A expects 
payment for the loan once the first stage is complete (if A receives the payment on time, she will also 
obtain the profit corresponding to the second stage). Nevertheless, B can choose to default on the 
payment and keep the money to obtain the additional profit. If B chooses this option, he still must send 
the loan repayment at the end of the second stage.  
The game took approximately one hour, and the instructions were read aloud in Spanish and Quichua. 
To begin, all players (A and B) were given an initial endowment of 5 US dollars (USD), which is a 
half-day’s salary for an agricultural worker in the region. In the first stage, player A has to send a 1 
USD loan out of his initial endowment to player B. Player A expects to be paid back in the following 
move together with some profit. B receives the loan from his partner, plus 0.50 USD profit (P1). 
Player B immediately must decide whether to repay the loan on time together with half of the profit, as 
expected by his partner, or to delay the payment until the end of the second stage and to return only 
half of the profit for the time being (0.5P1). If B decides to delay the payment, he obtains an additional 
profit of 0.25 USD (P2) for keeping the money during the second stage. If B decides to repay the loan 
on time, the 0.25 USD (P2) goes to player A. The trust game (second stage) starts once player A 
receives a response from B in a closed envelope that contains the 0.5P1 (0.25 USD) and additionally 
either contains or does not contain the 1 USD loan. Now, the trust game starts.  Player A must decide 
how much of the remaining 4 USD5 he wants to send to player B (X). X is tripled by the experimenter, 
so player B receives 3X. Finally, player B sends back whatever amount he wants (Z) in return for his 
partner’s trust. Additionally, if player B delayed the repayment of the loan in the first stage, he must 
pay the 1 USD loan at the end of the second stage.  Figure 2.1 shows a graphic representation of both 
stages of the game.   Monetary payoffs for the control and treatment groups and the English translation 
of the instructions of the game are shown in the Appendix 2, sections A2.2 and A2.3.  
 
 
5 Regardless of whether Player A received the 1 USD back, all of the A players in the second stage can only decide to send 
part of the remaining 4 USD. The control group also received a 5 USD initial endowment, but similarly, they were able to 
send only up to 4 USD out of the endowment to match the conditions of the A players in the extended version of the game.   
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From our game, we make three predictions based on the existing literature. First, if individuals have a 
strictly increasing utility function for wealth, it is expected that the B players will behave 
opportunistically in the first move by delaying the payment and keeping the loan during both stages of 
the game (RA = 0 for all players). Alternatively, if at least one B player complies with the rule and 
repays the loan on time, then we can test how the A players react to this positive signal. Second, as in 
the original game described by Berg et al. (1995), if the A players infer their partners’ dominant 
strategy of keeping all of the money, they will not cooperate. Therefore, player A will not trust player 
B because B is expected to send nothing in return. Finally, our third prediction is that social norms 
acting as private ordering mechanisms that sustain cooperation should modify A’s trust according to 
the signal received from his partner. Thus, Player A should increase his trust when receiving the 
payment on time ( 𝑋𝑋𝑇𝑇 > 𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶 if  RA=1) and should decrease his trust to protect himself against a 
possible negative outcome when not receiving the payment on time ( 𝑋𝑋𝑇𝑇 < 𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶  if   RA=0).    
A: Loan 
B:    - 
A:     - 
B: Loan + P1 
A: Loan+0.5P1 
B: 0.5P1 
A: 0.5 P1 















Trust game*   
& Late payment 
Trust game*   
& Late payment 
A 
3X    B 
       A 
Trust = X 
Reciprocity = Z 
Stage 1:  Signaling * Stage 2 : Trust game 
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3.4.2.  Data collection  
A household survey was conducted with a random sample of 401 small broccoli farmers in the 
highlands of Ecuador between December 2012 and February 2013. Former and active export chain 
suppliers were selected from a list of producers provided by the farmers’ association and were 
interviewed in 8 different villages. In addition, households in the same eight villages and in a ninth 
village located in the same province (with the same infrastructure and weather characteristics) that had 
never participated in the export market were selected through a random walk. A questionnaire was 
answered by a family member involved in broccoli production and marketing decisions.  
A member of one of the 383 interviewed households was invited to participate in the game (there were 
too few observations on three of the visited villages so as to organize an experimental session).  
Invitations were made immediately after the survey took place and repeated in the days after through 
phone calls. The participants were required to be involved in production and marketing decisions for 
broccoli but were not limited to heads of household. The game was played with the people who 
voluntarily attended each session after receiving the invitation. Fourteen sessions were played in six 
villages with 180 small farmers, of whom 51% participated as export chain suppliers. The trust game 
with signaling was played in 12 of the sessions, and in the remaining 2 sessions, the trust game alone 
was played as a control. The final sample comprised 90 observations,6 of which 49 observations 
received a delayed payment, 23 observations received the payment on time and 18 observations played 
the trust game alone.  
   
3.4.3.  Determinants of trust 
Our primary interest is to analyze the effects of positive and negative signaling on small farmers´ trust.  
To this end, we specified the following outcome or main equation: 
(2)  𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾𝛾´𝒁𝒁𝒊𝒊 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2,   
where Yi is the amount of USD sent by player A, Zi is a vector of variables influencing trust that 
include the dummies On time paymenti and Delayed paymenti accounting for the signal received from 
the B partner, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖2 is the unobserved error term for equation 2.   In addition to controlling for the 
initial signal received at the beginning of the game, Zi includes other covariates related to the personal 
characteristics of each trustor such as female, asset index7 (as a proxy for household wealth), 
organization membership and completed primary education (as a proxy for game understanding). We 
6 Because of the paired structure of the game. 
7 The asset index was calculated using principal component analysis. For details on the assets used to build the index as well 
as its validity (variance explained, loadings of the components and KMO) refer to the Appendix 2, section .A2.4. 
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also include the variable dropout as a control for whether the household had previously participated in 
the export chain which could influence a farmer’s response when confronted with similar situations. 
Recent studies (e.g. Frijters et al., 2015; Harrison et al., 2009) suggest that individuals might be more 
willing to participate in artificial field experiments due to some specific characteristics that 
differentiate them from the original sample, introducing a sample selection problem.  In our 
experiment, invited farmers´ had to decide whether to participate and once they arrived, they were 
further randomly assigned to two groups: A and B8. Our interest lies in the A players’ decision about 
how much to trust their partners. A Heckman model corrects for this selection process, in which the 
level of trust of the non-participants could be different than zero but is unknown. In such an approach, 
a probit model is used to explain the selection mechanism.  The model assumes that both decisions 
(e.g. the decisions to participate and the decision on how much to trust during the game)  have a 
bivariate distribution that allows both error terms to be correlated. If the errors of both equations are 
correlated (rho is significant), then unobservables in the first stage also affect the outcome variable in 
the second stage or outcome equation. In such cases, the Heckman model is appropriate to produce 
unbiased estimates. The probability of a farmer participating in the game can be estimated using a 
probit model if the error term is assumed to have a standard normal distribution. Our selection 
equation is defined as follows: 
(1)  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛽𝛽´𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊  , 
         𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ > 0, 0 𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
 
where the binary choice variable Pi takes the value of 1 if the farmer decided to participate and 0 
otherwise, Xi is a vector of exogenous variables influencing participation and εi1  is the unobserved 
error term to be minimized. Studies advise using an exclusion restriction in the selection equation to 
generate credible estimates. This exclusion restriction consists of at least one variable that appears 
with a non-zero coefficient in the selection equation but not in the equation of interest. Thus, we use 
number of household (HH) members and Distance to game, which should not have an effect on trust 
and could affect participation. We expect a positive effect of the number of HH members because the 
bigger the family, the lower the opportunity costs for one of its members to engage in activities outside 
the household. Distance to the game is a proxy for a farmer’s costs to travel to the location, which 
should affect participation negatively but should not have any effect on trust. 
8 A table showing the Characteristics of players A and B is presented in the Appendix 2, section A2.5.  There is no 
significant difference between both groups 
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The correlation between the error terms of both equations εi1 and εi2 is measured by ρ (Rho) which 
determines whether there is a sample selection problem. If ρ = 0, then εi1 and εi2 are not correlated, 
and there is no necessity to correct for sample selection (Wooldridge 2012).  
3.5.  Results and discussion 
3.5.1. Results from the experimental game 
Rational choice theory predicts that player B will behave opportunistically in the first move to 
maximize his monetary profits. Nevertheless, 23 of the 72 B players who were required to send a 
signal chose to repay the loan on time and thus to comply with the rules of the game. We can therefore 
reject our first prediction on the opportunistic behavior expected from all B. Some individuals 
behaved according to the rules, even though this meant giving up the extra profit they would have 
earned had they kept the loan for one more period.  
The decisions made by Players A and B sorted per group are summarized in Table 3.2. Three different 
groups are specified according to the treatment: 1) payment on time, 2) payment delayed and 3) 
control. The results confirm the existence of norms of trust and trustworthiness among smallholders 
even when no previous interaction has taken place. Generalized trust is quantified by the amount sent 
by the A players in the control group (1.16 USD, or 30% of their endowment), which shows the 
farmers’ tendency to trust their unknown partners. The level of general trust in our sample is much 
lower compared with that found in Berg et al. (1995) for American students (50% of their endowment) 
and the values compiled by Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) from different studies (40% of the initial 
endowment or higher). However, our trust result is similar to that found by Greig and Bohnet (2008) 
in the slums of Nairobi (30% of the initial endowment). According to these authors, this low level of 
trust is influenced by severe poverty and harsh conditions that create the need for participants to insure 
themselves against income shocks by keeping as much money as possible. 
The percentage returned by B (30% of the possible amount, or 1.25 USD) in the control group closely 
matches the results reported by Berg et al. (1995) and by Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) for non-
students. Regarding trustworthiness, on average, player A is better off when the game is over. Players 
in the control group receive a slightly higher amount than what was initially sent on average (Z – X = 
0.083 USD). Only 14% of the A players9 received less money than what they sent, and the rest 
received at least the same amount or higher. However, the average ratio of return observed (Z/X = 
1,185) is not significantly different than 1.10 This result is characteristic of balanced reciprocity, 
whereby the B players perceive that the money sent by A is an interest-free loan, and the profits 
should not be shared (Greig and Bohnet 2008). Similar to low trust, balanced reciprocity is present 
9 Two A players of the 14 who sent something in the first move.  
10 T-test applied. P value = 0.2947. 
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because the players keep as much money as possible for themselves to protect themselves from 
external shocks. From a negative perspective, this approach can discourage long-term business 
relationships.  
Table 3-2 Trust and trustworthiness according to the signal received. 









        Sig. Differences 
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Trust 






















(0.261) 0.043** 0.092* 0.920 
Amount returned by B 























(0.250) 0.000*** 0.009*** 0.0509* 
Trustworthiness 
















Standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.                                                                                                                             
a:  16 A players choose not to send anything –no trust-: 1 from group 1 (4%), 11 from group 2 (22%), and 4 from  group 3 (22%).  These 
observations were dropped out when calculating the ratio of return.                                                                                                                      
b: Data reported as means                                                                                                                                                                                        
c:  The Wilcoxon rank-sum test to find the level of significance between pairs.                  
 
Receiving the payment on time is interpreted as a positive signal that increases the level of trust and 
enhances cooperation. Individuals who were paid on time sent on average a significantly higher 
amount of their endowment (1.56 USD) compared to the average amount sent by players whose 
payment was delayed (1.12 USD). When comparing these figures to the control group, players who 
received a positive signal also trust more than players who received no signal at all (p value = 0.092). 
However, when comparing trust after a negative signal with that of the control group, there is no 
significant difference (p value = 0.920). In summary, a positive signal sent at the beginning of the 
relationship has the power to trigger a positive response and to enhance the trust of small farmers, but 
a negative signal has no effect. We find three possible explanations for this behavior. First, individuals 
do not have much room to react strongly toward their partner’s opportunism by significantly 
decreasing their trust because their level of general trust is already quite low. Our second explanation 
follows Yamagishi’s theory that generalized distrust provides protection to individuals but also leads 
them to social isolation and lower levels of social intelligence (Yamagishi 2001). The author finds 
evidence that low trustors respond more slowly to external information, especially when stimuli are 
negative. Finally, farmers might not decrease their already-low trust because they do not want to 
completely sever the relationship. It could be that maintaining a relationship is more important than 
severely sanctioning opportunism because of other social aspects (kinship or friendship within the 
members of the community with whom they are playing). 
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The average amount returned by B also differs among the three groups. The group of farmers who 
paid the loan back on time returned an average of 2.41 USD (50% of what they received) compared to 
the farmers who behaved opportunistically, and in the second stage they returned on average only 0.77 
USD (19% of what they received). The trustworthiness shown by the B players is clearly linked to 
their first decision about when to pay their counterpart. Players who behaved according to the rules 
also showed a higher degree of trustworthiness and reciprocity later on by sharing part of their profits 
with their counterparts. B players who kept the money for themselves also behaved selfishly later, and 
most of the time they made their counterparts worse off: on average, their partners received 26.5% less 
than what they had sent. 
3.5.2.  Determinants of trust considering sample selection 
To determine the factors influencing trust we use a Heckman selection model to control for possible 
self-selection of participants. In Table 3.3  we present the results for both stages: participation and 
trust.    
Table 3-3 Heckman model for trust. 
 VARIABLES 
1. Participation 2. Trust 
Coef. USD sent by A 
Treatmenta 





















Distance to main market 0.024 0.068 
 
(0.025) (0.041) 
Asset index -0.071 -0.051 
 
(0.047) (0.074) 
Organization membership 0.269* 0.832*** 
 
(0.147) (0.238) 
Dropout from export chain -0.0273 -0.158 
 
(0.142) (0.227) 








 Constant -0.988*** -1.724** 






Observations 383 88 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.                                                                                                                                                                                           a 
: Base group is the control group                                                                                                                                                          
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The rho estimate indicates a positive correlation between the error terms of both equations, and the 
Wald test indicates that this correlation is highly significant. Therefore, some unobserved factors 
positively influence participation and trust. This result confirms a selection problem and the adequacy 
of the Heckman model to analyze our data and correct for the positive bias that our estimates would 
otherwise have.  
The results of the Participation equation show that farmers who decided to participate in our sessions 
have specific characteristics that differentiate them from the entire sample of invited farmers.  Farmers 
who are members of an organization and those with more household members were more likely to 
participate. Although wealth negatively affects participation, as expected, it is not statistically 
significant. Members of an organization hold regular meetings in which it is common for outsiders to 
organize different activities such as technical training or the diffusion of information. Therefore, these 
farmers could be more willing to participate in a meeting organized by scholars. Moreover, we had the 
support of the farmers’ group in conducting the survey, and the group might have encouraged its 
members to participate in the game. It is also not surprising that wealthier farmers were less likely to 
participate. One of the variables in our exclusion restriction is also significant. Having an additional 
member of the household increases the likelihood that one of the household’s members has time to 
participate in our game.  When this variable is divided into household members over 15 and household 
members under 15, the results (see the Appendix 2, section A2.6.) show that having one household 
member older than 15 significantly increases the probability of participating in the game, which 
supports the idea that an additional household member alleviates the burden of household work, thus 
allowing another member to participate in external activities.  
After controlling for selection bias and other characteristics, we still find that a positive signal 
modifies the trust of an individual toward one’s partner, thus allowing us to accept H4. However, a 
negative signal does not have an effect on trust; therefore, we cannot reject our last null hypothesis. 
Holding all other variables constant, a small farmer who receives a loan repayment on time sends on 
average 0.57 USD more than one who has not received any signal from his partner. Conversely, a 
person whose payment was delayed sends on average the same amount of money as in the control 
group (p value: 0.785). Low trustors can take longer to react to external stimuli because of their 
reluctance to engage in social interactions, a situation that represents a problem when eliciting the 
trustworthiness of others. Additionally, females in our sample send an average of 0.43 USD less than 
males. This result confirms previous findings by Buchan et al. (2008) that females trust less than 
males. Additionally, the amount sent by members of an organization is an average of 0.83 USD higher 
than the amount sent by non-members. Our players do not know their partners’ identities, but because 
members of the same village often belong to the same organization, increased trust may be 
encouraged. Finally, it is interesting that even though former participants in the export value chain 
showed a negative coefficient for trust, this result is not statistically significant. 
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3.6.  Conclusions 
Care must be taken when drawing conclusions from experimental data because the individuals who 
participate in experimental games could systematically differ from the originally invited population. 
Recruiting participants is easier with the support of a local organization, but their members might have 
specific characteristics that differentiate them from the general population.  Therefore, selection bias 
should be accounted for when using game data derived from a subsample of the population for whom 
we wish to draw our conclusions. 
Our findings show a low level of generalized trust towards unknown people. This result could be the 
effect of the business conditions to which the farmers had been exposed, which include extremely 
volatile prices in the local market and high uncertainties due to quality (rejections) and price (payment 
delay) in the export market. This paper’s primary contribution is the study of farmers’ behavior when 
exposed to previous signaling from a partner. In such cases, the level of trust partly varied according 
to the type of signal. Behaving according to the rules and sending an on-time payment increased the 
amount of trust received in the game. Thus, we can conclude that positive signaling enhances trust and 
promotes norms of cooperation. However, farmers whose partners behaved opportunistically showed 
similar levels of trust as those who had no information at all. We should keep in mind that the reason 
for this lack of response could be a low capacity for eliciting others’ trustworthiness. Farmers already 
protect themselves at the beginning of any business relationship by showing mistrust toward an 
unknown partner and if they receive a negative signal, they may be unable to react promptly, so they 
choose to maintain the relationship at a low level. Nevertheless, if not reacting in the face of 
opportunism is an informal norm in the region, agreements would be considered flexible because not 
fulfilling them would have no visible consequences. Reacting slowly to external signs, particularly 
when such signs are negative can threaten livelihoods of farmers. If small farmers cannot react quickly 
enough, they might face large losses by the time they decide to sanction such behavior. In addition, 
according to Williamson (1993), if informal rules include weak sanctions, then an action depending on 
a reciprocal sense of responsibility will be less likely. Therefore, individuals may prefer the spot 
market, in which immediate exchanges take place, rather than some signed or verbal agreement in 
which both actors must act reciprocally and responsible during a prolonged period and in which they 
are exposed to hold ups.  
The low levels of trust toward unknowns and the existing norms that reward good behavior also 
suggest the need to send a strong positive signal at the beginning of any relationship to achieve 
cooperation. Now that technology facilitates the exchange of information on reputation, a database 
containing information about the reputation of possible partners can be established and distributed by 
the authorities to increase the initial level of trust. Additionally, adequate safeguards to ensure contract 
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compliance should be demanded from larger players as a sign of their willingness to engage in long-
term relationships. 
This study represents an initial approach that attempts to disentangle the internal norms that govern 
smallholder behavior. There is extensive room to expand the topic of signaling and trust using farmers 
as the subjects of study. We analyzed the response to a single signal, but it remains unknown whether 
repeated positive signals produce an added effect on trust or whether farmers’ responses cease to 
change at some point. Similarly, it would be interesting to see whether farmers change their behavior 
when faced with repeated negative signals. Finally, the signaling used was a delayed payment, which 
the farmers might not find very serious. There is a chance that farmers may react differently to other 
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Appendix 2  
A2.1:  Principal component analysis for construction of Trust variables. 




Trust in Export market 0.832 I think that I can trust on my buyer in the export market 
to fulfill his promises 
 
  In general, I think that my buyer in the export market has 
been honest with me 
 
  I would recommend my buyer in the export market  to 
my friends and family who grow broccoli 
 
  I think that my buyer in the export market  has been 
trustful during the time I have dealt with him 
 
Trust in Local market 0.779 I think that I can trust on my buyer in the local market to 
fulfill his promises 
 
  In general, I think that my buyer in the local market has 
been honest with me 
 
  I would recommend my buyer in the local market to my 
friends and family who grow broccoli 
 
  I think that my buyer in the local market has been trustful 
during the time I have dealt with him 
 
 
Table A2.2: Principal components for Trust 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Comulative 
Trust in Export market    
Comp1 2.68677 2.06259 0.6717 0.6717 
Comp2 .624182 .272973 0.1560 0.8277 
Comp3 .351209 .0133747 0.0878 0.9155 
Comp4 .337835 . 0.0845 1.0000 
Trust in Local market    
Comp1 2.44337 1.71933 0.6108 0.6108 
Comp2 .72404 .210389 0.1810 0.7919 
Comp3 .51365 .19471 0.1284 0.9203 
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Statement 1 0.5085 0.4954 
Statement 2 0.5244 0.5618 
Statement 3 0.4341 0.4178 
Statement 4 0.5272 0.5143 
 
Table A2.4: Kaiser-Meyer-Ohlin measure of sampling adequacy. 
Variable 
KMO for trust in 
export market 
KMO for trust 
in local market 
Statement 1 0.7844 0.7459 
Statement 2 0.7894 0.6857 
Statement 3 0.8588 0.8355 
Statement 4 0.7822 0.7798 
Overall 0.7971 0.7448 
 
A2.2.  Monetary payoffs for the control and treatment groups 
 
Control Group (Berg et al., 1995)   
Player A:    𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 + [4𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 − 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐 + 𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶] 
Player B:  𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 5𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 + 3𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐 − 𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶  
 
Treatment Group11 
Player A:    𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 =  
𝑃𝑃1
2
+ 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃2 + [1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 + 4𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 − 𝑋𝑋𝑇𝑇 + 𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶] 
Player B:  𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 =
𝑃𝑃1
2
+ (1 − 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃2 + [5𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 + 3𝑋𝑋𝑇𝑇 − 𝑍𝑍𝐶𝐶] 
 
Where: 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴,𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = Profit for player A and player B,  respectively 
𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐,𝑋𝑋𝑇𝑇  ∈  {0,1,2,3,4} ∶   Amount sent by player A = “trust” 
𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏;  𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏𝐶𝐶:  Percentage returned by player B of the total quantity received 
𝑍𝑍 ∈ {0,1, … ,12}:  Total amount sent by player B. 
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Z/X = Trustworthiness (ratio of return to A) 
P1 , P2:  Profits from loan during the first and second stage,  respectively. 
RA:  Dummy for player A receiving payment on time (1= Yes; 0=No) 
 
A2.3.  Instructions of the game translated to English 
PLAYER A 
For this game you have a partner in the room next door with whom you will play following the 
instructions we will read out loud.  Your partner does not know your name and you will not get to 
know his/her name either.  All decisions will be anonymous.  Please do not make any comments with 
the other players in this room.  If you do this, you will not be able to continue playing the game.   
To begin with, we will give you and your partner in the other room 5 dollars each for coming to the 
game.    
[Distribute envelopes containing 5 bills of 1 dollar] 
1 
To start, you have to give a loan of 1 dollar of the 5 dollars you got to your partner.  This dollar will 
produce a profit of 0,50 cents that will be split between you and your partner. So for the 1 dollar loan 
you will get a 0,25 cent profit and your partner will also get a 0,25 cent profit.  At the end of this stage, 
your partner MUST pay you the 1 dollar back plus the 0,25 cents of the profit.  It is important that you 
get this payment on time.   Now, please put 1 of the 5 dollars you got inside the blue envelope.   
[Collect blue envelopes] 
[Wait for response of player B] 
2 
Your partner MUST pay you the dollar you sent him/her as a loan plus the 0,25 cents that are your 
share of the profit.  This means that you MUST receive 1 dollar with 0,25 cents inside the yellow 
envelope that was sent to you by your partner. 
[Distribute yellow envelopes coming from player B] 
Please open the yellow envelope and look inside.  You will find 1 dollar if your partner PAID YOU 
ON TIME for the loan, plus the 0,25 cents of profit.  If your partner decided to NOT SEND THE 
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PAYMENT ON TIME and keep YOUR 1 dollar for longer, then your envelope will have only 0,25 
cents, which is your part of the profit. 
Now, If your partner PAID YOU ON TIME, that means if you got your 1 euro back already, you will 
get an additional profit for having your money with you. But if you did not find a dollar in the 
envelope then your partner DID NOT PAY YOU YET,  and the additional profit will go to your 
partner and not to you.   
The people who received the PAYMENT for the 1 dollar ON TIME, will get 0,25 cents as additional 
profit.  However, if your partner DID NOT GIVE YOU THE DOLLAR BACK YET, you will get NO 
additional profit.  
[Distribute white envelopes which contain 0,25 cents if the player got the payment on time or which 
are empty if the player did not get the payment on time]  
3 
 START SECOND STAGE OF THE GAME 
Now we will start the second stage of the game. During this second part, you are still playing with the 
same partner you have been playing so far.  You all must have at least 4 dollars left.  Now, you have to 
decide how much of this 4 DOLLARS you want to send to your partner.  The amount you send to your 
partner will be multiplied by three by us and then the total amount will be delivered to your partner.  
Your partner will receive this money and afterwards should decide how much he wants to send back to 
you. 
For example, if you send your partner 1 dollar of the 4 dollars you have left, we will multiply this by 3 
and give your partner 3 dollars.   Then, he/she HAS TO decide how much of these 3 dollars he/she 
wants to send back or share with you.  IF you decide to send your partner 2 dollars, we will give your 
partner 6 dollars and he/she will have to decide how much of these 6 dollars he/she wants to send back 
to you. 
There are no wrong decisions.  You can send to your partner 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 dollars.  Depending on how 
far you trust that your partner will send you a fair amount back.  Please take your decision and put the 
money on the white envelope in front of you.  
[Collect white envelopes] 
4 
[Distribute the envelopes coming from B players] 
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Please open the envelopes your partners have sent you.  The white envelop has the money that your 
partner sent you back.  The yellow envelope MUST have 1 dollar of the initial loan if you were not 
paid before.  If you were already paid, this envelope is going to be empty. 
END OF THE GAME 
PLAYER B 
For this game you have a partner in the room next door with whom you will play following the 
instructions we will read out loud.  Your partner does not know your name and you will not get to 
know his/her name either.  All decisions will be anonymous.  Please do not make any comments with 
the other players in this room.  If you do this, you will not be able to continue playing the game.   
To begin with, we will give you and your partner in the other room 5 dollars each for coming to the 
game.    
[Distribute envelopes containing 5 bills of 1 dollar] 
1 
Your partner sent you 1 dollar as a loan out of the 5 dollars he got.  This dollar generates a profit of 
0,50 cents.  You must share this profit with your partner and additionally PAY HIM/HER the 1 dollar 
back. 
[Distribute blue envelopes containing 1 dollar and white envelopes containing two coins of 0,25 cents] 
Inside the blue envelope you will find 1 dollar sent by your partner which you MUST immediately pay 
back.  Inside the white envelope you will find the 0,50 cents profit coming from this loan which you 
must share with your partner.  Please take this money out of the envelopes. 
Now, please take the yellow envelope placed in front of you and put inside the 0,25 cents that are  
your partners´ share of the profit.  
Now you must decide if you want to pay the 1 dollar loan made by your partner ON TIME as HE/SHE 
IS EXPECTING IT.  IF you decide to send the 1 dollar back ON TIME to his/her OWNER, your 
partner will get an additional profit of 0,25 cents but you will not receive any additional profit.   BUT, 
if you decide to KEEP the 1 dollar for longer, I will give you an additional 0,25 cents profit to you, but 
your partner (the owner of the DOLLAR) will not receive anything.   Please make your decision and 
close the yellow envelope.  
[collect yellow envelope] 
Now we will distribute the additional profit if you decided to keep the 1 dollar for longer. 
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[Distribute white envelopes which contain 0,25 additional cents for the players who kept the loan or 
which is empty for the ones who paid the loan on time] 
2 
 [Wait for white envelopes coming from A players] 
START SECOND STAGE OF THE GAME 
Do you remember that at the beginning of this game you and your partners received 5 dollars each.  
Now, your partner has decided to send you part of his 4 dollars as an investment.  What they decided 
to send you I have multiplied by three and is the amount that you will receive now.  Once you get this 
additional money, you have to decide how much you want to send back and share with your partner.  
For example, if your partner sent you 1 dollar of his 4 remaining dollars I multiplied this by 3 and you 
will receive 3 dollars now.  In a following move you have to decide how much of the 3 additional 
dollars you just received you want to share with your partner.  Another example: if your partner sent 
you 2 dollars, you will get 6 dollars inside the new envelope and you have to decide how much of this 
money you want to share with your partner.  If your partner sent you 3 dollars, you will receive 9 
dollars and you have to decide how much of these you want to send back to your partner.  Finally, if 
your partner sent you 4 dollars, you will receive 12 dollars and you have to decide how much of these 
12 dollars you want to send back to your partner.  The money that you do not send back to your 
partner will be yours. 
[Distribute white envelopes that comes from A partners] 
Please take the money out of the envelope and count it, but do not talk to your neighbor.  
Now you have to decide how much of what you just got you want to share with your partner.  Put this 
amount of money again inside the white envelope.  There are no wrong decisions.  This means that 
you can send back any amount you think is better, from 0 to everything you got.  Close the envelope. 
Now, please put inside the yellow envelope in front of you the 1 dollar that your partner sent you as a 
loan at the very beginning of the game if you did not paid on time.  If you already paid this dollar 
before, let the envelope empty and close it. 
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A2.4:  Principal component analysis for construction of the Asset Index 
Table A2.5. Principal components for Asset Index 
Number of Obs: 401 (Original survey participants).    
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Comulative 
Comp1 2.78363 1.55347 0.232 0.232 
Comp2 1.23016 0.154495 0.1025 0.3345 
Comp3 1.07566 0.057864 0.0896 0.4241 
Comp4 1.0178 0.124076 0.0848 0.5089 
Comp5 0.893723 0.0220651 0.0745 0.5834 
Comp6 0.871658 0.00361226 0.0726 0.6561 
Comp7 0.868045 0.10822 0.0723 0.7284 
Comp8 0.759826 0.0338496 0.0633 0.7917 
Comp9 0.725976 0.0246856 0.0605 0.8522 
Comp10 0.701291 0.146155 0.0584 0.9106 
Comp11 0.555136 0.0380417 0.0463 0.9569 
Comp12 0.517094 . 0.0431 1 
 
Table A2.6. Factor Loadings for Component 1 (rotation = varimax). 







HH floor 0.4186 
HH roof 0.2541 
HH aspect 0.2708 
HH bathroom 0.3697 
USD clothes 0.2852 
Extra house 0.2355 
 








HH floor 0.7941 
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HH roof 0.6595 
HH aspect 0.7842 
HH bathroom 0.8042 
USD clothes 0.8382 
Extra house 0.716 
Overall 0.7851 
 
A2.5.   Characteristics of players A and B 
Table A2.8. Descriptive statistics for player A and B 
    
 Players A Players B p value 
Female 0.523 0.494 0.708 
Asset Index -0.235 -0.423 0.441 
Organization membership 0.455 0.494 0.601 
Complete primary education 0.705 0.632 0.312 
Dropout from export chain 0.477 0.540 0.408 
Distance to main market 12.192 12.167 0.952 
HH members 4.375 4.080 0.228 
Distance to game location 0.578 0.645 0.418 
 
A2.6: Other models explaining participation and trust.  
Table A2.9  Heckman model with two different variables showing the composition of the household in 
the selection equation. 
VARIABLES 
1. 
Participation 2. Trust 
Coef. USD sent by A 
Treatmenta 





















Distance to main market 0.022 0.061 
 
0.025 0.041 
Asset Index -0.079* -0.039 
 
0.046 0.071 
Organization membership 0.264* 0.793*** 
 
0.147 0.230 
Dropout from export chain -0.018 -0.182 
 
0.143 0.222 




 HH members under 15 -0.1892628 
 









 Constant -1.301*** -1.501*** 
  0.355 0.699 
Rho   0.961*** 
  
(0.025)b 
Observations 383 88 
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4. Inclusive and beneficial?                                              
Governance in global food value chains in Costa Rica1 
 
Abstract 
Global agri-food systems have undergone a rapid transformation towards closer vertical coordination 
and more stringent food quality and safety regulation. Contractual arrangements can provide farmers 
in developing countries with a safeguard and thus potentially support investments into farm-level 
upgrading and standard adoption. We use original survey data from pineapple growers in Costa Rica 
to analyze the determinants of contract choice and the dynamics of standard adoption. Furthermore, 
we evaluate the effects of different market arrangements on pineapple revenues, transaction risks and 
relational capital. Our analysis reveals that while contracts represent an important catalyst for farm-
level upgrading, major transaction risks in the supply chain remain unresolved. In particular, farmers 
in formal contract schemes face high rejection rates and long payment delays.  Verbal agreements 
appear to be the best option that brings higher income, low transaction risks and higher relational 
capital in the form of trust and loyalty towards the buyer. 
 




4.1.   Introduction 
In recent years, global agri-food systems have undergone a rapid transformation towards higher 
concentration, closer vertical coordination, and more stringent food quality and safety standards 
(Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Reardon et al., 2009; Swinnen and Maertens, 2007). This has been 
driven in part by an increasing world demand for certified products with attributes related to safety, 
high quality and social or environmental responsibility (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006). In 
particular, current exports from developing countries to the EU or US markets need to comply with 
increasingly complex regulations (Dolan and Humphrey 2000; Henson et al. 2005). In response, 
modern management tools, such as standards and governance structures that allow closer coordination 
between lead firms and their suppliers, are more and more widely used in global value chains (Barrett 
et al., 2012). These market developments offer both opportunities as well as threats to smallholder 
farmers in developing countries. Many experts emphasize that participation in emerging high-value 
markets can support farmers in upgrading their production systems and improving their incomes by 
facilitating access to information and more profitable markets. On the other hand, stringent food safety 
1 This chapter is co-authored by Meike Wollni, Fernando Saenz, Jean-Francois Le Coq.  The authors’s contributions are as 
follows:  CR and MW contributed to the conceptualization and design of the research.  CR implemented the survey.  MW 
and CR contributed to the data analysis and interpretation of the results.  MW wrote the manuscript and all authors revised it. 
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requirements can also pose barriers to the participation in high-value markets. Acquiring the technical 
know-how and financial resources to adapt the production process to the new requirements can be 
challenging and potentially marginalize smaller and resource-poor farmers (Henson et al. 2005; Key 
and Runsten 1999; Reardon et al. 2009). 
 In the past, the definition and implementation of food safety standards was mostly in the domain of 
public institutions and regulators. However, over recent years, there has been a shift towards private 
standards that define minimum requirements for produce to enter a specific supply chain (Dolan and 
Humphrey, 2000; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). Some of the private standards have become quasi-
mandatory, such as the GlobalGAP standard, which has been adopted by a large number of retail 
chains in major EU markets.  
With a shift in the standard setting authority from public to private, the question arises who will 
support farm-level adjustments to the new standard requirements. Public extension services in 
developing countries often lack the capacities and specialized knowledge to prepare farmers for 
upgrading and compliance with private standards. This can partly be attributed to the dualistic market 
structure with low food safety and quality requirements in traditional markets and high requirements in 
modern domestic and export markets resulting in a food safety and quality gap at the producer level. 
Public extension services have so far mostly served traditional markets and are usually not equipped to 
support farmers in overcoming the food safety and quality gap between traditional and modern 
markets. Furthermore, in addition to limited access to extension services and specialized technical 
assistance, smallholder farmers in developing countries are often constrained by other market failures, 
including missing or imperfect credit, insurance and input markets (Key and Runsten, 1999).  In 
response to this, there has been a surge in contract schemes and new institutional arrangements 
including public-private partnerships that have evolved to solve the missing markets problem and to 
provide the necessary support structures to help farmers adjust to the new market requirements 
(Kersting and Wollni, 2012).  
Contract schemes vary from rather informal, trust-based agreements to written, legally enforceable 
contracts. Also, the intensity of vertical coordination varies from case to case. Simple marketing 
agreements only specify the quantity and time of delivery as well as a fixed or variable pricing 
scheme. Production contracts involve much closer vertical interaction where buyers may provide 
inputs or perform specific on-farm tasks during the production cycle. Previous studies have 
investigated the effects of contract farming on smallholder farmers. Several authors find that 
contractual arrangements can help small-scale farmers to participate in and benefit from high-value 
markets with high standard requirements (Miyata et al. 2009; Minten et al. 2009; Bellemare 2012; 
Narayanan 2014; Maertens and Swinnen 2009). Contract farming can provide farmers with a safe 
market outlet thus reducing the risks associated with relationship-specific investments (Dries and 
Swinnen, 2004). However, contract farming has also been associated with potential threats. Several 
studies claim that contracts can increase tensions within the household or community, increase 
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farmers’ dependence on one or few cash crops and lock them into an unbalanced relationship  
(Chemnitz et al. 2007; Cungu et al. 2008; Echanove and Steffen 2005; Key and Runsten 1999; 
Narayanan 2014) 
In this paper we investigate the role of formal and informal private-sector contract schemes for farm-
level upgrading and marketing performance in high-value chains. In a first step, we analyze the 
determinants of participation in formal and informal contract schemes. In a second step, we look at the 
effects of contract schemes on standard adoption. Finally, we investigate whether farmers benefit from 
participation in contract schemes in terms of higher net revenues and more sustainable supply chain 
relationships. We address these questions in the context of a case study carried out with export-
oriented small and medium-scale pineapple farmers in Costa Rica. The Costa Rican pineapple sector 
represents a typical agricultural high-value chain dominated by vertically integrated international 
agribusinesses with a strong export orientation, which is increasingly regulated by private standards 
that set product and process requirements. The paper is structured as follows. In the next chapter we 
provide some background on the Costa Rican pineapple sector and describe the food standards that are 
of relevance for the export market. In chapter three we introduce the data and methodology used in the 
study. Chapter four to six present and discuss results and chapter seven concludes. 
 
4.2  Governance in the Costa Rican pineapple sector. 
4.2.1    Coordination and regulatory system 
Since the introduction of pineapple as an export crop in Costa Rica, the sector has expanded rapidly 
(Vagneron et al.  2009), and nowadays, Costa Rica is the largest exporter of fresh pineapple in the 
world. Between 2000 and 2009, pineapple production more than doubled, increasing from 0.9 million 
tons to 1.9 million tons (FAO Stat 2011). A major part of the production is destined for the export 
market, which amounted to 1.5 million tons of pineapples in 2008 (FAO Stat 2011). The main 
destination markets of Costa Rican pineapple exports are Europe (approx. 52%) and the U.S. (approx. 
48%) (CANAPEP 2011). Due to trade agreements (Caribbean Basin Initiative and the Generalized 
System of Preferences), exporters do not incur entry tariffs to access these markets (Ingwersen 2012; 
MACMAP 2015). Both European and U.S. markets, however, are demanding in terms of sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary standards and public food safety regulations. Furthermore, the importance of private 
food safety and quality standards has been increasing in these markets over recent years. 
The most important food safety and quality standard in the Costa Rican pineapple sector is the 
GlobalGAP standard, a private collective farm-gate standard developed by the European Retailer 
Association. The GlobalGAP standard represents a set of rules defining good agricultural practices, 
especially related to food safety, environmental protection, pesticide use, handling of waste, and 
workers’ health, safety, and welfare (FoodPLUS and GTZ, 2008). While being a voluntary standard, 
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GlobalGAP is becoming quasi-mandatory in some countries, e.g. the UK and Scandinavia, because 
major retailers demand it as a prerequisite (Poisot, 2007). The main purpose of the GlobalGAP 
standard is the harmonization and codification of information along the supply chain, i.e., it is used as 
a coordination mechanism and not as a marketing tool. Therefore, it is not associated with a price 
premium at the consumer level.  Still, in some cases buyers may pay higher prices for GlobalGAP 
certified products at the producer level to provide incentives to farmers to comply with GlobalGAP 
regulations (Kersting and Wollni, 2012).  
Besides food safety and quality standards, sustainability standards have gained in importance during 
recent years. In the Costa Rican pineapple sector, organic certification and the Rainforest Alliance 
standard are of particular relevance. The Rainforest Alliance standard, which was developed by the 
Sustainable Agriculture Network – a coalition of various environmental NGOs, is a voluntary process 
standard focusing on sustainable production systems (Rain Forest Alliance 2011). Certification with 
this standard entitles farmers to use the Rainforest Alliance label on their products as a marketing tool 
to inform consumers about the sustainability of their product. Currently, markets are still limited and 
there is no secure price premium, however, farmers might benefit in terms of securing access to a 
potentially growing market (Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005).  
Similarly, the organic standard is a voluntary process standard that can be used as a signal to 
consumers who are willing to pay a price premium for organically produced products. The 
International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM) has developed basic guidelines 
that serve as a reference for national and private agencies to develop more specific organic standards. 
During the past decade, the organic market segment has experienced considerable growth rates in US 
and EU markets (Hughner et al., 2007). In response to this, many countries have implemented public 
standards to regulate the organic sector (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005). Certification with organic 
standards can be associated with high implementation costs, especially due to long transition periods 
from conventional to organic production systems (Coulibaly and Liu, 2006). This exposes farmers to 
major uncertainties regarding future prices of organic produce, given that the price premium is not 
fixed but depends on market conditions.   
The Costa Rican pineapple sector consists of approximately 170 exporters, 72 packing facilities and 
1300 producers (CANAPEP 2011). Many exporters are vertically integrated into the processing and 
production stages, thus disposing of their own packing plants and production units. The majority of the 
production destined to export markets originates from such vertically integrated production units that 
are owned by international and national private firms. Only 5 to 10% of the total export volume is 
produced by small and medium-scale farmers (MAG 2007; Vagneron et al. 2009 ). The vast majority 
of these smallholders, approximately 98%, are located in the Huetar Norte region, where around 50% 
of the pineapple destined for export markets is grown (MAG 2007, CANAPEP 2011). The other two 
pineapple growing regions, namely the Atlantic (33% of export production) and the Pacific (17% of 
export production) regions (CANAPEP 2011), are dominated by large-scale integrated production 
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units. Small-scale farmers usually deliver their produce directly to exporters, who impose strict 
standards in terms of volumes, product safety and quality (Vagneron et al. 2009). To close the gap 
between the quality and food safety of produce delivered by small and medium scale pineapple 
growers and the quality and safety requirements of international markets, several exporters have 
engaged in formal or informal contracts with growers. 
4.2.2    Transaction risks and asset-specific investments 
According to transaction costs theory, asset-specific investments will not occur in a highly uncertain 
environment without safeguards (Williamson, 1979). Asset-specific investments entail sunk costs that 
cannot be recovered, if the envisioned market exchange fails (Chavas, 1994; Johnson and Pasour, 
1981). Producers who make asset-specific investments are thus locked into a specific market 
relationship and exposed to potential opportunistic behavior (Klein, 1996; Williamson, 1979). Buyers 
can for example reduce the producers’ return on the investment by increasing their quality grading 
criteria, reducing prices or delaying payment. Having made a relationship-specific investment, the 
producer finds himself in a disadvantageous bargaining position vis-à-vis the buyer (Klein 1996). 
Anticipating this threat, producers will be reluctant to make asset-specific investments resulting in 
hold-ups, i.e. profitable investments are foregone as a result of coordination failure (Williamson 1984, 
Slangen et al. 2008).  
In the pineapple sector, producers face multiple risks at different stages of the production and 
marketing process ranging from weather, yield and price risk to potential opportunistic behavior of 
buyers. In particular, pineapple cultivation requires considerable upfront investments into the 
establishment of the plot, which are estimated to figure around 9000 US$ per hectare (CANAPEP 
2011). The majority of farmers take out a loan to finance this initial investment, which leaves them at 
risk of credit default if their harvest is damaged or prices are low. Once the pineapple is ripe, farmers 
face multiple risks throughout the marketing process (see Figure 1). First of all, it is important for 
them to find a buyer at the time of harvest, because the quality of ready-to-ship pineapples quickly 
deteriorates in the field. That is, at that point, farmers do not have much flexibility to wait and search 
for a better market option. At the time of harvest, farmers perform a first grading in order to decide 
how much of their produce they deliver to the exporter and how much is sent to the processing 
industry. In the processing industry, quality requirements are substantially lower, and so are prices. 
Farmers therefore try to maximize the amount delivered to the exporter, while at the same time taking 
transportation costs into account. Exporters will reject any produce that does not fulfill their quality 
standards and send it back to farmers, who then usually deliver it to a processing firm. Farmers bear 
the full costs of transportation including the return of the rejected produce. They thus have an 
incentive to grade their produce as accurately as possible. In the packaging plant, exporters perform a 
second grading, where grades 5 to 7 are the preferred grades and grades 8 and higher command lower 
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prices2. Given that farmers do not assist in the process, the grading process often lacks transparency 
and is potentially subject to opportunistic behavior on the side of the buyer.  
Based on our survey data collected from pineapple producers in Costa Rica, we estimated that overall 
in 2010 only 41% of the pineapples planted for the export market reached their destination, whereas 
59% were lost or re-directed to the processing industry (which is associated with significantly lower 
prices). Figure 4.1 reports the percentages of pineapples at each stage that where subject to quality-
related transaction risk. Finally, farmers face considerable price risk, which partly stems from seasonal 
variation and partly from variability in the grading process. During the production season 2010, grades 
5 to 7 obtained an average price of 30 US-cents/kg, ranging between 18 and 35 US-cents/kg, whereas 
grades 8 and higher obtained a fixed price of 12 US-cents/kg. 
 
Figure 4-1 Transaction risks faced by producers in the pineapple chain. 
 
Source: own elaboration, numbers in brackets represent average figures for 2010 obtained from our survey 
As outlined above, according to transaction costs theory producers will make more asset-specific 
investments, if they have a safeguard for their investment. That is, producers are more likely to invest 
into expanding their pineapple production area, if they have a safe and reliable market outlet. 
Similarly, farmers will also be more likely to invest into upgrading their production process and 
adopting food standards, if they have a market outlet they can rely on and where they may receive a 
price premium for certified produce. Contractual agreements between buyers and producers can 
represent such a safeguard, as long as they credibly reduce the risk that buyers behave 
opportunistically once producers have made an asset-specific investment and thus locked themselves 
into the market relationship. 
2 Grades 5 to 7 are the grades demanded in international markets. Grades 8 to 12 correspond to smaller 
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4.3   Empirical data and methods 
4.3.1    Survey data 
Pineapple production in Costa Rica takes place along the Atlantic and Caribbean coasts and in the 
northern part of the country, the Huetar Norte region. While the coastal production areas are 
characterized by large-scale vertically integrated production units, the Huetar Norte region is 
structurally more diverse. In this area, production units of different sizes and different forms of 
vertical coordination co-exist. Overall, the Huetar Norte region accounts for 50% of the national 
pineapple production and for 98% of the small and medium-scale pineapple producers in the country 
(MAG  2007). 
The analysis is based on original survey data that was collected in Pital and Guatuso, which are two 
main pineapple production areas in the Huetar Norte region in northern Costa Rica. The survey was 
implemented from November 2010 to January 2011. Prior to the household survey comprehensive 
information about pineapple farming was collected from CANAPEP, the national pineapple 
organization, as well as from local associations involved in the pineapple sector. Eventually, because 
no comprehensive and unbiased lists of pineapple farmers could be obtained, pineapple farmers were 
selected randomly through a random walk approach. For that purpose central locations were identified 
in the settlements and a direction was randomly determined. In that direction, households were chosen 
for interviews based on a certain interval, which was determined depending on the size of the 
settlement (in order to make sure to reach the outer boundaries of the settlement). Households 
qualified for the interview, if they could be considered small-scale producers of pineapple, i.e., with a 
pineapple area of less than 50 hectares3. If a household was not eligible or available for the interview, 
it was replaced with the neighboring household until a suitable household was found. Density of 
pineapple growers is very high in the selected research areas, which are economically dominated by 
pineapple cultivation. Overall, our sample consists of 173 households, of which two households had to 
be excluded due to incomplete data. The interview was conducted face-to-face with an adult 
household member involved in pineapple production. We used a standardized questionnaire to collect 
data on pineapple production and marketing, standard adoption, as well as on socio-economic 
household variables. 
4.3.2    Methodology to analyze contract choice 
In a first step, we aim to identify the determinants of contract choice. Farmers can choose between 
three alternative marketing arrangements to sell their pineapple. Firstly, they can sell in the open spot 
3 In our definition of small-scale farmers we follow CANAPEP, which classifies farmers cultivating pineapple on 
less than 50 ha as small-scale. In our sample, farmers cultivate on the average 5.9 ha, including owned as well 
as rented land. While size varies from a quarter hectare to 45 ha, 80% of the farmers in our sample grow 
pineapple on less than ten hectares. 
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market, i.e., without any prior marketing agreement. Secondly, they can engage in an informal 
agreement with a buyer, which entails that at the time of planting, they verbally pre-determine the 
terms of exchange to be followed at the time of harvest. Thirdly, they can enter a formal agreement 
with a buyer, which implies the signing of a written and legally binding contract. The individual 
decision to choose a particular market arrangement is modeled in a random utility framework. For 
farmer i with J choices, the utility of choice j can be expressed as 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
The farmer will choose a particular market arrangement, when the utility of that arrangement is larger 
than the utilities associated with all other alternatives, i.e., Uij > Uik for all k ≠ j. The choice of farmer 
i is indicated by a random variable Yi. Furthermore, the disturbances are assumed to be i.i.d. and 
follow a Gumbel distribution giving rise to the multinomial logit model (Greene 2003). In our case, 
where farmers can choose between three market arrangements, we obtain the following specification: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗|𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) =
𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
1 + ∑ 𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2𝑘𝑘=1
 
 
In our model, utility depends on Xi, which includes individual-specific characteristics that vary across 
producers, but are constant across market arrangements. We include several variables related to human 
capital, specialization, social capital, and accessibility that are likely to influence the probability of a 
farmer to participate in a particular market arrangement. These variables affect both the ability and 
preferences of the farmers to engage in contract schemes as well as the interest of buyers to engage 
with that particular farmer (depending on the transaction costs associated with dealing with the 
farmer). In general, farmers with better access to resources (land, quantity and quality of human 
capital) are expected to have better chances to obtain a contractual agreement (Key and Runsten 1999, 
(Barrett et al., 2012)). Similarly, farmers with better access to information (education, experience, 
social networks, geographic proximity) are expected to be better informed about contract options and 
to have better access to potential buyers (Barrett et al., 2012; Reardon et al., 2009). Finally, transaction 
costs matter in the decision to engage in a contract. Market search and contract negotiation costs are to 
a large extent fixed costs, which makes contract farming more attractive to larger and more specialized 
farms (Barrett, 2008). Due to the same reason, these farms are also often preferred by buyers (Reardon 
et al., 2009) Key and Runsten 1999, Reardon et al. 2009). On the other hand, small-scale farmer 
usually have less outside options, which can make a given contract offer relatively more attractive to 
them (Key and Runsten 1999). 
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4.3.3    Methodology to analyze standard adoption 
In a second step, we are interested to explore in how far the choice of a certain market arrangement 
speeds up or slows down the upgrading process. The underlying hypothesis is that vertical 
coordination provides a safeguard to farmers and therefore induces farm-level investments. We use a 
duration model to estimate the effects of participation in formal and informal contracts on the time it 
takes the farmers to adopt a standard. Duration models estimate the probability that a farmer switches 
from non-adoption to adoption, given that the farmer has not yet adopted the standard. This probability 
is reflected by the hazard function, which resembles the continuous time version of a sequence of 
conditional probabilities (Burton et al., 2003). The proportional hazard model is specified as 
 
𝜆𝜆�𝑡𝑡;𝑍𝑍(𝑡𝑡)� = 𝑒𝑒𝑍𝑍(𝑡𝑡)𝛽𝛽𝜆𝜆0(𝑡𝑡) , 
 
where t is the time period and β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The individual hazard rate is 
a function of the baseline hazard 𝜆𝜆0(𝑡𝑡) and a vector of variables Z(t) that shift the hazard 
multiplicatively. The baseline hazard can be described by different distributional forms, which vary 
with respect to the assumed course of adoption (Wooldridge 2002). If T has a Weibull distribution, the 
hazard function is 
 
𝜆𝜆0(𝑡𝑡) ≡ 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼−1 
 
In this specification, if 𝛼𝛼 > 1 the hazard rate is monotonically increasing, i.e., it exhibits positive 
duration dependence implying that the probability of adoption increases the longer the farmer is in the 
sector. On the other hand, if 𝛼𝛼 < 1 the hazard rate is monotonically decreasing (Wooldridge 2002).  
 
In our analysis we include all 171 households of which 86 adopted a standard over the observed time 
period. The remaining 85 households are non-adopters and are treated in the analysis as right-censored 
observations, i.e., they might adopt the standard at a later point in time.  The analyzed adoption spell 
starts at t=2002 or later for those individuals who entered the pineapple sector after 2002. The vector 
Z(t) includes both time-variant and time-invariant covariates. Most importantly, we include two 
dummy variables on the type of market agreement (one for participation in verbal and one for 
participation in formal contracts) that vary over the observed time spell. Additionally, we include 
time-variant information on membership in pineapple producer groups. Time-invariant variables 
include information on human capital, specialization, social capital and accessibility4. In general, we 
expect the variables assumed to influence contract choice also to play a role in standard adoption. 
Standard adoption is also associated with substantial fixed costs related to initial investments and 
4 We do not include variables related to the experience in the sector because the length a farmer has been in 
the sector and its effect on the probability to adopt is implicitly included in the baseline hazard. 
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transaction costs (Kersting and Wollni 2012). Farmers with more human capital, stronger 
specialization, more social capital and better accessibility are therefore hypothesized to be more likely 
to adopt a standard (Asfaw et al., 2010; Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Reardon et al., 2009).  
4.3.4    Methodology to analyze the impacts of contract choice 
Finally, we are interested in estimating unbiased treatment effects of participation in two treatments – 
participation in formal and informal contract schemes – on various outcome variables. Given that we 
cannot observe the same contract farmers without contractual arrangements, we need to construct a 
valid counterfactual in order to derive the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). This is 
achieved by matching treatment households on observable characteristics with households from the 
control group (i.e., farmers without contractual arrangement). In our case, we have two mutually 
exclusive treatments, defined as 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 1 if farmers have a verbal agreement and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 2 if farmers have 
a formal contract, and a control group of farmers without marketing agreement (𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 0). While most 
of the literature deals with estimating the ATT for a single treatment, the methodology can be 
extended to the case of multiple treatments (see e.g. (Chiputwa et al., 2015),  (Lechner, 2002), 
Maertens and Swinnen 2009). Given that there is a large number of potentially relevant covariates, 
matching directly on the covariates is not practical. Alternatively, a one-dimensional indicator, the 
propensity score, is constructed reflecting the conditional probability of being in the treatment group 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Based on the propensity score the ATT can then be estimated as 
follows (Becker and Ichino 2002): 
 
𝜏𝜏𝑣𝑣 = 𝐸𝐸{𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖|𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 1,𝑒𝑒(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖|𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑒𝑒(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)]|𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 1}  
 
𝜏𝜏𝑓𝑓 = 𝐸𝐸{𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌2𝑖𝑖|𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 2,𝑒𝑒(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖|𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 0,𝑒𝑒(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖)]|𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 2} 
 
where 𝑌𝑌1𝑖𝑖, 𝑌𝑌2𝑖𝑖 and 𝑌𝑌0𝑖𝑖 are vectors of outcome variables with and without treatment, respectively, and  
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of covariates used to obtain the propensity score. We use the multinomial logit model 
specified above to estimate the propensity score. With this specification, we achieve balancing for all 
of the included covariates. We use nearest neighbor matching to identify suitable comparison 
households for the treatment group.  Based on this algorithm, each treatment household is matched 
with the three nearest neighbors in terms of propensity score distances (with replacement) (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2008). Moreover, only households in the common support region are included in the 
calculation of the ATT (see Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix). Common support is satisfied when the 
propensity score of the treated units is no higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum score 
of the control units (Becker and Ichino 2002). 
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Propensity score matching is based on the conditional independence assumption (CIA) which sustains 
that – conditional on observed factors – treatment assignment is independent of subsequent outcomes 
(Lechner, 2002). If there are unobserved factors that affect treatment assignment and the outcome 
variable simultaneously, such hidden bias may adversely affect the robustness of the matching 
estimators (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). It is therefore useful to determine how sensitive the estimates 
are to unobserved factors influencing the selection process. This can be done by calculating 
Rosenbaum bounds as proposed by Becker and Caliendo (2007) and (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004). The 
procedure takes the difference in the response variable between treatment and control cases and 
calculates Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests that give upper and lower bound estimates of significance 
levels at given levels of hidden bias (Becker and Caliendo 2007). 
We consider several outcome variables to represent different dimensions of the marketing relationship. 
First of all, we look at net pineapple revenue both in total and per hectare terms. We expect that 
farmers in contractual relationships make more informed investment decisions resulting in higher 
monetary benefits derived from pineapple cultivation (Bellemare 2012, Michelson et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, we consider several variables related to transaction risks including rejection rate, quality, 
price and terms of payment. Given the coordination function of contractual agreements, we expect 
contract participation to have a positive impact on the terms of the exchange. On the other hand, high 
levels of product rejections have been reported to be a common problem in formal contract schemes in 
developing countries (Barrett et al. 2012). Finally, we compare relational capital across the different 
marketing arrangements including trust and loyalty. Such informal institutions can provide important 
enforcement mechanisms that facilitate market exchange, especially in environments characterized by 
weak formal institutions (e.g. Poulton et al. 2010). Previous research has concluded that trust is 
generated through exchange performed under good institutions (Fischer 2008, Berggren and Jordahl 
2006). On the contrary, we expect that if farmers are exposed to extensive transaction risks over 
prolonged time periods, their levels of trust and loyalty towards the downstream actors of the value 
chain are negatively affected. 
4.4  Contract choice 
4.1    Characteristics of marketing arrangements 
With respect to the contractual arrangements, we find that 32% of the farmers in our sample have a 
verbal agreement and 42% have a written agreement with their buyer. The remaining 26% of the 
farmers have no agreement prior to selling their fruit. In general, input provision is not very common 
in the Costa Rican pineapple sector. Table 1 shows that through only 3.6% of the verbal agreements 
and 1.4% of the written agreements, farmers received inputs from their buyer. Overall, input markets 
function well in the research area, so that access to inputs does not represent a major constraint to 
pineapple producers. In contrast, the extent of credit and extension provision varies significantly 
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between the different marketing arrangements. In the case of written agreements, 55% of farmers 
received credit and 90% received extension from their buyers. Credit and extension provision is 
substantially lower in the context of verbal agreements, but still significantly more common than in 
open spot market transactions. Furthermore, the majority of verbal and written agreements contain 
some specification of the volumes to be delivered, while the price is fixed very rarely in either type of 
agreement. In open spot market transactions, by definition no agreements between producer and 
exporter are made. However, Table 4.1 shows that in 33% of the spot market transactions producer 
and buyer agree on a volume just before the produce is physically delivered to the processor's plant. 
Given that farmers have to bear the cost of transportation of the fruit to the firm, such consultation can 
help to reduce their marketing risk to some extent. 
 
Table 4-1 Description of market arrangements in the pineapple sector. 
 No agreement Verbal agreement Signed contract  
 N=45 N=55 N=71  
 Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.  
Buyer provides inputs 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.189 0.014 0.119  
Buyer provides credit 0.067 0.252 0.218 0.417 0.549 0.501 ***a,c 
Buyer provides extension 0.067 0.252 0.491 0.505 0.901 0.300 ***a,b,c 
Agreed on volume 0.333 0.477 0.873 0.336 0.958 0.203 ***a,b 
Agreed on price 0.000 0.000 0.109 0.315 0.113 0.318 *a 
***[*] significant at 1%[10%] probability of error; a=significant difference between signed contract and no 
agreement; b= significant difference between verbal agreement and no agreement; c=significant difference 
between signed contract and verbal agreement. 
4.4.2    Determinants of contract choice 
Results of the multinomial logit model on contract choice are presented in Table 4.2. The first column 
provides results on the determinants of choosing a verbal agreement as opposed to no prior agreement. 
We find that younger farmers and those with better access to labor and land resources, i.e. having 
more male family members and larger pineapple areas, are more likely to choose a verbal agreement 
instead of selling in the spot market. Furthermore, membership in a pineapple producer organization is 
positively associated with engaging in verbal agreements.  
Next, we report results from the second column in Table 2, which refers to the choice of formal 
agreements as opposed to no prior agreement. We find that farmers involved in formal contract 
schemes tend to be more educated and more specialized, i.e. they have less nonfarm activities and 
larger pineapple areas. The lack of nonfarm activities may also reflect a larger need for access to 
credit, which is often obtained through formal contractual arrangements (see Table 1). Furthermore, 
membership in farmer groups and in social organizations increases the likelihood of a farmer to 
engage in formal contracts, pointing to the importance of social networks to gain access to formal 
contract schemes. In line with this, if the farmer has known the buyer for a longer time, they are more 
likely to engage in a formal contractual relationship. On the other hand, holding all else constant, 
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farmers with more experience in the pineapple sector are less likely to engage in a formal contractual 
relationship. This may be due to the fact that farmers with less experience need more technical 
assistance, which is often provided by buyers through formal contract schemes. Inclusion of a squared 
term shows that this relationship is non-linear, pointing to a u-shaped relationship between experience 
in the pineapple sector and the likelihood to participate in a formal contract. 
Comparing farmers engaged in formal contracts with those engaged in verbal agreements, we find that 
farmers in formal contracts are significantly more educated, but less experienced in the pineapple 
sector. This again indicates that farmers with long-term experience in the sector are less dependent on 
the support offered by formal contract schemes. On the other hand, all other factors held constant, the 
longer the farmer has know the buyer, the more likely they are to engage in a formal contract. Finally, 
membership in producer organizations and in social groups both increase the farmers’ likelihood to 
engage in a formal contract as compared to a verbal contract. 
 








 RRR std err sig RRR std err sig RRR std err sig Secondary school 0.439 0.345 
 
3.296 2.282 * 7.498 5.472 *** 














Land size (lagged) 1.064 0.037 * 1.072 0.037 ** 1.008 0.011 
 






Nonfarm activities 0.737 0.373 
 
0.365 0.207 * 0.495 0.246 
 
Member in pineapple group 
(lagged) 
4.365 3.811 * 14.570 12.320 *** 3.338 1.694 ** 
Member in social group 0.294 0.360 
 
3.739 2.955 * 12.701 15.477 ** 






Known buyer (in years) 1.012 0.009 
 
1.038 0.011 *** 1.025 0.009 *** 
Experience 1.012 0.095 
 
0.746 0.076 *** 0.737 0.069 *** 
Experience squared 1.000 0.003 
 
1.007 0.003 ** 1.007 0.003 *** 
LR chi2(26) =  96.00***, Pseudo R2 = 0.2596, Log likelihood = -136.870, N = 171 
***[*] significant at 1%[10%] probability of error; RRR= relative risk ratio 
 
4.5    Vertical coordination and upgrading 
4.5.1    Investments into pineapple cultivation 
As described before, farmers who have a contractual agreement with a buyer dispose of a safeguard 
and are therefore expected to invest more extensively in upgrading their pineapple production 
processes. Figure 4.2 depicts the expansion of land devoted to pineapple cultivation by farmers 
engaged in the three different types of market arrangements.  The black bar indicates the average size 
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of pineapple area owned by farmers when they entered the sector. According to one-way analysis-of-
variance and Bonferroni multiple comparison tests, the average size does not differ significantly 
between the three groups. Subsequently, however, farmers with verbal and formal agreements 
substantially expanded their pineapple area as compared to farmers who exchange their pineapples 
through open market transactions. As indicated by the grey and white bars, this applies to both the 
owned pineapple area as well as the total pineapple area including both rented and own land. 
According to the graphical depiction, farmers with formal contracts expanded their pineapple area 
more so than farmers with verbal contracts, however, the differences between these two groups are not 
statistically significant. 
Figure 4-2 Average pineapple area by type of market arrangement 
 
*** significant at 1% probability of error; a=significant difference between signed contract and no agreement; 
b= significant difference between verbal agreement and no agreement. 
 
Besides the expansion of land under pineapple cultivation, implementation of food safety and 
sustainability standards represents a substantial asset-specific investment. Standard adoption is 
associated with considerable up-front investments that only pay off for the farmer, if better market 
opportunities can be realized as a result. Presumably, farmers who have a contractual relationship with 
their buyer can be more secure about their future market outlet, and will therefore be more likely to 
invest in standard implementation. Table 4.3 shows the relationship between vertical coordination and 




















none verbal contract written contract
Average pineapple area by type of market arrangement
own pineapple area (lagged) own pineapple area 2010***a,b
total pineapple area 2010 (incl. rented)***a,b
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Figure 4-3Vertical coordination and standard adoption. 
 
Sustainability standard refers to Rainforest Alliance and/or Organic standard; *** significant at 1% probability 
of error; a=significant difference between signed contract and no agreement; b= significant difference between 
verbal agreement and no agreement; c=significant difference between signed contract and verbal agreement. 
Among farmers engaged in a formal contractual arrangement standard adoption is very common: 82% 
have implemented GlobalGAP and 34% are certified with a sustainability standard. In contrast, only 
38% of farmers holding a verbal agreement and 9% of farmers holding no agreement have adopted a 
standard to upgrade their production process. 
4.5.2    Dynamics of standard adoption 
Table 4.3 reports coefficient estimates and hazard ratios of the duration analysis. As outlined above, 
we use the Weibull distributional form to model the baseline hazard, where the shape of the hazard 
function is estimated with α. In our model, α is significantly larger than one indicating that the hazard 
rate is monotonically increasing. Given that the choice of the functional form is an empirical matter, 
we tested different distributional forms for the hazard function and chose the Weibull distribution 
based on the Akaike information criterion (Cleves et al. 2008). Our results are, however, consistent 
across different specifications.  
The coefficients are interpreted as effects on the hazard rate of adoption. A positive coefficient has a 
positive impact on the hazard rate, that is, it speeds up the adoption process and vice versa. Table 4.3 
also shows hazard ratios calculated from the coefficients. A ratio bigger/smaller than one speeds 
up/slows down the adoption process; subtracting one from the hazard ratio results in the marginal 
















none verbal contract written contract
Vertical coordination and standard adoption
Any standard***a,b,c GlobalGAP standard***a,b,c
Sustainability standard***a,c
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formal and informal contracts has a significant and positive effect, thus reducing the time spell to 
standard adoption. A verbal contract increases the hazard rate of adoption by 266% and a formal 
contract by 572%. These results confirm that contract schemes can act as an important catalyst for 
farm-level upgrading.  
 
Furthermore, we find that organized and more socially connected farmers adopt earlier. Membership 
in a pineapple producer organization increases the hazard rate of standard adoption by 139% and 
membership in a social group by 151%. In addition, we find that farm size speeds up the adoption 
process. This indicates that as expected there are scale economies associated with standard adoption; 
however, the marginal effect of each additional hectare of land is very small. Finally, remoteness 
slows down the adoption process. For each additional kilometer that farmers are located away from the 
road the hazard rate of adoption decreases by 4%. 
Table 4-3 Results of the duration analysis. 
 Coefficient Robust Std. Err. Hazard Ratio Robust Std. Err.  Signed contract (time variant) 1.905 0.315 6.720 2.118 *** 
Verbal agreement (time variant) 1.296 0.305 3.655 1.113 *** 
Secondary school 0.098 0.291 1.103 0.320  
Age 0.008 0.009 1.008 0.009  
Number of female adults -0.140 0.187 0.869 0.163  
Number of male adults -0.002 0.116 0.998 0.116  
Land size (lagged) 0.006 0.002 1.006 0.002 *** 
Farm is main business 0.524 0.343 1.689 0.578  
Nonfarm activities 0.153 0.254 1.166 0.296  
Member in pineapple group (time 
variant) 
0.871 0.274 2.389 0.655 *** 
Member in social group 0.919 0.426 2.508 1.067 ** 
Distance to road -0.038 0.020 0.963 0.019 * 
Known buyer (in years) -0.002 0.004 0.998 0.004  
Constant -4.695 0.681 
  
*** 
/ln_p 0.233 0.078 
  
*** 
P 1.262 0.098 
  
 
1/p 0.792 0.062 
  
 
AIC = 317,8      
Log pseudolikelihood = -143.918 
Wald chi²(13) = 171.20*** 
No. of obs./ Time at risk = 924 
No. of subjects = 171 
No. of failures = 94 
    
 
***(**)[*] significant at 1%(5%)[10%] probability of error. 
Figure4. 4 presents a graphical illustration of the survival probabilities by market arrangement. For 
each time interval, the survival probability is calculated as the number of non-adopters (i.e., the 
number of farmers at start minus the number of adopters) divided by the number of farmers at start. To 
obtain the cumulative probability of survival until any particular time we multiply all the probabilities 
of survival of the preceding time intervals. For example, the probability of a farmer not adopting a 
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standard after two years equals the probability of non-adoption in the first year multiplied by the 
probability of non-adoption in the second year given that the farmer did not adopt during the first year. 
From the graph we can see that after nine years farmers who sell in the open spot market have a much 
higher cumulative survival probability, i.e., a much higher probability to remain without standard, 
compared to farmers with formal and verbal agreements. 
Figure 4-4 Kaplan-Meier survival estimates by type of agreement. 
 
 
4.6    Sustainability of marketing relationships 
While formal and informal contracts facilitate upgrading and standard adoption, eventually it is of 
interest not only whether these investments take place, but also in how far they result in higher net 
revenues and better market access for farmers. We therefore use propensity score matching to compare 
various outcome measures across producers engaged in different forms of vertical coordination. Table 
4.4 gives an overview of the outcome measures and reports the mean values and standard deviations of 
unmatched cases by market arrangement. We consider three different categories of outcome measures: 
overall net revenues derived from pineapple cultivation, transaction risks, and relational capital that 
describe different dimensions of the quality of the marketing relationship from the perspective of 
producers. Figures A3.1 and A3.2 in the Appendix 3 show the propensity score distributions for the 
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Table 4-4Description of outcome variables (unmatched cases). 




agreement   
 Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev  
 N=71  N=55  N=45   
Net revenues        
Net revenue from 
pineapple 
18124.10 24219.93 17913.45 20919.24 6979.08 11806.11 ***a,b 
Net revenue per ha 2417.01 3668.57 3245.88 5951.04 4744.76 9406.94  
 
Transaction risks 
      
Pineapple rejections (%) 0.112 0.217 0.066 0.081 0.045 0.060 **a 
Informed about reason 0.535 0.502 0.709 0.458 0.400 0.495 ***b 
Percentage graded as high 
quality (grade 5-7) 
0.659 0.163 0.642 0.137 0.601 0.107 *a 
Average price received for 
high-quality fruit (in US$) 
0.301 0.040 0.298 0.026 0.310 0.075  
Days to payment 
according to agreement 
25.535 7.454 17.945 6.267 15.756 13.837 ***a,c 
Days to payment in reality 48.930 40.197 30.400 36.705 26.156 32.269 ***a,c 
 
Relational capital 
      
Trust -0.167 1.010 0.290 0.905 -0.094 0.956 **c 
Loyalty 0.150 0.856 0.053 1.197 -0.314 0.816  
***(**)[*] significant at 1%(5%)[10%] probability of error; a=significant difference between signed contract 
and no agreement; b= significant difference between verbal agreement and no agreement; c=significant 
difference between signed contract and verbal agreement. 
4.6.1    Impacts on pineapple revenues 
Table 4.5 presents unbiased average treatment effects for farmers with formal and informal marketing 
agreements. The first and second rows of Table 4.5 compare farmers with informal contracts and 
farmers with formal contracts to farmers selling their produce without any prior marketing agreement, 
respectively. The last row compares farmers with formal contracts to those with informal agreements. 
The results show that compared to farmers selling in the spot market, farmers with both formal and 
informal contracts obtain significantly higher annual net revenues from pineapple cultivation. 
Producers with formal contracts gain on average 11096 US$ more than producers without prior 
agreement, whereas a verbal agreement increases net revenue by 11092 US$. However, net revenues 
per hectare are not significantly different between farmers with and without contracts, indicating that 
the positive income effects are mainly due to larger areas cultivated by contract farmers. Comparing 
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Table 4-5  Impact on outcome variables (matched cases). 
  Verbal vs. none Signed vs. none Signed vs. verbal 
  ATT   Γ ATT   Γ ATT   Γ 
Net revenues                   
Net revenue from pineapple 11092 *** 2.4 11096 *** 1.5 -7980 






          Transaction risks 
         Pineapple rejections (%) 0.025 
  
0.084 ** 1.5 0.041 





  Percentage graded as high quality (grade 
5-7) 0.047 
  
0.087 ** 1.9 0.033 
  Average price received for high-quality 




Days to payment according to agreement -0.442 
  
5.852 * 3.5 4.391 ** 2.4 
Days to payment in reality -19.865 
  
21.9 ** 1.8 15.266 
  
          Relational capital 
         Trust 0.685 ** 2.1 -0.057 
  
-0.38 
  Loyalty 0.753 *** 1.7 0.493 * 5 0.128 
  
          Matched cases (common support) 52/45     61/45     64/55     
Source: own elaboration; ***(**)[*] significant at 1%(5%)[10%] probability of error. 
4.6.2    Impacts on transaction risks 
As described before, producers in the pineapple sector face multiple risks along the different 
marketing stages. We expect contractual relationships between buyers and producers to improve 
coordination and thereby reduce uncertainties in the supply chain. This should be reflected in lower 
rejection rates, higher quality grades, and better prices for farmers participating in contract schemes. 
Table 4.5 compares transaction risks across different market arrangements. While one would expect 
that closer vertical coordination leads to more efficient transmission of relevant information regarding 
product requirements along the value chain and thereby reduce rejection rates, we find that rejection 
rates are higher in formal contract schemes compared to spot market transactions. Results also indicate 
that information flows do not necessarily work better in market transactions with closer vertical 
coordination. In fact we find no significant difference regarding the availability of information about 
product rejections between the different coordination mechanisms. A potential explanation for higher 
rejection rates in formal contract schemes is that buyers use quality-related arguments for rejections as 
an excuse to avoid their purchase obligations during times of limited demand in international markets 
(empirical evidence supporting this claim is provided in Suzuki et al. 2011). This would also explain 
limited information flows about the reasons underlying product rejections. 
 
Chapter 4. Inclusive and beneficial?  Governance in global food value chains in Costa Rica             96 
  
 
This is also supported by the finding that, despite higher rejection rates, overall, farmers with formal 
contracts achieve high quality grades (grades 5 to 7) for a larger percentage of their pineapples. As 
shown before, farmers often can access extension and credit through the contracts, which we find 
reflected in higher quality output. Beyond this positive effect on product quality, other tangible 
benefits of formal contracts seem to be limited. With respect to the price obtained for high quality 
pineapples, we do not find a significant effect for farmers with formal agreements compared to 
farmers with verbal or no agreements. In addition, farmers with a formal contract face significantly 
longer payment periods and on top of that suffer from significantly longer payment delays. Altogether, 
the results indicate that major risks such as high rejection rates and long payment delays are not 
resolved, but rather aggravated in formal contract schemes. Between informal agreements and the spot 
market differences in transaction risks are less pronounced. The only significant difference concerns 
average prices obtained for high-quality pineapple, which is significantly lower with informal 
agreements (significant at 10% level). While this may be unlike expected, it may be due to some form 
of risk sharing between buyer and seller in informal market arrangements that we cannot capture in 
our cross-sectional data. 
 
4.6.3    Implications for relational capital 
The sustainability of the supply chain relationship is not only reflected in tangible benefits, but also 
depends on the relational capital build between producer and buyer. Two important aspects of 
relational capital include a trustful relationship and loyalty, which are important for the relationship to 
persist in the long-term. During the interviews, farmers were asked to rate different statements 
regarding trust and loyalty with their main buyer on a five-point Likert scale. Based on these 
statements two constructs were identified using principal component analysis. A description of these 
two constructs is provided in Table 4.6. The derived constructs have a mean value of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. Accordingly, higher values of the construct indicate higher levels of trust 
and loyalty. 
 




Trust 0.856 I think that my buyer has been trustful during the time I 
have dealt with him 
0.833 
  I will not say negative comments about my buyer to my 
friends and family 
0.818 
  I would recommend my buyer to my friends and family 
who grow pineapple 
0.811 
  In general, I think that my buyer has been honest with 
me 
0.737 
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Loyalty 0.606 If my buyer would lower the price he pays for the 
product, I would still work with him 
0.763 
  I would not switch to another buyer even if he offers me 
a better price for my product 
0.743 
  As long as I live here and harvest pineapple, I do not feel 
the need to look for another buyer 
0.663 
Source: own elaboration 
The comparison of relational capital across different market arrangements is presented in Table 4.5. 
Results show that relational capital figures most strongly in verbal agreements. Producers’ trust in and 
loyalty to their buyers is significantly higher in verbal market arrangements compared to spot market 
transactions. This confirms the importance of informal enforcement mechanisms, such as trust and 
reciprocity, for market exchange based on informal agreements. In formal contracts, farmers display 
lower levels of trust, which are comparable to the level of trust in open spot market transactions. 
Several farmers indicated that this is due to the long payment delays and high rejection rates that they 
have experienced in the past. On the other hand, loyalty within formal relationships is significantly 
higher than in open spot market transactions, mostly due to the legally binding character of the written 
agreement preventing farmers from switching buyers in the short run. In contrast, in the open spot 
market farmers normally choose the buyer offering the best prices at the time of harvest. 
4.6.4     Sensitivity analysis 
As a robustness check we estimate Rosenbaum bounds (Γ) for all significant ATTs in Table 4.5.   The 
Rosenbaum bound measures how large the difference in unobserved factors influencing treatment 
assignment would have to be, in order to turn the estimated ATT insignificant. A low level of Γ does 
not necessarily mean that unobserved heterogeneity exists and that there is no treatment effect; Γ 
merely pictures the worst-case scenario, at which the confidence interval for the ATT would include 
zero (Becker and Caliendo 2007). Rosenbaum bounds are shown in Table 4.5 and range from 1.5 to 5. 
This implies that farmers would have to differ in their unobserved characteristics by a factor of at least 
1.5 (50%) to 5 (400%) in order for the ATTs to become insignificant. Based on these results, we can 
be relatively confident that the estimates obtained from propensity score matching are robust to hidden 
bias. 
 
4.7     Conclusions 
 
Previous studies have documented the emergence of private contract schemes that aim at supporting 
farm-level adaptation (e.g. Le Coq et al.  2010). Most studies focusing on a particular outgrower 
scheme have been optimistic about the ability of these private-sector initiatives to support small-scale 
farmers in their upgrading process. In this study, taking into account verbal and written contracts 
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between pineapple producers and several downstream buyers, we find that contracts can act as an 
important catalyst for standard implementation and that contract farmers derive higher net revenues 
from pineapple production. Yet, we believe that some caution is warranted given that major 
uncertainties faced by farmers in the supply chain are not resolved.  
 
In order to build sustainable value chains that are beneficial to both farmers and buyers in the long-
term, transaction risks need to be managed more efficiently at the different stages of the supply chain. 
In particular, long payment delays and high rejection rates reduce farmers’ trust in the marketing 
relationship. Anecdotal evidence from the Costa Rican pineapple sector reveals that disadoption rates 
of standards are high among small and medium-scale producers due to the fact that farmers do not 
perceive a strong benefit in terms of market access (high rejection rates) or monetary compensation 
(no price premiums, long payment delays). In our case study, informal agreements seem to fare better 
compared to formal contract schemes in terms of generating fair exchange conditions for producers. 
Further research is needed that looks into the long-term sustainability of private-sector contract 
schemes and standard adoption. Future research should also extend to other actors of the value chain, 
such as the exporter - importer relationship, to evaluate the transaction risks faced at the downstream 




























Asfaw, Solomon, Dagmar Mithöfer, and Hermann Waibel. 2010. “What Impact Are EU Supermarket 
Standards Having on Developing Countries’ Export of High-Value Horticultural Products? 
Evidence From Kenya.” Journal of International Food & Agribusiness Marketing 22 (3-4): 
252–76. doi:10.1080/08974431003641398. 
Barrett, Christopher B. 2008. “Smallholder Market Participation: Concepts and Evidence from Eastern 
and Southern Africa.” Food Policy 33 (4): 299–317. doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2007.10.005. 
Barrett, Christopher B., Maren E. Bachke, Marc F. Bellemare, Hope C. Michelson, Sudha Narayanan, 
and Thomas F. Walker. 2012. “Smallholder Participation in Contract Farming: Comparative 
Evidence from Five Countries.” World Development 40 (4): 715–30. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.09.006. 
Becker, Sascha O., and Marco Caliendo. 2007. “Mhbounds - Sensitivity Analysis for Average 
Treatment Effects.” SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 958699. Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=958699. 
Becker, S.O., Ichino, A. (2002): Estimation of average treatment effects based on propensity  
scores. The Stata Journal 2(4): 358-377 
Bellemare, Marc F. 2012. “As You Sow, So Shall You Reap: The Welfare Impacts of Contract 
Farming.” World Development 40 (7): 1418–34. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.12.008. 
Berggren, Niclas, and Henrik Jordahl. 2006. “Free to Trust: Economic Freedom and Social Capital.” 
Kyklos 59 (2): 141–69. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.2006.00324.x. 
Burton, M, Rigby, D., Young, T. (2003): Modelling the adoption of organic horticultural    
            technology in the UK using duration analysis. Australian Journal of Agricultural and   
            Resource Economics 47(1): 29-54. 
CANAPEP (2011): Estadísticas de exportaciones,  
            http://www.canapep.com/canapep/estadisticas , retrieved in April 2011 
Caliendo, Marco, and Sabine Kopeinig. 2008. “Some Practical Guidance for the Implementation of 
Propensity Score Matching.” Journal of Economic Surveys 22 (1): 31–72. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
6419.2007.00527.x. 
Chavas, Jean-Paul. 1994. “Production and Investment Decisions Under Sunk Cost and Temporal 
Uncertainty.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76 (1): 114–27. 
doi:10.2307/1243926. 
Chemnitz, Christine, Harald Grethe, and Ulrich Kleinwechter. 2007. “Quality Standards for Food 
Products: A Particular Burden for Small Producers in Developing Countries?” 83/2007. 
Working Paper, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften an der Landwirtschaftlich-
Gärtnerischen Fakultät, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 
http://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/96464. 
Chiputwa, Brian, David J. Spielman, and Matin Qaim. 2015. “Food Standards, Certification, and 
Poverty among Coffee Farmers in Uganda.” World Development 66 (February): 400–412. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.09.006. 
Cleves et al.,. 2008. An Introduction to Survival Analysis Using Stata, Second Edition. Third. Stata 
Press. 
Coulibaly, A. L., and P. Liu. 2006. “Regulations, Standards and Certification for Agricultural Exports. 
A Practical Manual for Producers and Exporters in East Africa.” http://agris.fao.org/agris-
search/search.do?recordID=XF2007431465. 
Cungu, Azeta, Hamish Gow, Johan F. M. Swinnen, and Liesbet Vranken. 2008. “Investment with 
Weak Contract Enforcement: Evidence from Hungary during Transition.” European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 35 (1): 75–91. doi:10.1093/erae/jbn001. 
Chapter 4. Inclusive and beneficial?  Governance in global food value chains in Costa Rica             100 
  
 
DiPrete, Thomas A., and Markus Gangl. 2004. “Assessing Bias in the Estimation of Causal Effects: 
Rosenbaum Bounds on Matching Estimators and Instrumental Variables Estimation with 
Imperfect Instruments.” Sociological Methodology 34 (1): 271–310. doi:10.1111/j.0081-
1750.2004.00154.x. 
Dolan, C., and J. Humphrey. 2000. “Governance and Trade in Fresh Vegetables: The Impact of UK 
Supermarkets on the African Horticulture Industry.” Journal of Development Studies 37 (2): 
147–76. doi:10.1080/713600072. 
Dries, Liesbeth, and Johan F. M. Swinnen. 2004. “Foreign Direct Investment, Vertical Integration, and 
Local Suppliers: Evidence from the Polish Dairy Sector.” World Development 32 (9): 1525–
44. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.05.004. 
FAO Stat.  2011. The agricultural trade domain: imports and exports for pineapple, 2008, 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/342/default.aspx , retrieved in April 2011 
Echanove, F, and C Steffen. 2005. “Agribusiness and Farmers in Mexico:  The Importance of 
Contractual Relations” 171 (2): 166–76. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4959.2005.00157.x. 
Fischer, Justina A. V. 2008. “Is Competition Good for Trust? Cross-Country Evidence Using Micro-
Data.” Economics Letters 100 (1): 56–59. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2007.11.001. 
FoodPLUS and GTZ, 2008. GLOBALG.A.P. Smallholder Manual. Introduction to the EUREPGAP 
Standards for Fruit and Vegetables and Farmer Group Certification. Eschborn, Germany.  
Giovannucci, Daniele, and Stefano Ponte. 2005. “Standards as a New Form of Social Contract? 
Sustainability Initiatives in the Coffee Industry.” Food Policy, Private Agri-food Standards: 
Implications for Food Policy and Agri-food Systems, 30 (3): 284–301. 
doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2005.05.007. 
Greene, W.H. (2003): Econometric analysis. Fifth Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Henson, Spencer, Oliver Masakure, and David Boselie. 2005. “Private Food Safety and Quality 
Standards for Fresh Produce Exporters: The Case of Hortico Agrisystems, Zimbabwe.” Food 
Policy 30 (4): 371–84. doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2005.06.002. 
Hughner, Renée Shaw, Pierre McDonagh, Andrea Prothero, Clifford J. Shultz, and Julie Stanton. 
2007. “Who Are Organic Food Consumers? A Compilation and Review of Why People 
Purchase Organic Food.” Journal of Consumer Behaviour 6 (2-3): 94–110. 
doi:10.1002/cb.210. 
Humphrey, and Memedovic. 2006. “Global Value Chains in the Agrifood Sector.” 
http://agris.fao.org/agris-search/search.do?recordID=GB2013202293. 
Ingwersen, Wesley W. 2012. “Life Cycle Assessment of Fresh Pineapple from Costa Rica.” Journal of 
Cleaner Production 35 (November): 152–63. doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2012.05.035. 
Johnson, Marc A., and E. C. Pasour. 1981. “An Opportunity Cost View of Fixed Asset Theory and the 
Overproduction Trap.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63 (1): 1–7. 
doi:10.2307/1239806. 
Kersting, Sarah, and Meike Wollni. 2012. “New Institutional Arrangements and Standard Adoption: 
Evidence from Small-Scale Fruit and Vegetable Farmers in Thailand.” Food Policy 37 (4): 
452–62. doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2012.04.005. 
Key, Nigel, and David Runsten. 1999. “Contract Farming, Smallholders, and Rural Development in 
Latin America: The Organization of Agroprocessing Firms and the Scale of Outgrower 
Production.” World Development 27 (2): 381–401. doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(98)00144-2. 
Klein, Benjamin. 1996. “Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual 
Relationships.” Economic Inquiry 34 (3): 444–63. doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1996.tb01388.x. 
Lechner, Michael. 2002. “Program Heterogeneity and Propensity Score Matching: An Application to 
the Evaluation of Active Labor Market Policies.” Review of Economics and Statistics 84 (2): 
205–20. doi:10.1162/003465302317411488. 
Chapter 4. Inclusive and beneficial?  Governance in global food value chains in Costa Rica             101 
  
 
Le Coq, Faure G, and Saenz F. 2010. “Las Organizaciones de Produtores Y Las Modalidades de 
Prestación de Los Servicios Agrícolas.” Revista Centroamericana de Ciencias Sociales. 
http://agris.fao.org/agris-search/search.do?recordID=FR2013103028. 
MAG 2007.  Caracterización y plan de acción para el desarrollo de la agrocadenade piña en  
             la región Huetar Norte. Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería, Dirección Regional  
             Huetar Norte, Spet. 2007 
MACMAP.  2015. Market Access Map: Improving transparency in international trade and market 
access. http://www.macmap.org/    Retrieved in April 2015 
Maertens, Miet, and Johan F.M. Swinnen. 2009. “Trade, Standards, and Poverty: Evidence from 
Senegal.” World Development 37 (1): 161–78. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.04.006. 
Michelson, Hope, Thomas Reardon, and Francisco Perez. 2012. “Small Farmers and Big Retail: 
Trade-Offs of Supplying Supermarkets in Nicaragua.” World Development 40 (2): 342–54. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.013. 
Minten, Bart, Lalaina Randrianarison, and Johan F.M. Swinnen. 2009. “Global Retail Chains and Poor 
Farmers: Evidence from Madagascar.” World Development 37 (11): 1728–41. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.08.024. 
Miyata, Sachiko, Nicholas Minot, and Dinghuan Hu. 2009. “Impact of Contract Farming on Income: 
Linking Small Farmers, Packers, and Supermarkets in China.” World Development 37 (11): 
1781–90. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.08.025. 
Narayanan, Sudha. 2014. “Profits from Participation in High Value Agriculture: Evidence of 
Heterogeneous Benefits in Contract Farming Schemes in Southern India.” Food Policy 44 
(February): 142–57. doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2013.10.010. 
Poisot, A.-S. 2007. “Summary Analysis of Codes, Guidelines, and Standards Related to Good 
Agricultural Practices. Background Paper for the FAO Expert Consultation on a Good 
Agricultural Practice Approach, Rome, Italy, 10-12 November 2003.” FAO GAP Working 
Papers Series (FAO). http://agris.fao.org/agris-search/search.do?recordID=XF2008434563. 
Poulton, Colin, Andrew Dorward, and Jonathan Kydd. 2010. “The Future of Small Farms: New 
Directions for Services, Institutions, and Intermediation.” World Development, The Future of 
Small Farms Including Special Section: Impact Assessment of Policy-Oriented International 
Agricultural Research (pp. 1453–1526), 38 (10): 1413–28. 
doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.06.009. 
Rain Forest Alliance.  2011. About us.   http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/about. Retrieved on 
12.04.2011 
Reardon, Thomas, Christopher B. Barrett, Julio A. Berdegué, and Johan F. M. Swinnen. 2009. 
“Agrifood Industry Transformation and Small Farmers in Developing Countries.” World 
Development 37 (11): 1717–27. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.08.023. 
Rosenbaum, P.R., Rubin, D.B. (1983): The central role of the propensity score in  
observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika 70: 41-55.  
Slangen, L.H.G., Loucks, L.A., Slangen, A.H.L. (2008): Institutional economics and  
economic organization theory – an integrated approach. The Netherlands: Wageningen 
Academic Publishers  
Suzuki, A., L.S. Jarvis, R.J. Sexton (2011): Partial Vertical Integration, Risk Shifting, and Product 
Rejection in the High-Value Export Supply Chain: The Ghana Pineapple Sector. World 
Development 39(9), 1611-1623 
Swinnen, Johan F. M., and Miet Maertens. 2007. “Globalization, Privatization, and Vertical 
Coordination in Food Value Chains in Developing and Transition Countries.” Agricultural 
Economics 37: 89–102. doi:10.1111/j.1574-0862.2007.00237.x. 
Chapter 4. Inclusive and beneficial?  Governance in global food value chains in Costa Rica             102 
  
 
Vagneron, Isabelle, Guy Faure, and Denis Loeillet. 2009. “Is There a Pilot in the Chain? Identifying 
the Key Drivers of Change in the Fresh Pineapple Sector.” Food Policy 34 (5): 437–46. 
doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2009.05.001. 
Williamson, Oliver E. 1979. “Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual 
Relations.” Journal of Law and Economics 22 (2): 233–61. 
Williamson, O.E. (1984): The economics of governance: framework and implications. Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 140: 195-223. 





































0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
Verbal vs. None
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
Signed vs. none
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
Signed vs. Verbal
Chapter 5. Concluding remarks           104 
  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
5.1.  Synopsis 
 
During the past decades, attention has been drawn to promoting agricultural growth in developing 
countries in order to increase the income of the rural poor and reduce world poverty. Within this 
context, supporting small farmers has become a priority.   At the same time, the agrifood sector has 
undergone an important modernization process which involves the proliferation of new and tighter 
standards, a higher degree of concentration at the wholesale, processing and retail level and a shift 
from spot market transactions to vertical coordination.  These changes have brought new opportunities 
but also new challenges for policymakers in charge of facilitating smallholder participation into 
modern food markets.    Actions so far have managed to solve many problems in the rural sector: 
contract farming, external intervention and farmers´ organizations have efficiently solved market 
failures and facilitated access to inputs, credits or technical support.  Research has focused mainly on 
exclusion problems and welfare effects of participants, but long term analysis is still missing.  High 
value chains supplied by smallholders have appeared unstable and several of them have collapsed over 
time.  Small agricultural producers could be threatened by high concentration on the buyer side, and 
farmers are facing severe hold ups which threaten their participation.     External support aiming to 
support small farmers is still clearly needed, but adequate measures need to be identified and put in 
practice in order to mitigate the dangers of participation and ensure that the possible benefits reach the 
targeted population.  
In order to contribute to the missing literature, I analyzed the implications of high transaction risks in 
the form of experienced hold ups for small farmers´ participation in an horticultural export chain.  In a 
second phase, I analyzed different marketing arrangements, their influence on the dynamics of 
standard adoption and the implications for smallholders.  First, I used a panel data set from a group of 
small Ecuadorian broccoli suppliers to empirically analyze the effects of delay of payment and high 
rejections on their extent of participation and withdrawal decisions from an export chain.  From a 
subsample of this group of farmers, I further collected experimental data using an artefactual field 
experiment to measure the effect of opportunistic behavior on farmers´ trust.   Finally I used a cross-
section data set from Costa Rican pineapple farmers to study the determinants of the type of market 
arrangement they adopted, how these arrangements influenced standard adoption and their 
consequences for income, transaction risks and relational capital (e.g. trust and loyalty).  In contrast to 
many findings on small farmers´ successful inclusion in high value markets, I found that the 
sustainability of these chains is threated by hold ups exerted by the buyer which increase transaction 
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uncertainties and deteriorate the relationship with the producer. Moreover, the level of trust shown by 
both groups is low which further threatens cooperation and sustainability of the existing arrangements.     
Chapter 2 focused on the effect of transaction risks and external negative shocks on the extent of 
participation and on withdrawal decisions from a farmers´ collection center supplying the export 
market.  The availability of longitudinal data for the analysis allowed me to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity of farmers and for multiple periods of participation.  Also, Difference GMM allowed me 
to properly analyze the dynamics of participation by correcting for the endogeneity of the lag 
dependent variable (kg delivered by the farmer) and the predetermined covariate aggregated village 
supplies.  Additionally, a CRE approach for unbalanced panels allowed me to obtain estimates for 
important time invariant variables such as membership in farmers´ group and risk aversion.   Results 
were consistent with our expectations and can confirm the hypothesis that hold ups in the way of 
rejection and delay of payment indeed increase transaction uncertainties (and therefore transaction 
costs) and thus negatively influence farmers´ participation in the long run.   Smallholders appear much 
more sensitive to high rejection rates because the produce rejected by the buyer cannot be diverted to 
the local market anymore and constitute monetary losses.    This practice (rooted either in stringency 
of standards or in opportunistic behavior on the buyer’s side) negatively influences farmers´ decisions 
who, as a result, decrease the kilograms of produce delivered to the export market and speed up their 
withdrawal from the export chain.    Delay on payment showed a smaller negative effect, although it 
becomes important when the days of delay extend for a long period. Also, farmers may accept short 
delays especially if inflation is low and if they do not have financial obligations involving high interest 
rates, but this practice becomes a serious problem in cases such as the one analyzed where farmers´ 
payments were usually delayed for more than 60 days.  Farmers´ organizations constitute institutions 
that slow down the disintegration process, but are no guarantee of loyalty after an external negative 
shock, such as the one experienced by our group when the buying exporter went bankrupt and left the 
scene without paying for the product received.  Family ties, in contrast, act in an ambiguous way.  If a 
farmer has a family member working in the collection center, he might see the agreement as more 
flexible and decide to temporarily divert his produce to other marketing channels.  However, when 
facing difficult periods, farmers seem to support their family members and remain as suppliers of the 
collection center for longer times.   We find no evidence of small farmers´ exclusion from 
participation, but vulnerable groups such as poorer or female headed households might end up locked 
into risky arrangements (in reference to an arrangement with high uncertainties after an external 
negative crisis) more easily than larger producers.       
Sustainability problems along the high value chain are reflected in the low levels of trust shown by 
farmers towards their buyers in the export market in both study cases, especially when using signed 
contracts (case of Costa Rica).    Chapter 3 explores the effect of possible opportunistic behavior (in 
the form of delayed payment) on farmers’ trust preferences.  In contrast to other studies that use 
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survey questions to measure trust, in this analysis trust was elicited through a behavioral framed field 
experiment.  For this, the group of small broccoli farmers who previously took part in a household 
survey (part of the study case described in Chapter 2) was invited to participate.   Our results take into 
account the possible sample selection introduced when only certain farmers chose to join the 
experiments.   Results showed that generalized trust towards unknown people is extremely low, which 
could hinder participation in market transactions.   The most important contribution to the empirical 
literature is the study of farmers´ behavior when exposed to positive and negative signaling coming 
from their partner.   We conclude that positive signaling (in the form of on time payment) enhances 
trust and promotes cooperation.  However, participants did not react promptly to negative signaling (in 
the form of delayed payment) and showed similar levels of trust to a control group that did not get any 
signal at all.  The reason for this absence of reaction can have two grounds: the low capacity of these 
farmers for eliciting trustworthiness or the fact that low initial trust is already a way of protection 
against opportunism.  The consequences for this slow reaction can be severe for the livelihoods of this 
vulnerable population.  Furthermore, if informal rules in the region include weak sanctions, shirking 
an agreement might be seen as acceptable and this might drive individuals back to the spot market 
where immediate exchange of product for money takes place leaving less space for opportunism.  
Chapter four focuses on the role of different market arrangements in supporting farms’ upgrading 
process and private standard compliance.  Cross-section data collected from small and medium export 
pineapple farmers in the Huetar-Norte region of Costa Rica was used to analyze the determinants of 
different market arrangements (e.g. signed contracts, verbal agreements and spot market), their 
influence on standard adoption (Organic, Global Gap and Rain Forest Alliance), and the benefits they 
bring to producers in terms of revenue and quality of the relationships with the buyer.   While verbal 
agreements only specify the quantity and time of delivery, signed contracts involve closer coordination 
with buyers facilitating the access of farmers to credits and technical assistance.    Yet, both types of 
arrangements still shift most of the risks (production and price risks) to producers.   We find evidence 
that larger farmers are more likely to engage in some kind of agreement.  However we are not clear 
whether this is a sign of exclusion based on a firm´s decision or a matter of self-selection.  Smaller 
farmers might prefer to have more flexibility to deliver their pineapple to the buyer with the best offer 
once it is ready for harvest.   Farmers´ organizations again play an important role in facilitating the 
access to formal contracts and in upgrading the farm to achieve standard adoption.   In a further 
analysis, we notice the importance of vertical coordination for speeding up standard adoption.  Even 
though this can be a signal that contracts stimulate farmers to make specific investments, prompt 
standard adoption can also be a mandatory requirement imposed by the buyer.   Finally, evidence 
suggests that the monetary benefits of engaging in a market arrangement are significantly positive as 
the farmer has a secure outlet market and can invest in a larger area, but there are no net benefits when 
comparing the revenues obtained per hectare, therefore the price obtained is not better than in the other 
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options.   The option with the better outcome for the producer seems to be an informal verbal 
arrangement because it leaves the farmer with certain flexibility for negotiation.  This is reflected in 
the higher scores for trust and loyalty towards their buyers shown by the producers holding these 
arrangements. 
5.2. Implications for policy makers. 
Contract farming involving small farmers should be accompanied by policies involving government 
support at critical points, by the development of other outlet markets and by improving collective 
action schemes.   However, it is of necessary importance to separately analyze each region and its 
important crops in order to define the best possible intervention that will achieve growth without 
endangering the livelihoods and assets of producers.  
There is an evident difference between engaging in arrangements where both parties obtain a fair gain 
and engaging in unequal arrangements where the risks are pushed to the weakest actor and the profits 
captured by the stronger one.  In the extreme cases, producers can end up locked into unfair 
agreements that in the worst case scenario (weather, pests, low prices or even a financial crisis) could 
leave them highly indebted.  But why would farmers enter these unequal arrangements?  They are 
driven by their expectations of higher incomes and stable secure markets.  Also, they can be motivated 
to join in order to find a solution for missing markets. This reality brings up an urgent need for the 
intervention of external actors that derive adequate policies to regulate agreements and monitor their 
compliance.   It has been shown that when provided with the adequate support, small and poor farmers 
are able to comply with strict safety requirements and participate in new emerging markets.  
Nonetheless, if small farmers should survive and take advantage of the new marketing opportunities, 
they have to find a way to interact in a beneficial and sustainable way with their buyers and avoid 
getting trapped in risky deals with partners enduring financial problems.  As we have seen, agricultural 
producers in general, and small farmers livelihoods in particular, could be threatened by strong 
partners and even by financial shocks over which they have absolutely no control. An adequate legal 
system and appropriate enforcement mechanisms can help balancing the power and give farmers a real 
chance of improving their livelihoods in the long run.  Our results lead us to the following set of 
recommendations for policymakers. 
New regulations and accessible third party enforcement 
In general terms, there is still the need for governments to encourage firms to work with small famers.  
Yet, besides from providing these firms with the right incentives to do so, authorities should also 
demand adequate safeguards to reduce possible opportunistic behavior on the firm side.   It is the job 
of the authorities to provide strong regulations for contract farming systems, to monitor these 
relationships and to ensure that small farmers can access third party enforcement mechanisms.  Local 
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governments can support low cost mechanisms to solve contract disputes (i.e.  implementation of a 
third-party control mechanism to increase transparency in the grading process) or provide the 
economical means to farmers´ organizations for making use of the legal system.  Producers and 
producers´ groups should also act with care and react promptly to negative signals.  Otherwise they 
could find themselves highly indebted and can end up trapped in a vicious circle where they either 
have to acquire new debts to pay the old ones and be able to continue as suppliers  or they have to sell 
their assets to honor their debts. 
Developing other markets 
If producers have other marketing options, buyers are more likely to comply with the existing 
agreements to maintain their suppliers. The local market can be attractive to small farmers because the 
quality requirements are lower, they can find a buyer regardless of the volume and the payment is on 
the spot.  Therefore, external actors should also devote resources to improve the efficiency of domestic 
chains so producers can obtain higher profits.  Additionally, these efforts will contribute to the 
upgrade of the whole agricultural sector and not only a group of peasants (usually small) trying to 
reach international markets.    
Collective action 
Farmers´ organizations play an important role in linking farmers to markets and in negotiating and 
monitoring the terms of the agreement with the buyers on one side and with the suppliers on the other.  
They are crucial for coordinating production, assuring quality and developing quality monitoring 
systems (necessary for standard compliance).  Moreover, they also solve input and financial missing 
markets by providing these services to their members and collecting the money at the end of the cycle.   
However, the existence of a producer organization does not guarantee its effectiveness.  These 
organizations also face internal and external challenges that can make them collapse.  Farmers´ 
organizations often face problems dealing with free riders who do not comply with their obligations 
bringing discomfort to the complying members.  At the same time, decisions are taken collectively 
which reduce their flexibility in comparison to private single farms.   Consequently there is also a need 
for government and other external support in this field, not only for building and enforcing 
organizations´ capacities but also for monitoring them.   More specifically, capacity building is still 
needed in the managerial areas, with special emphasis on negotiation. More importantly, farmer 
groups´ performance should be constantly measured and these organizations should be closely 
monitored by an external entity.    
 
Access to information 
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Improving the access to information can also improve the negotiation and coordination mechanisms 
between buyer and suppliers.  Both actors will profit if they get continuous updates on prices, volumes 
traded, quality requirements, business terms, and reputation of the partner.  For this, new and cheap 
technology can be used such as cellphones.  
 
5.3. Limitations and ideas for further research 
 
There are some factors that limit the scope of this study.    In this last section I highlight the major 
limitations faced and provide ideas for future research.  First, even though the panel data set used for 
Chapter 2 was very detailed regarding marketing characteristics in the export market, recall data still 
had to be collected on socio economic and farm characteristics for the 11 years which might have 
introduced some measurement error, especially for the initial years.   Additionally, there was no 
information on local market prices for the entire period under study. Local market prices obtained by 
the farmers for 2012 were collected using recall also.   Obtaining accurate values for this variable is 
quite difficult because prices in the local market are extremely volatile and can drastically change 
within days.  Nonetheless, we used this information as proxy for farmers´ bargaining power in the 
local market as this variable also plays an important role in marketing decisions. We had to assume 
that farmers negotiation abilities do not vary over time and used this proxy as a time invariant 
covariate.  Regarding the models employed for estimations, other approaches can be implemented to 
further refine the results.  In the correlated random effects model we assume a constant unobserved 
heterogeneity term for the entire period, but random slopes can be used to determine if farmers´ 
heterogeneity also varies with time or sector.   
 Additionally, there is still plenty of room for further research in the hold-ups topic, especially 
concerning downstream links of the high value chain and other marketing channels available for small 
farmers.  Understanding the relationship between exporter and importer would be of great value and 
allow us to get a better, more complete picture of the current food chain situation.  It can be the case 
that exporters also suffer hold ups that force them to behave opportunistically with their suppliers in 
order to survive in the business.   On the other hand, marketing problems faced by small farmers in the 
local market should be further analyzed to define policies that make them more efficient and therefore 
attractive to local producers.  Special emphasis should be put on the study of vulnerable groups such 
as female headed households who can be in a disadvantaged position in markets and could end up 
locked into unequal arrangements.   
Regarding experimental data, the relatively small number of participants showing up to the sessions 
might bring some limitations when identifying the treatment effect.  In addition, participants might 
have known each other because they came from the same community (communities are relatively 
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small).  Even though farmers did not know who their partners in the game were, they could have 
assumed they knew them and therefore acted in a specific way.   This study can be followed up in 
bigger farming communities and in other regions to confirm the observed behavior.  It would also be 
interesting to replicate the experiment with farmers who face higher investment costs (as is the case 
for long cycle crops such as pineapple) and to whom payment delays might affect more due to the 
interests they have to pay on their credits. Further research can also deal with the reaction of farmers 
towards other hold ups such as high rejection rates or monetary penalties for “low” quality.   
The results on relational capital (Chapter 3) rely on cross sectional survey data which can have some 
endogeneity problems related to reverse causality.  That is, farmers who show lower trust and loyalty 
from the beginning are the ones who self select into signed contracts.  The findings can be extended by 
following up on the same households and building up a panel data set that allows to control for such 
possible problems.      Finally, interviewing farmers who had bad experiences with the export market 
can become a challenge because they might be reluctant to give information or this information might 
be negatively biased.  Therefore, results drawn from subjective questions can be accompanied by 
results obtained through other methods such as experimental games where farmers behave more 
realistically.   
    
 
 
 
